Joe Uscinski’s Conspiracy Theory Reference List

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(Check back for periodic updates)

"10th Anniversary 9/11 Truth Hit Piece Roundup." 2011. 911 Truth News. (July 15, 2015

"Celebrity 9/11 Conspiracy Club Still Growing." 2008. The Washington Times.

"Conspiracy Theories: Separating Fact from Fiction." 2009. Time.com. (July 13, 2013).

"Democrats and Republicans Differ on Conspiracy Theory Beliefs." 2013. Public Policy Polling. (August 3, 2013).

Aaronovitch, David. 2010. Voodoo Histories: The Role of Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History. New York: Riverhead Books.

Abalakina-Paap, Marina, Walter G. Stephan, Traci Craig, and W. Larry Gregory. 1999. "Beliefs in Conspiracies." *Political Psychology* 20: 637-47.

This study used canonical correlation to examine the relationship of 11 individual difference variables to two measures of beliefs in conspiracies. Undergraduates were administered a questionnaire that included these two measures (beliefs in specific conspiracies and attitudes toward the existence of conspiracies) and scales assessing the 11 variables. High levels of anomie, authoritarianism, and powerlessness, along with a low level of self-esteem, were related to beliefs in specific conspiracies, whereas high levels of external locus of control and hostility, along with a low level of trust, were related to attitudes toward the existence of conspiracies in general. These findings support the idea that beliefs in conspiracies are related to feelings of alienation, powerlessness, hostility, and being disadvantaged. There was no support for the idea that people believe in conspiracies because they provide simplified explanations of complex events.

Abramowicz, Michael. (2008). Predictocracy: Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper.

Subjects with some religious affiliation are more prejudiced than those without affiliation, but no significant difference between Protestants and Catholics. There is a low but significant negative relation of intelligence and education to ethnocentrism. Interviews threw light on parental relations, childhood, conception of self, and dynamics and organization of personality. Projective techniques are described and results analyzed. 63 interviews are analyzed qualitatively for prejudice, political and economic ideas, religious ideology and syndromes among high and low scorers. The development of two contrasting cases is given. Criminality and antidemocratic trends in prison inmates and a study of clinic patients complete the investigation of the authoritarian personality pattern.

Ahlquist, J. S., et al. (2014). " Alien Abduction and Voter Impersonation in the 2012 U.S. General Election: Evidence from a Survey List Experiment." *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.* 13(4): 460-475.

State legislatures around the United States have entertained—and passed—laws requiring voters to present various forms of state-issued identification in order to cast ballots. Proponents argue that such laws protect the integrity of the electoral process, sometimes claiming that fraudulent voting is widespread. We report the results of a survey list experiment fielded immediately after the 2012 U.S. general election designed to measure the prevalence of one specific type of voter fraud most relevant to voter ID laws: voter impersonation. We find no evidence of widespread voter impersonation, even in the states most contested in the presidential or statewide campaigns. We also find that states with strict voter ID laws and states with same-day voter registration are no different from others in the (non) existence of voter impersonation. To address possible “lower bound” problems with our conclusions we run both parallel and subsequent experiments to calibrate our findings. These ancillary list experiments indicate that the proportion of the population reporting voter impersonation is indistinguishable from that reporting abduction by extraterrestrials. Based on this evidence, strict voter ID requirements address a problem that was certainly not common in the 2012 U.S. election. Effort to improve American election infrastructure and security would be better directed toward other initiatives.

Aistrope, Tim. 2013. "Conspiracy Discourse and the Occupy Movement." *Global Change, Peace & Security* 25(1): 113-18.

Akerlof, G. A., and R. J. Shiller. (2015) "Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception." Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Akhtar, A. S., and A. N. Ahmad. (2015) "Conspiracy and Statecraft in Postcolonial States: Theories and Realities of the Hidden Hand in Pakistan’s War on Terror." *Third World Quarterly* 36(1): 94-110.

This paper is a cautiously sympathetic treatment of conspiracy theory in Pakistan, relating it to Marxist theories of the state, structural functionalism and Machiavellian realism in international relations. Unlike moralising mainstream news reports describing terrorism in terms of horrific events and academic research endlessly lamenting the ‘failure’, ‘weakness’ and mendacity of the Pakistani state, conspiracy theory has much in common with realism in its cynical disregard for stated intentions and insistence on the primacy of inter-state rivalry. It contains a theory of the postcolonial state as part of a wider international system based on class-conspiracy, wedding imperial interests to those of an indigenous elite, with little concern for preserving liberal norms of statehood. Hence we consider some forms of conspiracy theory a layperson’s theory of the capitalist state, which seeks to explain history with reference to global and domestic material forces, interests and structures shaping outcomes, irrespective of political actors’ stated intentions. While this approach may be problematic in its disregard for intentionality and ideology, its suspicion of the notion that the ‘War on Terror’ should be read morally as a battle between states and ‘non-state actors’ is understandable – especially when technological and political-economic changes have made the importance of impersonal economic forces driving towards permanent war more relevant than ever.

Aldrich, J. H., and R. D. Mckelvey. (1977) "A Method of Scaling with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections." *The American Political Science Review* 71(1): 111-130.

A method of scaling is proposed to estimate the positions of candidates and voters on a common issue dimension. The scaling model assumes that candidates occupy true positions in an issue space and that individual level perceptual data arise from this in a two step process. The first step consists of a stochastic component, satisfying the standard Gauss Markov assumptions, which reflects true misperception. The second step consists of a linear distortion which is introduced in the survey situation. Estimates of the parameters of the model are developed by applying the least squares criterion, and distributions of the estimates are investigated by Monte Carlo methods.The scaling technique is applied to the seven-point issue scales asked in the 1968 and 1972 SRC survey. The resulting ideal point estimates are related to candidate positions in 1968 to test a simple Downsian voting model.

Allman, Matthew J. 2010. "Swift Boat Captains of Industry for Truth: Citizens United and the Illogic of the Natural Person Theory of Corporate Personhood." *Fla. St. UL Rev.* 38: 387.

Allport, G. W., and L. J. Postman. 1947. The Psychology of Rumor. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

The authors' goal is a basic textbook on rumor containing all the relevant information. Rumor is classed as one of the many forms of human communication "that are not rigidly constrained by objective and impersonal standards of truth," and in which the essential principle involves the "tendencies to level, to sharpen, and to assimilate to personal and cultural contexts." There are chapters on rumor in wartime, on experimental studies of testimony, recall and rumor, and on the psychological analysis and social importance of rumor. There is a 4-page bibliography and an appendix: "standards for agencies working on the prevention and control of wartime rumor."

Altemeyer, Robert. 1996. The Authoritarian Specter. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Anderegg, W. R., and G. R. Goldsmith. (2014) "Public Interest in Climate Change over the past Decade and the Effects of the ‘climategate’ Media Event." *Environmental Research Letters* 9(5): 054005.

Despite overwhelming scientific consensus concerning anthropogenic climate change, many in the non-expert public perceive climate change as debated and contentious. There is concern that two recent high-profile media events—the hacking of the University of East Anglia emails and the Himalayan glacier melt rate presented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change—may have altered public opinion of climate change. While survey data is valuable for tracking public perception and opinion over time, including in response to climate-related media events, emerging methods that facilitate rapid assessment of spatial and temporal patterns in public interest and opinion could be exceptionally valuable for understanding and responding to these events' effects. We use a novel, freely-available dataset of worldwide web search term volumes to assess temporal patterns of interest in climate change over the past ten years, with a particular focus on looking at indicators of climate change skepticism around the high-profile media events. We find that both around the world and in the US, the public searches for the issue as 'global warming,' rather than 'climate change,' and that search volumes have been declining since a 2007 peak. We observe high, but transient spikes of search terms indicating skepticism around the two media events, but find no evidence of effects lasting more than a few months. Our results indicate that while such media events are visible in the short-term, they have little effect on salience of skeptical climate search terms on longer time-scales.

Anderegg, W. R. L., et al. (2010) "Expert Credibility in Climate Change." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107(27): 12107-2109.

Although preliminary estimates from published literature and expert surveys suggest striking agreement among climate scientists on the tenets of anthropogenic climate change (ACC), the American public expresses substantial doubt about both the anthropogenic cause and the level of scientific agreement underpinning ACC. A broad analysis of the climate scientist community itself, the distribution of credibility of dissenting researchers relative to agreeing researchers, and the level of agreement among top climate experts has not been conducted and would inform future ACC discussions. Here, we use an extensive dataset of 1,372 climate researchers and their publication and citation data to show that (*i*) 97–98% of the climate researchers most actively publishing in the field surveyed here support the tenets of ACC outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and (*ii*) the relative climate expertise and scientific prominence of the researchers unconvinced of ACC are substantially below that of the convinced researchers.

Anderson, Benedict. 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New Edition). New York, NY: Verso.

Ansolabehere, S. (2012). Cooperative Congressional Election Study: Common Content Release 1. H. University. Cambridge, MA, USA http://cces.gov.havard.edu.

Anthony, S. 1973. "Anxiety and Rumor." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 89: 91-98.

This study explored rumor transmission as a function of the anxiety of the group exposed to that rumor. Four eight-member groups which were designated either as high anxiety or low anxiety on the basis of scores on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS) were presented with a rumor through a sociometrically selected individual. Issues relevant to the groups, with basic similarities across all four groups, were selected as the rumors. That these topics were equally important to the individuals involved is testified to by the fact that importance rating on these issues at the conclusion of the study did not differ significantly among the groups. As predicted, the groups that were high anxious when confronted with a rumor of importance transmitted that rumor throughout that group with a higher frequency than did the groups of low anxious members when confronted with an issue of importance. A model of rumor transmission dependent upon anxiety was proposed.

Apt, C. C. (1983). The anti-smoking industry. Retrieved from http://lefgacy.library.ucsf.edy/tid/vob81f00.

