

Personal Attributes and Latino Voting Behavior in Congress*

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Objective. Researchers have long examined the nature of representation, paying particular attention to the dynamics of descriptive and substantive representation in racial and ethnic communities. The objective of this article is to determine the extent to which personal attributes influence the voting behavior of Latino members of Congress. *Methods.* We test the relationship between legislator's personal attributes and Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE scores for Latino members of the 101st–108th Congresses. *Results.* After controlling for institutional and electoral factors, results show that education, gender, nativity, and generation have significant effects on Latino legislators' voting behavior. Religion and national origin appear not to have an effect. *Conclusions.* This analysis shows that personal attributes predict Latino congressional voting even when controlling for district and institutional factors. As such, this study demonstrates that Latino legislators have in-group differences and therefore should not be considered a monolithic group.

Political scientists have long examined the nature of representation, paying particular attention to the dynamics of descriptive and substantive representation in racial and ethnic communities (Pitkin, 1967).¹ Descriptive representation occurs when the representative mirrors the constituency in some way. Resemblance has come to be based on the race, ethnicity, or gender of the public and the elected representative (Hero, 1992). A growing body of literature has demonstrated that descriptive representation matters in U.S. politics. Specifically, scholars have found that women (Burrell, 1994; Welch, 1985; Tatolovich and Schier, 1993; Swers, 1998; McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006), African-American (Tate, 2003; Canon, 1999; Lublin,

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¹There are other forms of representation. For example, Pitkin (1967) discusses symbolic representation, and Mansbridge adds theories of anticipatory, surrogate, and introspective representation to the discussion (Mansbridge, 1999). However, descriptive and substantive representation dominate the literature of minority politics.

1997, Whitby, 1998), and Latino (Kerr and Miller, 1997; Lublin, 1997) representatives behave differently than their white and/or male colleagues.

Although these studies have advanced our knowledge of descriptive representation tremendously, much of the work on descriptive representation has tended to treat Latino, African-American, and female legislators as monolithic groups. We contend that the next step is to explore factors that contribute to in-group variation in the behavior of female and minority legislators. Therefore, we investigate the extent to which the personal attributes of Latino members of Congress (MCs) influence their voting behavior. This question is important for two reasons. First, the relevance of descriptive representation depends on whether descriptive attributes influence legislators' voting decisions. In other words, electing representatives who "look like" voters means little if it is, in fact, other attributes of representatives that affect policy. Second, the study of Latino congressional behavior is especially interesting given the increase in Latino representation over the past two decades at all levels of government (Geron, 2005) and the tremendous diversity of the Latino population in the United States (Uhlman and Garcia, 2002). If our results suggest that personal attributes influence congressional voting for Latino MCs, we will have evidence to suggest that voters should consider factors beyond the race, ethnicity, or gender of descriptive representatives.

Moving Beyond a Monolithic View of Descriptive Representation

A large literature has developed to understand the nature of substantive representation in Congress, with party and constituency preferences at the center of most of the research. Somewhat less attention has been paid to the role of descriptive representation in congressional voting behavior, especially for Latino members of Congress. To the extent that Latino behavior in Congress has been studied, the focus has generally been on whether Latino members of Congress (MCs) provide greater substantive representation to Latino communities than non-Latino MCs (Welch and Hibbing, 1984; Hero and Tolbert, 1995; Lublin, 1997; Kerr and Miller, 1997). To our knowledge, extant research does not investigate differences *within* the Latino block in Congress.² As such, this analysis contributes to the growing literature on the relevance of descriptive representation to substantive political outcomes.

Dovi's (2002) analysis contends that minority and female representatives are not monolithic, and that some descriptive representatives are preferable to others. We advance this argument by exploring the diversity among

²Although there has yet to be analysis of differences within the Latino congressional cohort (see Espino (2004) for an exception), recent work on African-American congressional representation has begun to explore in-group variation (Tate, 2003; Canon, 1999).

Latino MCs and investigating the extent to which the personal characteristics of Latino MCs influence their roll-call vote decisions. If the characteristics of Latino MCs do not influence their substantive voting decisions in significant ways, then it may be said that citizens should account only for race, party, and other political factors when electing Latino representatives. On the other hand, if the personal attributes of members of Congress are shown to have behavioral consequences, then we would have support for Dovi's contention that descriptive representatives vary in ways beyond their skin color.