Arnold, Gordon B. 2008. Conspiracy Theory in Film, Television, and Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Arnold, Gordon B. 2008. Conspiracy Theory in Film, Television, and Politics: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Aron, Jacob. 2012. "Metal Detector Knows How Much Cash Is in Your Wallet." *New Scientist* 213: 23.

Atkinson, Matthew, and Joseph E Uscinski. 2013. "Why Do People Believe in Conspiracy Theories? The Role of Informational Cues and Predispositions."

Conspiratorial beliefs are currently salient in both the media and among scholarly researchers. Why do people believe in conspiracy theories? This note addresses three major explanations of conspiratorial belief: informational cues, political ideology, and predispositions toward conspiratorial views. Using a national survey experiment, we test the effect of an informational cue on belief in a conspiracy theory impugning the media while accounting for partisanship and conspiratorial predispositions. Our results suggest the conditions under which conspiratorial beliefs can flourish, and provide an explanation for individual heterogeneity in the holding of conspiratorial beliefs.

Aupers, Stef. 2012. "‘Trust No One’: Modernization, Paranoia and Conspiracy Culture." *European Journal of Communication* 27: 22-34.

Popular conspiracy theories, like those about JFK, the attacks of 9/11, the death of Princess Diana or the swine flu vaccination, are generally depicted in the social sciences as pathological, irrational and, essentially, anti-modern. In this contribution it is instead argued that conspiracy culture is a radical and generalized manifestation of distrust that is embedded in the cultural logic of modernity and, ultimately, produced by processes of modernization. In particular, epistemological doubts about the validity of scientific knowledge claims, ontological insecurity about rationalized social systems like the state, multinationals and the media; and a relentless ‘will to believe’ in a disenchanted world – already acknowledged by Adorno, Durkheim, Marx and Weber – nowadays motivate a massive turn to conspiracy culture in the West.

Avery, Dylan. 2009. Loose Change 9/11: An American Coup: Microcinema International.

Avery, James M. 2006. "The Sources and Consequences of Political Mistrust among African Americans." *American Politics Research* 34: 653-82.

This study calls into question the current wisdom in the political trust literature maintaining that trust in government, for all citizens, represents satisfaction with short-term political and policy performance and does not affect political participation. I argue, first, that the sources of political trust among African Americans are distinct from those of Whites: Trust among African Americans follows more from racial group consciousness than from short-term political and policy evaluations. Second, I argue that lack of trust among African Americans is associated with a greater propensity to engage in protest types of participation. The findings support these hypotheses and suggest that lack of trust among Blacks represents displeasure with the political system.

Babcock, Linda, and George Loewenstein. 2000. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases." In Behavioral Law and Economics, ed. Cass Sunstein. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Baehr, Peter, and Daniel Gordon. 2012. "Unmasking and Disclosure as Sociological Practices Contrasting Modes for Understanding Religious and Other Beliefs." *Journal of Sociology* 48: 380-96.

Unmasking is a recurrent feature of modern sociology and cultural criticism. While *false consciousness* is imputed by intellectuals to religious groups and to certain social classes, *unmasking* is, or claims to be, a corrective performed by intellectuals themselves. Unmasking supposes that enlightened enquirers are able to help the less rational to understand their real interests; a type of exposure, it offers a cognitive tool of emancipation. This article (a) examines *unmasking*; and (b) contrasts it with an approach to understanding that we call *disclosure*. Our claim is that disclosure is more attuned to the full keyboard of social action, and less demeaning of its players, than unmasking is. Disclosure attempts to grasp what actions are like for those who enact them. Nothing has been more often or consistently unmasked and with more venom than religion. It is the main example explored in this article.

Bailyn, Bernard. 1992. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Banas, John A., and Gregory Miller. 2013. "Inducing Resistance to Conspiracy Theory Propaganda: Testing Inoculation and Metainoculation Strategies." *Human Communication Research* 39: 184-207.

This investigation examined the boundaries of inoculation theory by examining how inoculation can be applied to conspiracy theory propaganda as well as inoculation itself (called metainoculation). A 3-phase experiment with 312 participants compared 3 main groups: no-treatment control, inoculation, and metainoculation. Research questions explored how inoculation and metainoculation effects differ based on the argument structure of inoculation messages (fact- vs. logic-based). The attack message was a 40-minute chapter from the 9/11 Truth conspiracy theory film, Loose Change: Final Cut. The results indicated that both the inoculation treatments induced more resistance than the control message, with the fact-based treatment being the most effective. The results also revealed that metainoculation treatments reduced the efficacy of the inoculation treatments.

Barkun, Machael. 2006. A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America Berkeley. CA: University of California Press.

Baron, Hans. 1966. The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Barone, Michael. 2010. "Dems Sour on Obama's "Good War" in Afghanistan " The Washington Examiner. (September 11, 2013).

Barreto, Matt A., Betsy L. Cooper, Benjamin Gonzalez, Christopher S. Parker, and Christopher Towler. 2012. "The Tea Party in the Age of Obama: Mainstream Conservatism or out-Group Anxiety?" *Political Power and Social Theory* 22.

With its preference for small government and fiscal responsibility, the Tea Party movement claims to be conservative. Yet, their tactics and rhetoric belie this claim. The shrill attacks against Blacks, illegal immigrants, and gay rights are all consistent with conservatism, but suggesting that the president is a socialist bent on ruining the country, is beyond politics. This chapter shows that Richard Hofstadter's thesis about the “paranoid style” of American politics helps characterize the Tea Party's pseudo-conservatism. Through a comprehensive analysis of qualitative interviews, content analysis and public opinion data, we find that Tea Party sympathizers are not mainstream conservatives, but rather, they hold a strong sense of out-group anxiety and a concern over the social and demographic changes in America.

Barrett, Kevin. 2013. "New Studies: ‘Conspiracy Theorists’ Sane; Government Dupes Crazy, Hostile." PressTV. (August 14, 2013).

Bartlett, Jamie, and Carl Miller. 2010. "The Power of Unreason: Conspiracy Theories, Extremism and Counter-Terrorism." *London: Demos*.

Basham, Lee. 2003. "Malevolent Global Conspiracy." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 34: 91-103.

Bedard, Paul. 2011. "Nra Boss: Obama's Gone in 2012." *US News and World Report*, (June 27).

Berinsky, Adam. 2012. "The Birthers Are (Still) Back." YouGov: What the World Thinks.

———. "Poll Shows False Obama Beliefs a Function of Partisanship." Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-berinsky/poll-shows-false-obama-be\_b\_714503.html.

———. 2012. "Rumors, Truths, and Reality: A Study of Political Misinformation." In http://web.mit.edu/berinsky/www/files/rumor.pdf. MIT.

———. 2013. "Telling the Truth About Believing the Lies?" Paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, August 28th, 2013.

Berlet, Chip. 2012. "Collectivists, Communists, Labor Bosses, and Treason: The Tea Parties as Right-Wing Populist Counter-Subversion Panic." *Critical Sociology* 38: 565-87.

The Tea Parties are a right-wing populist movement echoing earlier episodes of white nationalism in the USA. Power elites have encouraged similar counter-subversion panics using populist rhetoric and producerist narratives to enlist a mass base to defend their unfair power, privilege, and wealth. Typically, a large, middle-class white constituency sides with organized wealth as a way to defend their relative and precarious position in society. The blame for economic, political, and social tensions is transferred away from free market capitalism to mythical conspiracies of collectivists, communists, labor bosses, and other scapegoated subversives and traitors. At the same time, defense of unequal racial and gender hierarchies can be mobilized as part of these counter-subversion efforts. Patriots, economic libertarians, Christian dominionists, militia activists, nativists, and ethnic nationalists fit under the Tea Party umbrella in an uneasy coalition ostensibly built around reversing the ‘big government’ policies of the Obama administration.

Berlet, C. 1992. "Friendly Fascists: The Far Right Tries to Movi in on the Left." *The Progressive* 56: 16-20.

Berman, Ari. 2011. "The Gop War on Voting." Rolling Stone. (September 10, 2013 ).

Betts, Stephen. 2010. "Local Residents Claim Regional Road Planning Is International Plot." Waldo Village Soup.

Bey, Hakim. "The Ontological Status of Conspiracy Theory." *Zero News Datapool, Available online at:< http://www. t0. or. at/hakimbey/conspire. htm*.

Biggs, Andrew G. 2012. "Cato's Mr. Biggs on the Social Security Mess."

Bignell, Paul. 2011. "Secret Memos Expose Link between Oil Firms and Invasion of Iraq." *The Independent* 19.

Bilewicz, Michal, and Ireneusz Krzeminski. 2010. "Anti-Semitism in Poland and Ukraine: The Belief in Jewish Control as a Mechanism of Scapegoating." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 4: 234-43.

Systemic transition in post-communist Eastern Europe resulted in high inflation, rapid economic changes, and increased lack of control in everyday life. At the same time, anti-Semitic incidents were reported in this region after 1989. The ideological model of scapegoating (Glick 2002; 2005) might serve as an explanation of anti-Semitic prejudice in post-transition Eastern Europe. The model predicts that the ideology defining Jews as powerful, cunning, and dangerous would gain popularity in times of crises and would lead to greater discrimination against Jews. In two nationwide representative sample studies of anti-Semitism, in Poland (n = 1098) and Ukraine (n = 1000), we applied the ideological model of scapegoating to study various forms of anti-Semitism(conspiracy-based belief in Jewish control and discriminatory intentions toward Jews). In both samples, economic deprivation led to increased discriminatory intentions toward Jews; however, only in the Polish sample was deprivation linked with higher beliefs in Jewish control (scapegoat-defining ideology). In Poland the rise of conspiracy beliefs about Jewish control partially explained the effect of deprivation on discriminatory intentions toward Jews. The implications of these results are discussed.

Bilewicz, Michal, Mikołaj Winiewski, Mirosław Kofta, and Adrian Wójcik. 2013. "Harmful Ideas, the Structure and Consequences of Anti-Semitic Beliefs in Poland." *Political Psychology* n/a-n/a.

The harmfulness of anti-Semitic beliefs is widely discussed in current political and legal debates (e.g., *Cutler v. Dorn*). At the same time, empirical studies of the psychological consequences of such beliefs are scarce. The present research is an attempt to explore the structure of contemporary anti-Semitic beliefs in Poland—and to evaluate their predictive role in discriminatory intentions and behavior targeting Jews. Another aim was to determine dispositional, situational, and identity correlates of different forms of anti-Semitic beliefs and behavior. Study 1, performed on a nation-wide representative sample of Polish adults (N = 979), suggests a three-factorial structure of anti-Semitic beliefs, consisting of: (1) belief in Jewish conspiracy, (2) traditional religious anti-Judaic beliefs, and (3) secondary anti-Semitic beliefs, focusing on Holocaust commemoration. Of these three beliefs, belief in Jewish conspiracy was the closest antecedent of anti-Semitic behavioral intentions. Study 2 (N = 600 Internet users in Poland) confirmed the three-factor structure of anti-Semitic beliefs and proved that these beliefs explain actual behavior toward Jews in monetary donations. Both studies show that anti-Semitic beliefs are related to authoritarian personality characteristics, victimhood-based social identity, and relative deprivation.

Blair, J Anthony. 2012. "The Keegstra Affair: A Test Case for Critical Thinking." In Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Springer. 13-22.

Bleyer, Willard Grosvenor. 1927. Main Currents in the History of American Journalism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Bock, Alan W. 1993. "Ambush at Ruby Ridge." Reason Magazine. (July 7, 2013).

Boden, Matthew Tyler, and Howard Berenbaum. 2012. "Facets of Emotional Clarity and Suspiciousness." *Personality and Individual Differences*.

In a college student sample, we explored the relations between individual differences in facets of emotional clarity and suspiciousness. Previous theory and research has treated emotional clarity as a one-dimensional construct. Boden and Berenbaum (2011) proposed that a second facet of emotional clarity, source awareness (a general understanding of the cause of their emotions), could be distinguished from type awareness (a general understanding of the type of emotions [anger, fear] experienced). We found that source and type awareness were incrementally, inversely associated with suspiciousness when statistically accounting for the extent to which emotions are attended to, and gender. Additionally, source awareness significantly predicted suspiciousness after accounting for anger, anxious arousal, and social anxiety, whereas type awareness did not. Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, among individuals with low source and type awareness, suspicious beliefs are formed to make sense of and explain emotional arousal.

Bolyard, Paula. 2012. "Why Occupy Values Lead to Occupy Violence: The Postmodern Seeds of Radical Criminality." PJMedia.com. (August 10, 2013).

Booth, Stephanie. 2011. "A Slew of Suspects." *Psychology Today*.

Bost, Preston R., and Stephen G. Prunier. 2013. "Rationality in Conspiracy Beliefs: The Role of Perceived Motive." *Psychological Reports: Sociocultural Issues in Psychology* 113: 118-28.

Bost, Preston R, and Stephen G Prunier. 2013. "Rationality in Conspiracy Beliefs: The Role of Perceived Motive 1." *Psychological Reports* 113: 118-28.

Previous work has raised the possibility that the perception of motive may contribute to conspiracy beliefs. The current study tested the prediction that conspiracy beliefs will strengthen as the apparent motive of the alleged conspirators strengthens. Participants (N = 57) rated the plausibility of fictional conspiracy theories, manipulated for the strength of direct evidence for the conspiracy and the type of outcome (gain vs. no gain) experienced by the alleged conspirators after the event. Ratings revealed that participants were more likely to believe conspiracy claims not only if the evidence was strong but also if the apparent motive was high, and that the effect of apparent motive was independent of the strength of the evidence. The findings suggested that information about apparent motive may help create and sustain conspiracy beliefs.

Bost, P. R. , S. G. Prunier, and A. J. Piper. 2010. "Relations with Familiarity with Reasoning Strategies in Conspiracy Beliefs." *Psychological Reports* 107: 593-602.

The prevalence and resilience of conspiracy beliefs suggest that such beliefs may derive in part from general information-processing mechanisms. Two predictions were tested: conspiracy beliefs would increase as familiarity with the conspiracy increased, and conspiracy beliefs would rest in part on the perception of the alleged conspirators’ motive. Participants read condensed versions of four real-life conspiracy theories of varying familiarity, rated their belief in the conspiracies, and explained their ratings. Although belief was not associated with familiarity, participants used different justifications for their beliefs about familiar and unfamiliar conspiracies, relying prominently on motive when the conspiracy was unfamiliar. Preliminary data suggested that participants’ beliefs in conspiracies may have been equally strong when they reasoned only in terms of motive as when they reasoned in terms of documented evidence. An additional finding suggested also that beliefs in conspiracies may increase as affiliation with the victim of the alleged conspiracy increases.

Boudry, Maarten, and Johan Braeckman. 2011. "Immunizing Strategies and Epistemic Mechanisms." *Philosophia* 39: 145-61.

An immunizing strategy is an argument brought forward in support of a belief system, though independent from that belief system, which makes it more or less invulnerable to rational argumentation and/or empirical evidence. By contrast, an epistemic defense mechanism is defined as a structural feature of a belief system which has the same effect of deflecting arguments and evidence. We discuss the remarkable recurrence of certain patterns of immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms in pseudoscience and other belief systems. Five different types will be distinguished and analyzed, with examples drawn from widely different domains. The difference between immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms is analyzed, and their epistemological status is discussed. Our classification sheds new light on the various ways in which belief systems may achieve invulnerability against empirical evidence and rational criticism, and we propose our analysis as part of an explanation of these belief systems’ enduring appeal and tenacity.

Bowden, Mark. 1999. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.

Brady, David W., John Ferejohn, and Laurel Harbridge. 2008. "Polarization and Public Policy: A General Assessment." In Red and Blue Nation: Consequences and Correction of America's Polarized Politics, eds. Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady. Vol. 2. Washington D.C.: Brookings Hoover Institution Press.

Bratich, Jack Z. 2008. Conspiracy Panics: Political Rationality and Popular Culture. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Bratich, Jack Zeljko. 2004. "Trust No One (on the Internet): The Cia-Crack-Contra Conspiracy Theory and Professional Journalism." *Television & New Media* 5: 109-39.

This article examines the “metastory” surrounding Gary Webb’s 1996 “Dark Alliance” series as a moment of crisis in mainstream journalism. Two forces converge in Webb’s series and its aftermath: (1) establishment journalism confronts and manages the reemergent phenomenon of conspiracy theory, and (2) establishment print-based journalism attempts to organize a relationship with the emergent medium of the internet. When these two forces collide in the profession, conspiracy theories and the web end up mutually defining each other. This problematization of a conspiracy theory has multiple effects—not only in disqualifying the story itself but in reshaping the profession of journalism in its relation to new technology. Eschewing technological determinism, this article demonstrates how a new technology is made sensible through a professional discourse as a way of making it manageable. In turn, professional journalism operates as technical expertise in a liberal political rationality of “governing at a distance.”

Brewer, Paul R. 2004. "Public Trust in (or Cynicism About) Other Nations across Time." *Political Behavior* 26: 317-41.

This study uses survey data from 1994 and 1999 to examine the nature, causes, and consequences of Americans’ generalized beliefs about other nations during the decade prior to September 11, 2001—a relatively sedate era in international relations compared to the Cold War and post-September 11 periods. As was the case after the terrorist attacks, relatively few citizens expressed high levels of trust in other nations; more did in 1999 than in 1994, however. Partisanship, beliefs about government, age, and education were related to trust in other nations at the individual level, with some of these relationships varying over time. Trust in other nations, in turn, was related to preferences for diplomacy and support for military interventions. The strength of the former relationship varied over time, whereas the nature of the latter relationship depended on the nature of the intervention in question. The findings raise the question of why so few Americans trust other nations not only during periods of external threat but also during “quieter” times.

Bricker, Brett Jacob. 2013. "Climategate: A Case Study in the Intersection of Facticity and Conspiracy Theory." *Communication Studies* 64: 218-39.

In 2009, the Climate Research Unit had over 1,000 private e-mails stolen and made publicly available. Quickly, several of the e-mails were widely reported in the media: supposedly providing proof of conspiracy among scientists supporting the Anthropogenic Climate Change hypothesis. Despite the inaccuracy of the accusations, the charge of conspiracy stuck. In this essay, I argue that a set of interrelated variables (existing anti-elitism, the consistency of the charge with existing ideology, the perceived accuracy of the narrative, and the poor rhetorical response by the accused) caused the Climategate conspiracy to resonate even after the charge was proven false. This essay adds to contemporary rhetorical theory about conspiracy theory by considering variables beyond paranoid style and accuracy of the charge.

Briggs, Charles L. 2004. "Theorizing Modernity Conspiratorially: Science, Scale, and the Political Economy of Public Discourse in Explanations of a Cholera Epidemic." *American Ethnologist* 31: 164-87.

When some five hundred people in eastern Venezuela died from cholera in 1992–93, officials responded by racializing the dead as “indigenous people” and suggesting that “their culture” was to blame. Stories that circulated in affected communities talked back to official accounts, alleging that the state, global capitalism, and international politics were complicit in a genocidal plot. It is easy to attribute such conspiracy theories to differences of culture and epistemology. I argue, rather, that how political economies position different players in the processes through which public discourses circulate, excluding some communities from access to authoritative sources of information and denying them means of transforming their narratives into public discourse, provides a more fruitful line of analysis. In this article I use—and talk back to—research on science studies, globalization, and public discourse to think about how conspiracy theories can open up new ways for anthropologists to critically engage the contemporary politics of exclusion and help us all find strategies for survival.

Briones, Rowena, Xiaoli Nan, Kelly Madden, and Leah Waks. 2011. "When Vaccines Go Viral: An Analysis of Hpv Vaccine Coverage on Youtube." *Health Communication* 27: 478-85.