We approach this study from the perspective that personal attributes matter to how members of Congress vote. We believe representatives' descriptive characteristics are important determinants of their ideology, a factor that students of Congress have long shown to be a key determinant of congressional voting (e.g., Kingdon, 1989; Fiorina, 1974; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Our theory is grounded in work by Easton and Dennis (1969) and Jennings and Niemi (1974), who argue that attitudes are a result of a life-long process of political socialization and learning. Our work is motivated largely by the work of de la Garza and Vaughan (1984), who find the socialization process of Latino elites to be different from that of whites, and that this unique socialization leads to distinct behaviors among Latino elites. We focus our attention on five agents of socialization for Latino members of Congress: education, religion, generation, nativity, and ancestry. We also address gender, a factor that has consistently been shown to matter to congressional behavior.

Data and Methods

The dependent variable in our study is the voting behavior of Latinos in Congress. There has been substantial debate concerning the most appropriate voting score for members of Congress. One popular approach is to utilize interest group vote scores, such as those of the National Hispanic Leadership Association (NHLA). However, recent research has found interest groups scores to be flawed—especially if one wishes to compare votes across Congresses and chambers (Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder, 1999). We therefore utilize Poole and Rosenthal's well-known DW-NOMINATE scores to measure a member's voting behavior. The scores run from -1 , which indicates most liberal, to 1 , most conservative, and allow for temporal comparability. We have multiplied the scores by 100 to simplify the interpretation (our score ranges from -100 to 100).

Though we are interested in Latino MCs' general ideology, we nonetheless ran tests of correlation between our DW-NOMINATE variable and the NHLA interest group score. We also estimated our models with unadjusted NHLA scores for the years that the score is available. The high correlation statistic and similar multivariate results suggest that the more comprehensive

DW-NOMINATE measure captures much of the nuance associated with the more specific measure, and that our results are consistent across measures.³

Our data consist of all Latinos who served between the 101st and 108th Congresses. Using NALEO's *National Directory of Latino Elected Officials* as well as the *Almanac of American Politics*, we identified 33 Latino members of the House during this timeframe. The unit of analysis is the legislator-Congress and the data take a cross-sectional time series form. Because most individuals served more than one term during this period of study, most appear more than once in the data. To account for the nonindependence across observations, we utilize OLS regression, in which we cluster individual members of Congress.

There are three sets of independent variables in the model.⁴ The first set is institutional in nature. The first of these institutional variables is the MC's party affiliation (coded 1 if the legislator is a Democrat, 0 if he or she is a Republican). Previous research has found party affiliation to be a significant contributor to congressional voting behavior (Bartels, 1991; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2001; Erikson and Wright, 2000, 2001). Therefore, we expect Latino Democrats to have more liberal voting records than those who belong to the Republican Party, holding all else constant. We also control for whether a Latino MC is a party or committee leader. As Swain (1992) and Menifield and Jones (2001) note, promotions to leadership positions introduce minority MCs to an inevitable host of cross-pressures that dampen their incentives to represent minority issues. Therefore, gaining influential positions may pressure minorities into being less responsive to their minority constituents. It is reasonable, then, to expect Latino leaders to vote more conservatively than nonleaders, holding all else constant.⁵

Some students of Congress have explored the degree to which House members become more liberal and more supportive of an expanded public sector as they become more senior (Payne, 1991; Moore and Hibbing, 1996). Specifically, Payne (1991) argues that socialization leads to MCs becoming more supportive of governmental programs and spending to

³The correlation statistics of -0.74 for the years available for NHLA scores (105th–108th Congresses) and DW-NOMINATE score suggest that the higher the NHLA score, the more liberal the member registers on the DW-NOMINATE measure. We have chosen not to present NHLA results here due to the narrow range of scores available and limited number of observations (80) for these models. However, even despite the low N problem, the results were consistent with those of the DW-NOMINATE model. Most of our descriptive attribute variables (nativity, Catholic, generational cohort, and gender) remain significant and in the predicted directions (as do the conventional institutional and electoral variables). The NHLA model is available from the authors on request.

⁴For detailed coding schemes of these variables, see the Appendix.