This article reports a content analysis of YouTube videos related to the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine. In total, 172 YouTube videos were examined with respect to video sources, tones, and viewer responses. Additionally, coverage of specific content was analyzed through the lens of the Health Belief Model (Rosenstock, 1974) and in terms of two content themes (i.e., conspiracy theory and civil liberties). The relations among these aspects of the videos were assessed as well. We found that most of these videos were news clips or consumer-generated content. The majority of the videos were negative in tone, disapproving of the HPV vaccine. In addition, negative videos were liked more by the viewers than positive or ambiguous ones. Accusations of conspiracy theory and infringement of civil liberties were manifested in these videos. The videos also presented mixed information related to the key determinants of health behavior as stipulated in the Health Belief Model. Implications for the findings are discussed.

Brotherton, Robert, and Christopher C. French. 2014. "Belief in Conspiracy Theories and Susceptibility to the Conjunction Fallacy." *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 28: 238-48.

People who believe in the paranormal have been found to be particularly susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. The present research examines whether the same is true of people who endorse conspiracy theories. Two studies examined the association between conspiracist ideation and the number of conjunction violations made in a variety of contexts (neutral, paranormal and conspiracy). Study 1 found that participants who endorsed a range of popular conspiracy theories more strongly also made more conjunction errors than participants with weaker conspiracism, regardless of the contextual framing of the conjunction. Study 2, using an independent sample and a generic measure of conspiracist ideation, replicated the finding that conspiracy belief is associated with domain-general susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. The findings are discussed in relation to the association between conspiracism and other anomalous beliefs, the representativeness heuristic and the tendency to infer underlying causal relationships connecting ostensibly unrelated events. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Brotherton, Robert, Christopher C. French, and Alan D. Pickering. 2013. "Measuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale." *Frontiers in Psychology* 4.

People who believe in the paranormal have been found to be particularly susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. The present research examines whether the same is true of people who endorse conspiracy theories. Two studies examined the association between conspiracist ideation and the number of conjunction violations made in a variety of contexts (neutral, paranormal and conspiracy). Study 1 found that participants who endorsed a range of popular conspiracy theories more strongly also made more conjunction errors than participants with weaker conspiracism, regardless of the contextual framing of the conjunction. Study 2, using an independent sample and a generic measure of conspiracist ideation, replicated the finding that conspiracy belief is associated with domain-general susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. The findings are discussed in relation to the association between conspiracism and other anomalous beliefs, the representativeness heuristic and the tendency to infer underlying causal relationships connecting ostensibly unrelated events. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Bruder, Martin, Peter Haffke, Nick Neave, Nina Nouripanah, and Roland Imhoff. 2013. "Measuring Individual Differences in Generic Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories across Cultures: The Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (Cmq)." *Frontiers in Psychology* 4.

Conspiracy theories are ubiquitous when it comes to explaining political events and societal phenomena. Individuals differ not only in the degree to which they believe in specific conspiracy theories, but also in their general susceptibility to explanations based on such theories, that is, their conspiracy mentality. We present the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), an instrument designed to efficiently assess differences in the generic tendency to engage in conspiracist ideation within and across cultures. The CMQ is available in English, German, and Turkish. In four studies, we examined the CMQ’s factorial structure, reliability, measurement equivalence across cultures, and its convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity. Analyses based on a cross-cultural sample (Study 1a; N = 7,766) supported the conceptualization of conspiracy mentality as a one-dimensional construct across the three language versions of the CMQ that is stable across time (Study 1b; N = 141). Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated cross-cultural measurement equivalence of the CMQ items. The instrument could therefore be used to examine differences in conspiracy mentality between European, North American, and Middle Eastern cultures. In Studies 2–4 (total N = 476), we report (re-)analyses of three datasets demonstrating the validity of the CMQ in student and working population samples in the UK and Germany. First, attesting to its convergent validity, the CMQ was highly correlated with another measure of generic conspiracy belief. Second, the CMQ showed patterns of meaningful associations with personality measures (e.g., Big Five dimensions, schizotypy), other generalized political attitudes (e.g., social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism), and further individual differences (e.g., paranormal belief, lack of socio-political control). Finally, the CMQ predicted beliefs in specific conspiracy theories over and above other individual difference measures.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1981. "Quotation of the Day." The New York Times. (July 31, 2013).

Buell, Emmett H. 1975. "Eccentrics or Gladiators? People Who Write About Politics in Letters-to-the-Editor." *Social Science Quarterly* 56: 440-49.

Drawing on an ethnographic study, this article describes how the editorial-page staff at one San Francisco Bay newspaper think of the letter-writing public. It is suggested that the staff are skeptical about the value of the letters section as a site for democratic communication because of what they perceive as the poor quality of public participation, as well as the non-representativeness of the letter-writers. To be more specific, the editors speak the ‘idiom of insanity’, which plays off the idea that contributors to the section – the members of the letter-writing public – are insane or ‘crazy’. This article examines the manifestations of the idiom of insanity and analyses its implications for deliberative democracy; it also suggests that the use of the idiom of insanity is a way for the staff to distance themselves from their work on letters to the editor, and renounce their responsibility to make democracy work.

Buenting, Joel, and Jason Taylor. 2010. "Conspiracy Theories and Fortuitous Data." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 40: 567-78.

We offer a particularist defense of conspiratorial thinking. We explore the possibility that the presence of a certain kind of evidence—what we call “fortuitous data”—lends rational credence to conspiratorial thinking. In developing our argument, we introduce conspiracy theories and motivate our particularist approach (§1). We then introduce and define fortuitous data (§2). Lastly, we locate an instance of fortuitous data in one real world conspiracy, the Watergate scandal (§3).

Bugliosi, Vincent, and Marc Cashman. 2008. The Prosecution of George W. Bush for Murder: Vanguard Press New York.

Bullock, John G. 2011. "Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate." *American Political Science Review* 105: 496-515.

An enduring concern about democracies is that citizens conform too readily to the policy views of elites in their own parties, even to the point of ignoring other information about the policies in question. This article presents two experiments that undermine this concern, at least under one important condition. People rarely possess even a modicum of information about policies; but when they do, their attitudes seem to be affected at least as much by that information as by cues from party elites. The experiments also measure the extent to which people think about policy. Contrary to many accounts, they suggest that party cues do not inhibit such thinking. This is not cause for unbridled optimism about citizens' ability to make good decisions, but it is reason to be more sanguine about their ability to use information about policy when they have it.

Bullock, John G., Alan Gerber, and Gregory Huber. 2010. "Partisan Bias in Responses to Factual Questions." *SSRN eLibrary*.

Partisanship has long been known to affect people's attitudes and votes, but political scientists increasingly suggest that it may also affect people's beliefs about purely factual matters. For example, Republicans seem more likely than Democrats to believe that the deficit rose during the Clinton administration; Democrats seem more likely than Republicans to believe that inflation rose under Reagan. What remains unclear is whether partisan patterns in responses to factual questions actually reflect differing beliefs among partisans or instead reflect a desire to voice support for one party or opposition to another. We report results from a 2x2 survey experiment designed to shed light on this question. All subjects were asked a set of factual questions about politics. Some received financial incentives to answer correctly. Others were told that their answers would be scored and reported back to them. And others were exposed to neither or both of these treatments. We find consistent partisan response patterns across all four conditions, which constitutes the strongest evidence to date that such patterns reflect sincere differences in factual beliefs.

Butler, Daniel M., and Emily Schofield. 2010. "Were Newspapers More Interested in Pro-Obama Letters to the Editor in 2008? Evidence from a Field Experiment." *American Politics Research* 38: 356-71.

During the 2008 presidential election, the authors submitted letters to the editor at 100 major U.S. newspapers as part of a field experiment to test whether interest in the letter depended on which candidate the letter supported. The authors find, contrary to what charges of a liberal media bias would suggest, that newspapers expressed more interest in pro-McCain letters than pro-Obama letters. Furthermore, it was found that papers were most likely to be interested in letters supporting the candidate they did not endorse, a result that is consistent with the idea that editors seem to be using their gatekeeping powers to allow dissenting opinions to be heard.

Butler, Lisa D., Cheryl Koopman, and Philip G. Zimbardo. 1995. "The Psychological Impact of Viewing the Film Jfk: Emotions, Beliefs, and Political Behavioral Intentions" *Political Psychology* 16: 237-57.

Oliver Stone's controversial film, JFK induced an array of psychological sequelae in an educated, politically diverse audience seeing the film under natural circumstances. Fifty-three adults were surveyed as they entered a theater to see the film, while another 54 respondents answered the same questions as they exited from seeing the film. The film significantly aroused anger and changed beliefs toward accepting the broad conspiracy hypothesis of multiple agents and agencies involved in the Kennedy assassination and its cover-up. The film's impact on moods, beliefs, and judgments was found to be specific to the themes and persuasive message of the film and did not carry over to general political judgments or to perceptions of conspiracies in viewers' own lives, with one exception: viewing JFK was associated with a significant decrease in viewers' reported intentions to vote or make political contributions. A general helplessness effect is proposed to account for the increase in feelings of anger and hopelessness and the decrease in intentions to vote or make political contributions.

Callan, Eamonn. 1995. "Rejoinder: Pluralism and Moral Polarization." *Canadian Journal of Education / Revue canadienne de l'éducation* 20: 315-32.

Cannon, Lou. 1991. "Gary Sick's Lingering Charges." The Washington Post.

Caplan, Bryan. 2007. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Carney, Dana R., John T. Jost, Samuel D. Gosling, and Jeff Potter. 2008. "The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind." *Political Psychology* 29: 807-40.

Although skeptics continue to doubt that most people are “ideological,” evidence suggests that meaningful left-right differences do exist and that they may be rooted in basic personality dispositions, that is, relatively stable individual differences in psychological needs, motives, and orientations toward the world. Seventy-five years of theory and research on personality and political orientation has produced a long list of dispositions, traits, and behaviors. Applying a theory of ideology as motivated social cognition and a “Big Five” framework, we find that two traits, Openness to New Experiences and Conscientiousness, parsimoniously capture many of the ways in which individual differences underlying political orientation have been conceptualized. In three studies we investigate the relationship between personality and political orientation using multiple domains and measurement techniques, including: self-reported personality assessment; nonverbal behavior in the context of social interaction; and personal possessions and the characteristics of living and working spaces. We obtained consistent and converging evidence that personality differences between liberals and conservatives are robust, replicable, and behaviorally significant, especially with respect to social (vs. economic) dimensions of ideology. In general, liberals are more open-minded, creative, curious, and novelty seeking, whereas conservatives are more orderly, conventional, and better organized.

Cassino, Dan, and Krista Jenkins. 2013. "Conspiracy Theories Prosper: 25% of Americans Are 'Truthers'." *press release*.

CBS. 2009. "Cbs Poll: Jfk Conspiracy Lives." *CBSNews.com*.

Chait, Jonathan. 2007. The Big Con: The True Story of How Washington Got Hoodwinked and Hijacked by Crackpot Economics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Chanley, Virginia. 2002. "Trust in Government in the Aftermath of 9/11: Determinants and Consequences." *Political Psychology* 23: 469-83.

Among the most notable changes in U.S. public opinion that occurred after 11 September 2001 was a significant increase in trust in the national government. This study extends existing research on the causes of such changes in public opinion to include the post–9/11 period. The results indicate that a shift in public focus from domestic to international concerns was an important factor in the decline in cynicism that occurred after 9/11, and that public support for expending resources to address issues such as homeland security will be greater if increased trust in government can be sustained.

Chomsky, Noam. 2006. "9-11: Institutional Analysis Vs. Conspiracy Theory." Z Communications.

Chong, Dennis, Herbert McClosky, and John Zaller. 1983. "Patterns of Support for Democratic and Capitalist Values in the United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 13: 401-40.

Two major traditions of belief, democracy and capitalism, have dominated American public life from its inception. Although they have not always coexisted in perfect harmony – indeed their union has often been torn by conflict – they have managed to accommodate to each other with sufficient flexibility to have forged a viable political culture.

Chung, K. 2009. "The Phenomenon of the Conspiracy Theory Has Contributed Substantially to the Belief That Vaccination Is the Direct Cause of Autism." *The Journal of the American Osteopathic Association* 109: 384.

Citrin, J., Herbert McClosky, J. M. Shanks, and P. Sinderman. 1975. "Personal and Political Sources of Political Alienation " *British Journal of Political Science* 5.

This paper began by reviewing several major conceptual and methodological difficulties surrounding the measurement of political alienation/allegiance and proceeded to describe the level and the sources of alienation (as measured by our preliminary indicator, the PAI) within the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Area. We defined political alienation as a relatively enduring sense of estrangement from or rejection of the prevailing political system and emphasized the importance of distinguishing this attitude from disapproval of incumbent officeholders.

Clark, April, Jennifer K Mayben, Christine Hartman, Michael A Kallen, and Thomas P Giordano. 2008. "Conspiracy Beliefs About Hiv Infection Are Common but Not Associated with Delayed Diagnosis or Adherence to Care." *AIDS patient care and STDs* 22: 753-59.

We sought to determine the prevalence of HIV conspiracy beliefs in patients with HIV and how those beliefs correlate with access and adherence to HIV care and health outcomes. From March to December 2005, 113 patients at four public facilities in Houston, Texas, diagnosed with HIV for 3 years or less, participated in a cross-sectional survey. Conspiracy beliefs were assessed with five items that dealt with HIV origin, cure, and vaccine. Medical records were reviewed for CD4 cell counts, HAART use, and appointment dates. Statistical analyses (including analysis of variance [ANOVA], χ2 testing, and regression) determined the predictors of conspiracy beliefs and correlated them with outcomes. Sixty-three percent of the participants endorsed 1 or more conspiracy beliefs. African American patients more often held HIV conspiracy beliefs than white and other/mixed race patients (73%, 52%, 47%; p = 0.045). Persons holding 1 or more conspiracy beliefs had higher CD4 cell counts at diagnosis (254 cells/mm3 versus 92, p = 0.03); and similar rates of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) use (73% versus 71%), 100% adherence to HAART by self-report (53% versus 45%,), mean adherence by pharmacy refill (83% versuss 87%), and gaps in care greater than 120 days (49% versus 53%), compared to subjects who did not hold any conspiracy beliefs (all p > 0.40). Since recruitment focused on patients in care, patients with extreme conspiracy beliefs may be underrepresented. Despite this, more than 50% of the study population endorsed 1 or more conspiracy belief. However, these beliefs did not negatively impact access or adherence to HIV care. Efforts to improve adherence to HIV care may not need to focus on eliminating conspiracy beliefs.

Clarke, Steve. 2006. "Appealing to the Fundamental Attribution Error: Was It All a Big Mistake?" In Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate, ed. David Coady. London: Ashgate Pub Co.

———. 2002. "Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 32: 131-50.

The dismissive attitude of intellectuals toward conspiracy theorists is considered and given some justification. It is argued that intellectuals are entitled to an attitude of prima facie skepticism toward the theories propounded by conspiracy theorists, because conspiracy theorists have an irrational tendency to continue to believe in conspiracy theories, even when these take on the appearance of forming the core of degenerating research program. It is further argued that the pervasive effect of the “fundamental attribution error” can explain the behavior of such conspiracy theorists. A rival approach due to Brian Keeley, which involves the criticism of a subclass of conspiracy theories on epistemic grounds, is considered and found to be inadequate.

———. 2007. "Conspiracy Theories and the Internet: Controlled Demolition and Arrested Development." *Episteme* 4: 167-80.

Following Clarke (2002), a Lakatosian approach is used to account for the epistemic development of conspiracy theories. It is then argued that the hypercritical atmosphere of the internet has slowed down the development of conspiracy theories, discouraging conspiracy theorists from articulating explicit versions of their favoured theories, which could form the hard core of Lakatosian research programmes. The argument is illustrated with a study of the “controlled demolition” theory of the collapse of three towers at the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.

CNN. 1997. "Poll U.S. Hiding Knowledge of Aliens." CNN.com. http://articles.cnn.com/1997-06-15/us/9706\_15\_ufo.poll\_1\_ufo-aliens-crash-site?\_s=PM:US. (April 1, 2012).

Coady, David. 2003. "Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories." *International Journal of Applied Philosophy* 17: 197-209.

———. 2006. Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Comeforo, Kristin. 2010. "Review Essay: Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media." *Global Media and Communication* 6: 218-30.

Comsides, L. . 1989. "The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task." *Cognition* 31.

In order to successfully engage in social exchange—cooperation between two or more individuals for mutual benefit—humans must be able to solve a number of complex computational problems, and do so with special efficiency. Following Marr (1982), Cosmides (1985) and Cosmides and Tooby (1989) used evolutionary principles to develop a computational theory of these adaptive problems. Specific hypotheses concerning the structure of the algorithms that govern how humans reason about social exchange were derived from this computational theory. This article presents a series of experiments designed to test these hypotheses, using the Wason selection task, a test of logical reasoning. Part I reports experiments testing social exchange theory against the availability theories of reasoning; Part II reports experiments testing it against Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) permission schema theory. The experimental design included eight critical tests designed to choose between social exchange theory and these other two families of theories; the results of all eight tests support social exchange theory. The hypothesis that the human mind includes cognitive processes specialized for reasoning about social exchange predicts the content effects.

Converse, Philip E. 2006. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics (1964)." *Critical Review* 18: 1-74.

Cooper, Anderson. 2012. "Muslim Conspiracy Theory; Mitt Romney's Overseas Trip; Fight for Syrian City of Aleppo." In CNN. Lexis Nexis Academic. Web.

Cooper, Christopher A., H.Gibbs Knotts, and Mashe Haspel. 2009. "The Content of Political Participation: Letters to the Editor and the People Who Write Them." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 42: 131-37.

Letters to the editor are an important but poorly understood form of voluntary political participation. To learn more about the content of letters to the editor and the characteristics of the people who write them we conducted a content analysis of 1,415 randomly selected printed letters from eight newspapers from 2002 to 2005. We also matched the letter writers from our sample to demographic and political information contained in a state voterfile.

Coovadia, Hoosen M. 2013. "The Aids Conspiracy?": Academy of Science of South Africa.

Corn, David. 2009. "Van Jones and the 9/11 Conspiracy Theory Poison." *Mother Jones, September* 7.

Corte, Ugo, and Bob Edwards. 2008. "White Power Music and the Mobilization of Racist Social Movements." *Music and Arts in Action* 1: 4-20.

At the end of the 1970s a racist rock music movement known as White Power music emerged in Great Britain in connection with political parties of the extreme right and remains a vibrant force in racist social movements today. Throughout the 1990s, White Power music expanded significantly from its origins in a clandestine network of punk-inspired live shows and record promotions into a multi-million dollar, international enterprise of web-pages, radio stations and independent record labels promoting White Power musicians performing a wider range of musical genres. In this article, we view White Power music as a cultural resource created and produced by racist movements and used as a tool to further key movement goals. Specifically, we examine White Power music’s role when used to 1) recruit new adherents, especially youth, 2) frame issues and ideology to cultivate a White Power collective identity, and 3) obtain financial resources. In doing so we rely upon in-depth interviews with White Power musicians and promoters as well as representatives of watchdog and monitoring organizations. Interviews were conducted by the lead author from 2002-2004 or accessed through transcripts of similar interviews made available by another researcher. This research also relies upon an extensive examination of White Power music, lyrics, newsletters and websites.

We conclude that White Power music continues to play a significant role in the mobilization of racist political and social movements by drawing in new youth, cultivating a racist collective identity, and generating substantial sums of money to finance a range of racist endeavours.

Coser, Lewis. 1956. The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: Free Press.

Craciun, Catrinel, and Adriana Baban. 2012. "“Who Will Take the Blame?”: Understanding the Reasons Why Romanian Mothers Decline Hpv Vaccination for Their Daughters." *Vaccine* 30: 6789-93.