⁵Exactly half the Latinos who served between the 101st and 108th Congresses were committee or party leaders at least once. This is a significant—and somewhat surprising—number given most of the legislators' relatively short length of tenure (the median length of tenure is seven years, or three and a half terms). Perhaps this reflects a desire by the parties to appear more descriptively representative.

address the nation's problems. We therefore include a measure for seniority in our model, which is operationalized as the number of years a member has served as of the date he or she was first elected. We expect a member's voting record to become more liberal as he or she increases in seniority.

The second set of variables is electoral in nature. First, we use presidential vote share, a popular measure for constituency preferences (Schwarz and Fenmore, 1977; Erikson and Wright, 2000, 2001; Jacobson, 2000; Rothenberg and Sanders, 2000), to control for the effect of constituent preferences on MCs voting behavior. More specifically, following Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning (2006), we use the normalized presidential vote in each House district. This is calculated by subtracting the Democratic presidential candidate's percentage of the majority party vote in the entire nation from his percentage of the vote in the district. We expect a Latino legislator's voting record to become more liberal as his or her district votes more Democratic.

Second, we control for whether the MC represents a majority-minority district. We expect Latinos who represent majority-minority districts to vote more liberal than those from other districts. Our reasoning is straightforward. As Fiorina (1974) notes, district homogeneity improves representatives' certainty regarding their constituents' preferences, thus allowing representatives to more easily abide by voters' preferences. Heterogeneity, in contrast, decreases representatives' certainty. The result is that representatives from heterogeneous districts "play it safe" and build more moderate voting records in order to alienate as few voters as possible. Those from homogenous districts, on the other hand, tend to vote at the extremes where their constituents' preferences lie. Since most Latinos in Congress are Democrats, we believe it is reasonable to expect Latino legislators from relatively homogenous majority-minority districts to vote more liberal than those from more heterogeneous districts.

A third electoral variable is whether the legislator represents a southern district. Our expectation is that the voting behavior of southern representatives will reflect the more conservative preferences of southern voters. The final electoral variable is electoral security, measured as a member's previous vote margin. Electoral margin is a factor that has consistently been shown to affect most forms of congressional behavior (Mayhew, 1974). Because electoral security frees MCs from having to moderate their positions, we expect a Latino legislator's voting record to become more liberal as he or she becomes more secure. Each of these variables was acquired from the *Almanac of American Politics*.⁶

⁶Most of the legislators in our data set are secure in their seats (the average vote margin is 53 percent) and represent Democratic districts (the average presidential vote is 26 percent in favor of the Democratic presidential candidate). However, more than half represented non-majority minority districts at least once during the period of study (13 to be exact).

The final set of explanatory variables is personal attributes. These variables are collected from the *Almanac of American Politics*, representatives' websites, or personal phone calls to legislators' offices. As mentioned above, these variables are gender, nativity (i.e., whether the Latino representative is foreign or U.S. born), national origin (i.e., whether the representative is of Cuban descent), high school status (i.e., whether the representative attended private or public schools), level of education (i.e., whether the representative has an advanced degree), religion (i.e., Catholic or non-Catholic), and generation (i.e., whether the member is a member of the "Silent Generation," a "Baby Boomer," or a member of "Generation X"). The first attribute that we examine is gender, which has long been shown to influence congressional voting (e.g., Burrell, 1994; Welch, 1985; Tatolovich and Schier, 1993; Swers, 1998; McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006). Among other things, research finds that women are more liberal than their male counterparts in Congress, even within the same party (Burrell, 1994; Welch, 1985).

Nativity is another factor that may influence a Latino legislator's political socialization and ideology. Approximately 40 percent of all Latinos in the United States are foreign born (Ramirez, 2004). It is reasonable to argue that Latinos born outside the United States experience a political socialization different from those born and raised in the United States. Uhlaner and Garcia (2002) note that the likelihood of foreign-born Latinos identifying as Democrats increases as they gain exposure to U.S. politics. Given Latino legislators' level of U.S. political socialization, we consider it likely that they will be more liberal than their native-born colleagues. In addition to nativity we must also account for a representative's national origin, especially since the ideology and partisanship of Latinos vary according to ancestry. For example, Cubans tend to be more conservative and identify with the Republican Party at rates far greater than other Latino subgroups (Uhlaner and Garcia, 2002). Although this trend is mostly associated with Latinos in general, we expect the same trend to hold for Latino elected officials as well.