Because Romania has the highest incidence of cervical cancer in Europe, in 2008 a HPV vaccination campaign was introduced targeting 10–11 year old girls. However, only 2.5% of the eligible girls were given parental for vaccination. Campaign failure makes it important to look for possible reasons and investigate mothers’ attitudes and perceptions of the HPV vaccine. Three focus groups and 11 interviews were conducted with mothers from urban areas. Data were transcribed verbatim and analysed with thematic analysis.

Results show as main reasons for not vaccinating their daughters perceiving the vaccine as risky, the belief that the vaccine represents an experiment that uses their daughters as guinea pigs, the belief that the vaccine embodies a conspiracy theory that aims to reduce the world's population and general mistrust in the ineffective health system. Mothers stated they would need clear, factual information about the HPV vaccine and its link to cervical cancer in order to motivate them to accept it for their daughters.

The study offers insight into the beliefs and attitudes towards the vaccine and provides ideas for structuring future health communication campaigns regarding the HPV vaccine.

Crocker, Jennifer, Riia Luhtanen, Stephanie Broadnax, and Bruce Evan Blaine. 1999. "Belief in U.S. Government Conspiracies against Blacks among Black and White College Students: Powerlessness or System Blame?" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 25: 941-53.

Black Americans are far more likely than White Americans to endorse theories about conspiracies by the U.S. government against Blacks. The present study explored the predictors of these conspiracy beliefs for 91 Black and 96 White college students. Two explanations for belief in these conspiracies were considered, one focusing on political powerless and externality of attributions and the other focusing on system blame for Blacks’ disadvantaged status. Regression analyses supported the view that belief in these conspiracy theories is related to blaming problems of Black Americans on prejudice and discrimination. Race was a powerful predictor of belief in these conspiracies even when socioeconomic status was controlled. Furthermore, the race effect was partially mediated by the system blame measure but not by political powerlessness or greater externality of attributional style. System blame was a much stronger predictor of conspiracy beliefs for Black than for White students. Conspiracy beliefs were positively associated with the racial self-esteem of Black students and negatively for White students. Clinical implications and implications for intergroup relations are discussed.

Crothers, Lane. 2003. Rage on the Right: The American Militia Movement from Ruby Ridge to Homeland Security. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Darwin, Hannah, Nick Neave, and Joni Holmes. 2011. "Belief in Conspiracy Theories. The Role of Paranormal Belief, Paranoid Ideation and Schizotypy." *Personality and Individual Differences* 50: 1289-93.

Surveys indicate that belief in conspiracy theories is widespread. Previous studies have indicated that such beliefs are related to agreeableness, low levels of self esteem, certain negative attitudes towards authority, and paranoia. The current study investigated the relationship between conspiracy theory beliefs, paranormal belief, paranoid ideation, and schizotypy, in a study involving 60 females and 60 males aged 18–50. Sex differences were found in paranormal belief, with females scoring significantly higher than males in spiritualism, precognition, psi, and overall paranormal belief. Partial correlations controlling for sex showed that conspiracy beliefs were significantly and positively correlated with paranormal beliefs, paranoid ideation and schizotypy. Confirmatory analysis revealed a best fit model to explain conspiracy beliefs that included schizotypy and paranoid ideation, but not paranormal beliefs. These findings suggest that paranoid ideation and schizotypy are strongly associated with belief in conspiracy theories.

Davis, Brion David, ed. 1972. Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

———. 2003. "Foreward." In Conspiracy Theories in American History Vol. 1, ed. Peter Knight. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC CLIO. ix-x.

———. 2006. Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World. New York: Oxford University Press.

Davis, David Brion. 1969. The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style. Baton Rouge: LSU Press.

deHaven-Smith, Lance. 2010. "Beyond Conspiracy Theory: Patterns of High Crime in American Government." *American Behavioral Scientist* 53: 795-825.

This article explores the conceptual, methodological, and practical implications of research on state crimes against democracy (SCADs). In contrast to conspiracy theories, which speculate about each suspicious event in isolation, the SCAD construct delineates a general category of criminality and calls for crimes that fit this category to be examined comparatively. Using this approach, an analysis of post—World War II SCADs and suspected SCADs highlights a number of commonalities in SCAD targets, timing, and policy consequences. SCADs often appear where presidential politics and foreign policy intersect. SCADs differ from earlier forms of political corruption in that they frequently involve political, military, and/or economic elites at the very highest levels of the social and political order.The article concludes by suggesting statutory and constitutional reforms to improve SCAD prevention and detection.

———. 2013. Conspiracy Theory in America: University of Texas Press.

———. 2006. "When Political Crimes Are inside Jobs: Detecting State Crimes against Democracy." *Administrative Theory & Praxis* 28: 330-55.

Public administration theory and practice tend to overlook the possibility of state political criminality in liberal democracies. This article proposes a policy science to detect state crimes against democracy (SCADs), using social and political theory to understand when, why, how, and by whom such crimes are likely to be committed. After defining SCADs and differentiating them from other types of political crimes, the article analyzes SCADs in terms of antidemocratic tendencies posited by theories of liberal democracy. SCADs are traced to specific institutional objectives by analyzing patterns in SCAD targets, timing, and modus operandi. The role played by career civil servants in exposing government crimes and deceptions suggests that professional public administrators are a critical line of defense against the criminalization of the state.

deHaven-Smith, Lance, Alexander Kouzmin, Kym Thorne, and Matthew T Witt. 2010. "The Limits of Permissible Change in Us Politics and Policy." *Administrative Theory & Praxis* 32: 134-40.

Barack Obama's election to the presidency offers scholars a rare opportunity to test their theories of modern representative democracy and US government. Different theories imply different trajectories for US politics and policy under Obama's leadership. In this article, the authors present one such theory, draw out its prognosis for the new administration, and contrast their predictions with those that follow from other, competing perspectives. In so doing, they are making some predictions for the record and hoping others will do likewise. It should be noted at the start that none of the many theoretical traditions currently active in political science and public administration would predict that Obama's policies will depart dramatically from those of his predecessor. The one area where Obama may be forced by his position as president to confront the treasonous guardians of American militarism, imperialism, and capitalism is in dealing with the war crimes of the Bush administration.

Dehghanpisheh, Babak. 2010. "Conspiracy Theories with a Bite: Shark Attacks in Egypt Prompt Charges of Outsider Sabotage of Tourism." Newsweek. (July 7, 2013).

Deudney, Daniel H. 1995. "The Philadelphia System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787-1861." *International Organization* 49: 191-228.

A rediscovery of the long-forgotten republican version of liberal political theory has arresting implications for the theory and practice of international relations. Republican liberalism has a theory of security that is superior to realism, because it addresses not only threats of war from other states but also the threat of despotism at home. In this view, a Hobson's choice between anarchy and hierarchy is not necessary because an intermediary structure, here dubbed “negarchy,” is also available. The American Union from 1787 until 1861 is a historical example. This Philadelphian system was not a real state since, for example, the union did not enjoy a monopoly of legitimate violence. Yet neither was it a state system, since the American states lacked sufficient autonomy. While it shared some features with the Westphalian system such as balance of power, it differed fundamentally. Its origins owed something to particular conditions of time and place, and the American Civil War ended this system. Yet close analysis indicates that it may have surprising relevance for the future of contemporary issues such as the European Union and nuclear governance.

DiFonzo, Nicholas, and Prashant Bordia. 2007. Rumor Psychology: Social and Organizational Approaches: American Psychological Association.

Difonzo, Nicholas, Prashant Bordia, and Ralph L. Rosnow. 1994. "Reigning in Rumors." *Organizational Dynamics* 23: 47-62.

Douglas, Karen M., and Robbie M. Sutton. 2011. "Does It Take One to Know One? Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories Is Influenced by Personal Willingness to Conspire." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 50: 544-52.

We advance a new account of why people endorse conspiracy theories, arguing that individuals use the social–cognitive tool of projection when making social judgements about others. In two studies, we found that individuals were more likely to endorse conspiracy theories if they thought they would be willing, personally, to participate in the alleged conspiracies. Study 1 established an association between conspiracy beliefs and personal willingness to conspire, which fully mediated a relationship between Machiavellianism and conspiracy beliefs. In Study 2, participants primed with their own morality were less inclined than controls to endorse conspiracy theories – a finding fully mediated by personal willingness to conspire. These results suggest that some people think ‘they conspired’ because they think ‘I would conspire’.

Douglas, K.M., and R.M. Sutton. 2008. "The Hidden Impact of Conspiracy Theories: Perceived and Actual Influence of Theories Surrounding the Death of Princess Diana." *Journal of Social Psychology* 148: 210-21.

The authors examined the perceived and actual impact of exposure to conspiracy theories surrounding the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in 1997. One group of undergraduate students rated their agreement and their classmates' perceived agreement with several statements about Diana's death. A second group of students from the same undergraduate population read material containing popular conspiracy theories about Diana's death before rating their own and others' agreement with the same statements and perceived retrospective attitudes (i.e., what they thought their own and others' attitudes were before reading the material). Results revealed that whereas participants in the second group accurately estimated others' attitude changes, they underestimated the extent to which their own attitudes were influenced.

Douthat, Ross. 2010. "Nuts and Dolts." *New York Times Book Review*.

Easton, David, and Robert D Hess. 1962. "The Child's Political World." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 6: 229-46.

Edelman, M. 1985. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana, Il: University of Illinois Press.

Edwards, Steven. 2012. "Un Arms Treaty Takes Shape, Raising Alarm among Gun Rights Advocates." FoxNews.com. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/07/25/un-treaty-takes-shape-and-takes-aim-at-gun-owners/. (8/4/2012).