One factor that has proven to have a variety of important affects on political socialization and learning is education. First, students of socialization find that the more education citizens receive, the more liberal they become (Feldman and Newcomb, 1969). We believe the same will hold for Latino members of Congress. Second, we expect a member's *type* of schooling to impact voting behavior. For example, it is reasonable to expect private education to be a proxy for a representative's socioeconomic background. Given the well-documented relationship between class and political opinions (e.g., Stonecash, 2000), we expect that those who could afford a private education are more conservative than those who attended public school.

Generational effects have also been shown to affect the political preferences of individuals (Miller, 1992). Research generally suggests that a new batch of adults brings a new perspective to old problems like taxing and spending. These new perspectives stem from the socialization gained by "coming of age" in a technologically, socially, and politically different era

(Mannheim, 1952). Following Delli Carpini (1986) and Dennis and Owen (1997), we expect those who came of age in the 1960s—the “Baby Boomer Generation”—to exhibit more liberal ideologies than the Generation Xers who came of age one generation later. We also expect those who came of age during President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal era—the “Silent Generation”—to be more liberal than Generation Xers.⁷

Finally, religion has been shown to affect the political socialization of individuals. According to the Census Bureau, 74 percent of Latinos in the United States identify themselves as Catholic. This is consistent with our data; of the 33 Latino legislators in our data set, 28 are Catholic. We therefore limit our analysis to Catholics or non-Catholics. Despite the challenge of translating Catholics’ multidimensional ideologies into a one-dimensional continuum, we expect Catholics to vote more liberal than non-Catholics because of Catholics’ historic allegiance to the Democratic Party. As Erikson and Tedin note: “Even though the social and economic reasons for remaining Democratic no longer exist, there is a family tradition of Democratic partisanship among Catholics that keeps them from turning Republican” (2005:199). Further, Uhlaner and Garcia (2002) note that among Latinos, Catholics are more likely to support the dominant party of their national origin group, which for all but Cubans is the Democratic Party.

Results

Table 1 depicts the results for three models: a model with only institutional variables; another with institutional and electoral variables; and a third that includes personal attributes. The intent is to determine whether personal attributes add explanatory value to what previous research has determined to be significant predictors of congressional behavior—party affiliation and constituency preferences.

The first column of Table 1—Model 1—shows that of the three institutional variables, only party affiliation reaches statistical significance. Still, party explains approximately 78 percent of the variance in Latinos’ voting behavior in Congress. Specifically, Democrats vote about 73 points more liberal than Republicans, holding all else constant. The other measures for institutional status—tenure and leadership—do not determine Latinos’ voting patterns in Model 1. Do these findings hold after controlling for electoral factors?

Model 2 of Table 1 shows that electoral factors partly explain Latino legislators’ voting behavior. Introducing the electoral variables improves the overall explanatory value of the model ($R^2 = 0.86$) and dampens the

⁷We employ Neil Howe and William Strauss’s (1992) definitions of U.S. generations: Silent Generation, 1930–1942; Baby Boomers, 1943–1960; and Generation X, 1961–1979.

TABLE 1
Regression Results, Latino MC Voting Behavior (101st–108th Congresses)

Variable	Model 1 COEF (SE)	Model 2 COEF (SE)	Model 3 COEF (SE)
Democrat	− 73.03*** (5.44)	− 58.56*** (6.25)	− 63.16*** (5.54)
Tenure (years served)	0.02 (0.32)	− 0.23 (0.30)	− 0.21 (0.27)
Party or committee leader	0.96 (3.75)	2.95 (2.61)	4.98*** (1.86)
Democratic presidential vote margin		− 0.25 (0.17)	− 0.31** (0.15)
Legislator’s previous vote margin		− 0.09** (0.05)	− 0.01 (0.03)
Represents majority-minority district		− 7.83** (4.39)	− 9.57*** (3.71)
Represents southern district		15.28*** (4.10)	15.00*** (4.40)
Attended public high school			− 6.67** (3.60)
Foreign born			− 4.64* (3.15)
Cuban descent			− 3.47 (5.11)
Catholic			1.27 (4.57)
Female			− 4.91** (2.54)
Silent Generation (1930–1942)			− 39.80** (20.08)
Baby Boomer (1943–1960)			− 39.17** (19.97)
Advanced degree (MA, Ph.D., or JD)			− 6.37** (2.69)
Constant	31.36*** (5.23)	28.42*** (7.73)	79.00*** (21.06)
Observations	136	136	136
R ²	0.78	0.86	0.92

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (one-tailed).

NOTE: The dependent variable is a legislator’s ideology, measured using Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores.

independent effect of party affiliation (the other institutional variables remain insignificant). Three of the four electoral variables are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) and in the predicted directions. First, a Latino legislator votes more liberal as his or her electoral security increases, holding all else constant. The effect is not strong, however; a one-unit increase in

electoral security decreases the DW-NOMINATE by only 0.09. Needless to say, despite its statistical significance, electoral security has little substantive effect on the voting behavior of Latinos in Congress.

On the other hand, the other two variables that reach statistical significance—majority-minority district and region—have strong effects on a legislator's vote record. Specifically, those who represent majority-minority districts vote about eight points more liberal than representatives from non-majority-minority districts. Legislators from southern districts vote 15 points more conservative than their nonsouthern colleagues. Given these statistically and substantively interesting results, it is safe to conclude that the electoral variables improve on the restricted “institutional model” presented in the first column of Table 1.

Model 3 of Table 1 is the “unrestricted” model: it controls for personal attributes as well as institutional and electoral factors. Six of the eight personal characteristics are statistically significant and the overall R^2 value increases five points to 0.92. Further, each significant coefficient is in the predicted direction. First, Latino representatives' type of education matters to their voting record in Congress. Those who attended a public high school are approximately seven points more liberal than those who attended a private high school. Second, the results also indicate that Latino representatives born outside the United States vote 4.6 points more liberal than U.S.-born Latino MCs. Third, as expected, Latinas vote about five points more liberal than their male colleagues, holding all else constant. Fourth, Latino members who belong to the Silent Generation or Baby Boom Generation vote more liberal than Generation Xers. The differences are quite large; those born around the time of World War II vote about 40 points more liberal than Generation Xers. This indicates that Generation X Latinos vote more conservatively than previous generations of Latinos and that the unique socialization processes that Generation X Latinos were exposed to led them to more conservative ideologies than their predecessors. Finally, those with advanced degrees vote about six points more liberal than those who did not attend graduate school.

The only statistically insignificant personal attribute variables in the model are religion and national origin. Though unexpected, the religion finding it is not surprising given the challenge of capturing any religion's ideology on a single dimension (especially Catholics, who tend to be conservative on some social issues, such as abortion, but liberal on others, such as welfare spending). Surprisingly, national origin as reflected in our Cuban variable does not reach statistical significance. Although bivariate-level t tests indicate that Cuban representatives do vote more conservatively than other Latinos, the difference in voting behavior is not large enough to produce statistical significance in a multivariate context. This is most likely due to the high correlation between partisanship and being Cuban, as the impact of being Cuban appears to be minimized by the fact that only one of the Cuban MCs in our data set is a Democrat.

Finally, there are a few notable changes in the electoral and institutional effects after controlling for personal attributes. First, leadership status and district ideology reach statistical significance in Model 3. As expected, the results show that Latino leaders in the Democratic Party are about five points more conservative than Latino nonleaders. This is not surprising given the unique institutional and electoral constraints faced by congressional leaders discussed earlier. Second, as expected, a Latino legislator's voting record becomes more liberal as his or her district becomes more Democratic. The effect, however, is not great. For every one-unit increase in a Democratic presidential candidate's vote share in a district, a Latino legislator's DW-NOMINATE score decreases by only 0.31.

Third, electoral security is no longer statistically significant after controlling for personal attributes. This is an interesting result. We believe one explanation for the change is electoral security's covariance with Latino MCs' personal attributes. Though the collinearity is not high enough to disrupt the validity of the model, it is reasonable to argue that descriptive characteristics affect vote margins. Thus, controlling for exogenous factors such as gender, nativity, and education dampens the significance of electoral security. The relationship between electoral security and personal attributes certainly deserves further research.