Edy, Jill, and Erin Baird. 2012. "The Persistence of Rumor Communities: Public Resistance to Official Debunking in the Internet Age." Paper presented at the APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper

Using E. E. Schattschneider’s (1975) model of conflict socialization, this study conceptualizes rumor communities, instead of the more typical rumor chains, engaged in a form of social and political activism similar to that of interest groups. It examines online user-generated commentary from the “vaccines cause autism” rumor community, a grassroots group that resists government-mandated vaccine requirements. Community members limit the scope of conflict by asserting authority to speak publicly and rejecting contributors with countering opinions as irrelevant. They sustain their threatened community by denying scientific evidence and demanding unattainable levels of scientific proof, and they socialize conflict by recruiting bystanders to enter the fray using appeals to wider social values. Understanding rumors as persuasive appeals that are socially constructed and maintained helps explain the survival of rumors and has implications for official debunking efforts. Schattschneider’s theory effectively models the behaviors of non-institutionalized groups but requires adaptation to the modern political communication environment and post-Reagan beliefs about government. Asserting the authority to speak publicly and maintaining group viability are necessary precursors to socializing conflict for grassroots interest groups. When citizens have been taught government is the problem rather than the solution, socializing political conflict may not be synonymous with federalizing it.

Ehman, Lee H. 1980. "The American School in the Political Socialization Process." *Review of Educational Research* 50: 99-119.

This review addresses the question: What is known from empirical studies about the effects of schooling on the political socialization of American youth? School-level and classroom-level attributes are related to four political socialization outcomes: political knowledge, political attitudes and values toward society and politics, attitudes toward political participation, and participation in political or quasi-political affairs. The school curriculum is found to be effective in transmitting knowledge but not in influencing attitudes; social status of students influences these relationships. Classroom climate and student participation in school activities, and the school organizational climate were main factors found related to student political attitudes.

Einstein, Katherine Levine, and David M. Glick. 2013. "Do I Think Bls Data Are Bs? The Consequences of Conspiracy Theories." *unpublished paper*.

While the willingness of people to believe unfounded and conspiratorial explanations

of events is fascinating and troubling, few have addressed the broader impacts of the

dissemination of conspiracy claims. We use survey experiments to assess when the realistic exposure to a conspiracy claim affects conspiracy beliefs and trust in government.

These experiments yield interesting and potentially surprising results. We discover that

respondents who are asked whether they believe in a conspiracy claim after reading a

specific allegation actually report lower beliefs than those not exposed to the specific

claim. Turning to trust in government, we find that exposure to a conspiracy claim has

a potent negative effect on trust in government services and institutions including those

unconnected to the allegations. Moreover, and consistent with our belief experiment,

we find that first asking whether people believe in the conspiracy mitigates the negative

trust effects. Combining these findings suggests that conspiracy exposure increases

conspiracy beliefs and reduces trust, but that asking about beliefs prompts additional

thinking about the claims which softens and/or reverses the exposure’s effects on beliefs and trust.

———. 2013. "Scandals, Conspiracies and the Vicious Cycle of Cynicism."

Erikson, Emily, and Joseph Parent. 2007. "Central Authority and Order." *Sociological Theory* 25: 245-67.

Conspiracy belief has largely been linked with individual-level traits like partisanship and cynicism. We use a series of original survey experiments to investigate whether macro-level variables, like a high scandal political climate, might similarly affect beliefs

in conspiracy theories. We document what we call the vicious cycle of cynicism. Political scandals diminish trust in government; this lower confidence in turn spurs higher

levels of conspiracy belief, even in claims unrelated to ongoing scandals. Moreover, we

uncover important methodological effects of scandal-heavy climates. In particular, we

reveal that they affect the measurement of conspiracy experimental effects, a result

with important implications for future researchers.

Faris, Stephan. 2008. "Conspiracy Theory." *The Atlantic* 301: 32-34.

Farrakhan, Louis, and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. 1996. "Farrakhan Speaks." *Transition* 140-67.

Fears, Darryl. 2007. "Black Opinion on Simpson Shifts." Washington Post. (August 12, 2013).

Fekete, Liz. 2012. "The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre." *Race & Class* 53: 30-47.

Fenster, Mark. 1999. Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Fernandez, Maria Luz. 2006. "Dietary Cholesterol Provided by Eggs and Plasma Lipoproteins in Healthy Populations." *Current Opinion in Clinical Nutrition & Metabolic Care* 9: 8-12.

Feyer, Thomas. 2003. "To the Reader." *New York Times Book Review* September 14.

Firth, R. 1956. "Rumor in a Primitive Society." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 53: 122-32.

This case report is an attempt to study the formation, incidence, and social repercussions of rumor in a small-scale "primitive" society, the Polynesian island of Tikopia in the Western Pacific. The content of rumor in Tikopia is closely related to the experience of the inhabitants, and while the total range is wide, the main themes are relatively few and repetitive. The mode of communication is almost wholly verbal. Most rumors are ephemeral. "They tend to succeed one another in fairly rapid succession, especially when the issue is one of immediate emotional significance—as a famine, or the fate of absent kin. When they persist or reappear, it is because they correspond to some deep-seated structural cleavage."

Foster, H. Schuyler, and Carl J. Friedrich. 1937. "Letters to the Editor as a Means of Measuring the Effectiveness of Propaganda." *The American Political Science Review* 31: 71-79.

In spite of the enormous literature on propaganda recently surveyed by a committee of the Social Science Research Council, there has not as yet emerged a generally accepted definition of propaganda. Consequently, any discussion in this field requires at the outset some statement or general indication of what one is dealing with, in order to reduce misunderstanding. As political scientists, we are taking a strictly pragmatic view of propaganda, as completely removed as possible from the area of psychological controversies. We have, for the purposes of our studies, considered only such propaganda as is manifested in the organized activities involved in efforts to get people to take a particular step, such as to vote for Roosevelt, or to abstain from objecting to a particular step, such as the United States’ entry into the World War. These efforts, when promotional, may be denominated “a propaganda campaign.” Such a campaign proceeds by the organized dissemination of propaganda appeals. But these same appeals can, and do, operate without any organized promotion; and still they tend to influence those whom they reach. Many different kinds of individuals carry these appeals—teachers, writers, gossips, etc. From the viewpoint of propaganda analysis, they may be called “propagandizers.” In the course of a typical campaign, there appear propagandizers who indulge in various activities which are significant in spite of their unorganized nature. Different is the propagandist who participates in a propaganda campaign.

Franks, Bradley, Adrian Bangerter, and Martin W Bauer. 2013. "Conspiracy Theories as Quasi-Religious Mentality: An Integrated Account from Cognitive Science, Social Representations Theory, and Frame Theory." *Frontiers in Psychology* 4.

Conspiracy theories (CTs) can take many forms and vary widely in popularity, the intensity with which they are believed and their effects on individual and collective behavior. An integrated account of CTs thus needs to explain how they come to appeal to potential believers, how they spread from one person to the next via communication, and how they motivate collective action. We summarize these aspects under the labels of stick, spread, and action. We propose the quasi-religious hypothesis for CTs: drawing on cognitive science of religion, social representations theory, and frame theory. We use cognitive science of religion to describe the main features of the content of CTs that explain how they come to stick: CTs are quasi-religious representations in that their contents, forms and functions parallel those found in beliefs of institutionalized religions. However, CTs are quasi-religious in that CTs and the communities that support them, lack many of the institutional features of organized religions. We use social representations theory to explain how CTs spread as devices for making sense of sudden events that threaten existing worldviews. CTs allow laypersons to interpret such events by relating them to common sense, thereby defusing some of the anxiety that those events generate. We use frame theory to explain how some, but not all CTs mobilize collective counter-conspiratorial action by identifying a target and by proposing credible and concrete rationales for action. We specify our integrated account in 13 propositions.

Franks, Mary Anne. 2011. "When Bad Speech Does Good." *Loyola University Chicago Law Journal* 43.

Free speech defenders generally treat bad speech – hateful, offensive, obscene speech – as a necessary evil, not something that should be celebrated in itself but an inevitable byproduct of a system that protects expressive flourishing. This essay instead praises the content of bad speech, arguing that the very badness of some bad speech can serve to dilute and delegitimize other forms of much more dangerous speech. To see how this is possible, it is important to differentiate between "confused" bad speech and "focused" bad speech. Confused bad speech makes declarations, targets wide-ranging or poorly defined groups, and seeks primarily to aggravate or provoke its audience. Focused bad speech issues imperatives, targets specific individuals or groups, and seeks primarily to aggregate supporters. Focused bad speech is dangerous because it can be transformed into violent action, as genocidal speech does, but it relies on a strong signal-to-noise ratio to do so. Confused bad speech can often provide beneficial "noise" to drown on focused bad speech's "signal." The more confused and noisy the variety of speech is, the harder it is for any one form of speech to emerge as a dominant discourse. Speech overload produces effects similar to "choice overload," which produces disorientation, fatigue, and general passivity. While these effects may be regrettable in many contexts, they can be beneficial in the context of violent calls to action.

Freedman, David H. 2013. "Are Engineered Foods Evil?" *Scientific American* 309: 85.

Freeman, Daniel. 2007. "Suspicious Minds: The Psychology of Persecutory Delusions." *Clinical psychology review* 27: 425-57.

At least 10–15% of the general population regularly experience paranoid thoughts and persecutory delusions are a frequent symptom of psychosis. Persecutory ideation is a key topic for study. In this article the empirical literature on psychological processes associated with persecutory thinking in clinical and non-clinical populations is comprehensively reviewed. There is a large direct affective contribution to the experience. In particular, anxiety affects the content, distress and persistence of paranoia. In the majority of cases paranoia does not serve a defensive function, but instead builds on interpersonal concerns conscious to the person. However, affect alone is not sufficient to produce paranoid experiences. There is also evidence that anomalous internal experiences may be important in leading to odd thought content and that a jumping to conclusions reasoning bias is present in individuals with persecutory delusions. Theory of mind functioning has received particular research attention recently but the findings do not support a specific association with paranoia. The threat anticipation cognitive model of persecutory delusions is presented, in which persecutory delusions are hypothesised to arise from an interaction of emotional processes, anomalous experiences and reasoning biases. Ten key future research questions are identified, including the need for researchers to consider factors important to the different dimensions of delusional experience.