In all, the results indicate that in addition to institutional and electoral factors, personal attributes partly explain Latinos' voting behavior in Congress. After controlling for other factors, such as party affiliation and constituent preferences, gender, generational cohort, nativity, and type of schooling significantly explain Latino representatives' ideology. Further, despite being limited to a narrow range of Congresses (105th–108th Congresses), results from a model estimated using NHLA scores are very similar to those presented here, suggesting that personal attributes help explain how Latino MCs vote on issues that are specific to the Latino community. Specifically, when isolating votes on issues identified by the NHLA to be salient to Latinos, the foreign born, women, baby boomers, and non-Catholics all have more liberal voting records. In short, the results show that regardless of whether one is interested in a wide range of issues, or a subset of issues salient to Latinos, personal attributes do matter.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to determine the extent to which descriptive characteristics of Latino members in Congress influence their ideological positions on votes. We included in the analysis personal attributes that research has found to be agents of political socialization and learning, and therefore important determinants of ideology in general. The findings show that descriptive attributes indeed help explain Latinos' voting record in Congress. After controlling for institutional and electoral factors,

the results show that level and type of education, gender, nativity, and generation have significant effects on voting behavior. Religion and national origin, on the other hand, do not.

This study has three important implications. The first, and perhaps most important, implication is that we show personal attributes to have policy consequences and thus empirical meaning. Dovi (2002) and others argue that the descriptive attributes of representatives have normative value, primarily because descriptive representation is a necessity for true democracy. Our results clearly show that voters have good reason to take the personal attributes of their elected officials and candidates seriously as well. Attributes such as generation, gender, and education are important agents of socialization and thus integral foundations of ideology—ideology that is expressed through the voting behavior of members of Congress. Our results confirm that personal attributes are meaningful not only across a wide range of issues, but also to those salient to Latinos. Therefore, it is clear that Latino MCs should not be interpreted as a monolithic group.

Second, this study contributes to our understanding of Latino voting behavior in Congress. Little research has examined the voting behavior of what has become a very diverse, not to mention politically relevant, segment of the U.S. Congress. As such, we felt it necessary to move beyond simple comparisons between Latino and non-Latino members of Congress and articulate the factors that explain Latino congressional behavior more specifically. By empirically testing the relationship between personal attributes and Latino ideology, we believe that we have taken an important step in the process toward a greater understanding of descriptive representation.

Still, there is much to be learned about Latino politics in Congress. With three members of the U.S. Senate, and 23 members of Congress, Latinos are becoming a greater force in national policy making. Further, with continued population increases, normal aging of their population, and greater naturalization rates, there is reason to believe that Latino representation will continue to increase. Therefore, greater knowledge of representatives from this community is both timely and valuable. Indeed, the time is ripe for a closer look into whether a greater Latino presence in Congress has any important policy, electoral, or institutional consequences.

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Appendix

TABLE A1

Variable	Coding Scheme
Ideology (DV)	DW-NOMINATE score (–100 = most liberal, 100 = most conservative)
Democrat	1 = Democrat; 0 = Republican
Tenure	Number of years served
Party or committee leader	1 = Speaker of the House, majority leader, minority leader, majority whip, minority whip, full committee chair, subcommittee chair, full committee ranking minority member, subcommittee ranking minority member; 0 = otherwise
Normalized presidential vote	Democratic candidate % in district – Democrat candidate % for nation
Previous vote margin	Incumbent vote share – Challenger vote share
Hispanic majority	1 = district's Hispanic population > 50%; 0 = otherwise
South	1 = legislator serves a Florida or Texas district; 0 = otherwise
Public high school	1 = attended public high school; 0 = private high school
Foreign born	1 = born outside United States; 0 = born in United States
Catholic	1 = Catholic; 0 = otherwise
Cuban	1 = of Cuban ancestry; 0 = otherwise
Female	1 = female; 0 = male
Silent Generation	1 = born between 1930–1942; 0 = otherwise
Baby Boomer	1 = born between 1943–1960; 0 = otherwise
Generation X (omitted)	1 = born between 1961–1979; 0 = otherwise ^a
Advanced degree	1 = has a MA, Ph.D. or JD; 0 = no graduate degree

^aThe cutoffs for the three generations were taken from Neil Howe and William Strauss's (1992) study of U.S. generations.