Freud, Sigmund. 1964. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Oxford, England: Macmillan.

Fulcher, Benjamin I Page Gordon Scott. 2002. Navigating Public Opinion: Polls, Policy, and the Future of American Democracy: Polls, Policy, and the Future of American Democracy: Oxford University Press.

Furnham, Adrian. 2013. "Commercial Conspiracy Theories: A Pilot Study." *Frontiers in Psychology* 4.

There are many ways to categorise conspiracy theories. In the present study, we examined individual and demographic predictors of beliefs in commercial conspiracy theories among a British sample of over 300 women and men. Results showed many people were cynical and sceptical with regard to advertising tricks, as well as the tactics of organisations like banks and alcohol, drug and tobacco companies. Beliefs sorted into four identifiable clusters, labelled sneakiness, manipulative, change-the-rules and suppression/prevention. The high alpha for the overall scale suggested general beliefs in commercial conspiracy. Regressions suggested that those people who were less religious, more left-wing, more pessimistic, less (self-defined as) wealthy, less Neurotic and less Open-to-Experience believed there was more commercial conspiracy. Overall the individual difference variables explained relatively little of the variance in these beliefs. The implications of these findings for the literature on conspiracy theories are discussed. Limitations of the study are also discussed.

Gamson, William A. 1992. Talking Politics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Gause III, George. 2010. The International Relations of the Persian Gulf New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gentilviso, Chris. 2012. "Donald Trump Birther Doubts Revived, Still Questions Obama Birth Certificate (Tweet) " Huffington Post. (July 12, 2013).

Gerber, Alan S., and Gregory A. Huber. 2010. "Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessments." *American Journal of Political Science* 54: 153-73.

Previous research shows that partisans rate the economy more favorably when their party holds power. There are several explanations for this association, including use of different evaluative criteria, selective perception, selective exposure to information, correlations between economic experiences and partisanship, and partisan bias in survey responses. We use a panel survey around the November 2006 election to measure changes in economic expectations and behavioral intentions after an unanticipated shift in political power. Using this design, we can observe whether the association between partisanship and economic assessments holds when some leading mechanisms thought to bring it about are excluded. We find that there are large and statistically significant partisan differences in how economic assessments and behavioral intentions are revised immediately following the Democratic takeover of Congress. We conclude that this pattern of partisan response suggests partisan differences in perceptions of the economic competence of the parties, rather than alternative mechanisms.

Gershtenson, Joseph, Jeffrey Ladewig, and Dennis L. Plane. 2006. "Parties, Institutional Control, and Trust in Government." *Social Science Quarterly* 87: 882-902.

**Objectives.** Partisanship should affect evaluations of Congress just as it affects evaluations of the president, and these institutional evaluations should affect political trust. We argue that the relationship between partisanship and trust is dependent on partisan control of Congress and that much of party identification's influence on trust occurs indirectly through approval of governmental institutions.

**Methods.** Using data collected before and after the 2002 congressional elections by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut, we examine changes in frequency distributions and mean values for trust and institutional approval. We use multivariate regression models and a path model to estimate the causes of political trust and self-perceived change in trust.

**Results.** We find evidence that party control of government and party identification are important in explaining trust and institutional approval. The Republican takeover of the Senate led Republicans to evaluate the Senate more favorably and to become more trusting of the government, while having the opposite effect on Democrats.

**Conclusions.** The changes in approval and trust resulting from the 2002 elections suggest that at least some segment of the population is cognizant of changes in the political environment and updates its views of government when the political environment changes.

Geyer, Georgie Anne. 1977. "The Rewriting of History to Fit Our Age of Conspiracy." The Los Angeles Times 1.

Gibbon, Edward. 1993. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. New York: Everyman.

Gibson, James L. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the Mccarthy Red Scare." *The American Political Science Review* 82: 511-29.

I test several hypotheses concerning the origins of political repression in the states of the United States. The hypotheses are drawn from the elitist theory of democracy, which asserts that repression of unpopular political minorities stems from the intolerance of the mass public, the generally more tolerant elites not supporting such repression. Focusing on the repressive legislation adopted by the states during the McCarthy era, I examine the relationships between elite and mass opinion and repressive public policy. Generally it seems that elites, not masses, were responsible for the repression of the era. These findings suggest that the elitist theory of democracy is in need of substantial theoretical reconsideration, as well as further empirical investigation.

Gilbert, Felix. 1984. Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence. New York: Norton.

Gilens, Martin. 2001. "Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences." *American Political Science Review* 95: 379-96.

In contrast with the expectations of many analysts, I find that raw policy-specific facts, such as the direction of change in the crime rate or the amount of the federal budget devoted to foreign aid, have a significant influence on the public’s political judgments. Using both traditional survey methods and survey-based randomized experiments, I show that ignorance of policy-specific information leads many Americans to hold political views different from those they would hold otherwise. I also show that the effect of policy-specific information is not adequately captured by the measures of general political knowledge used in previous research. Finally, I show that the effect of policy-specific ignorance is greatest for Americans with the highest levels of political knowledge. Rather than serve to dilute the influence of new information, general knowledge (and the cognitive capacities it reflects) appears to facilitate the incorporation of new policy-specific information into political judgments.

Glazer, Nathan. 1971. "The New Left and Its Limits." In American Political Radicalism, ed. Gilbert Abcarian. Lexington, MA: Xerox College Publishing. 244-62.

Goertzel, Ted. 1994. "Belief in Conspiracy Theories." *Political Psychology* 15: 733-44.

A survey of 348 residents of southwestern New Jersey showed that most believed that several of a list of 10 conspiracy theories were at least probably true. People who believed in one conspiracy were more likely to also believe in others. Belief in conspiracies was correlated with anomia, lack of interpersonal trust, and insecurity about employment. Black and hispanic respondents were more likely to believe in conspiracy theories than were white respondents. Young people were slightly more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, but there were few significant correlations with gender, educational level, or occupational category.

———. 2013. "The Conspiracy Meme." *Skeptical Inquirer* 2013.

———. 2010. "Conspiracy Theories in Science." *EMBO reports* 11: 493-99.

Goldberg, Robert Alan. 2001. Enemies Within: The Culture of Conspiracy in Modern America. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Goldman, Adam, Eric Tucker, and Matt Apuzzo. 2013. "Tamerlan Tsarnaev, Influenced by Mysterious Muslim Radical, Turned Towards Fundamentalism " Huffington Post. (July 7, 2013).

Gosa, Travis L. 2011. "Counterknowledge, Racial Paranoia, and the Cultic Milieu: Decoding Hip Hop Conspiracy Theory." *Poetics* 39: 187-204.

This article contributes to existing research on knowledge production and popular racial discourse. Specifically, it explores the production and circulation of conspiracy theories and other stigmatized knowledge in popular culture. The article investigates how hip hop culture uses conspiratorial ideas to challenge racial inequality. The analysis draws on rap lyrics, news articles, and Internet websites to understand better the role of this prominent sub-theme within the contexts of entertainment and calculated identity politics. Hip hop culture is theorized as “counterknowledge,” an alternative knowledge system intended to challenge mainstream knowledge producers such as news media and academia. Building on John Jackson's notion of “racial paranoia,” I show how hip hop's alarmist and conspiratorial claims are meant to explain continued race-class disadvantage in an era of supposed color-blindness. This article traces the discourses that shape and influence hip hop including popular culture, prison culture, Black Muslim (“Five Percenter”) religion, and black books subculture. It reveals how hip hop resembles the “cultic milieu,” a space where disparate countercultural ideas propagate and create unlikely political alliances. Overall, the article seeks to demonstrate that conspiratorial thinking serves multiple purposes, including addressing legitimate but complex political grievances in contemporary society.

Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Graumann, C. F. 1987. "Conspiracy: History and Social Psychology - a Synopsis." In Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, eds. C. F. Graumann and S. Moscovici. Vol. 245-251. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Graumann, Carl Friedrich, and Serge Moscovici, eds. 1987. Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, Springer Series in Social Psychology. USA.

Grebe, Eduard, and Nicoli Nattrass. 2012. "Aids Conspiracy Beliefs and Unsafe Sex in Cape Town." *AIDS and Behavior* 16: 761-73.

This paper uses multivariate logistic regressions to explore: (1) potential socio-economic, cultural, psychological and political determinants of AIDS conspiracy beliefs among young adults in Cape Town; and (2) whether these beliefs matter for unsafe sex. Membership of a religious organisation reduced the odds of believing AIDS origin conspiracy theories by more than a third, whereas serious psychological distress more than doubled it and belief in witchcraft tripled the odds among Africans. Political factors mattered, but in ways that differed by gender. Tertiary education and relatively high household income reduced the odds of believing AIDS conspiracies for African women (but not men) and trust in President Mbeki’s health minister (relative to her successor) increased the odds sevenfold for African men (but not women). Never having heard of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the pro-science activist group that opposed Mbeki on AIDS, tripled the odds of believing AIDS conspiracies for African women (but not men). Controlling for demographic, attitudinal and relationship variables, the odds of using a condom were halved amongst female African AIDS conspiracy believers, whereas for African men, never having heard of TAC and holding AIDS denialist beliefs were the key determinants of unsafe sex.

Greenstein, Fred. 1960. "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority." *The American Political Science Review* 54: 934-43.

Greenwald, Glenn. 2010. "Obama Confidant’s Spine-Chilling Proposal." *Salon. com, January* 15.

Gribbin, William. 1974. "Antimasonry, Religious Radicalism, and the Paranoid Style of the 1820s." *History Teacher* 7: 239-54.

Griffin, David Ray. 2010. Cognitive Infiltration: An Obama Appointee's Plan to Undermine the 9/11 Conspiracy Theory. USA: Olive Branch Pr.

Groh, Dieter. 1987. "Belief in Conspiracy Theory, Or: Why Do Bad Things Happen to Good People?" In Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, eds. C. F. Graumann and S. Moscovici. New York: Springer-Verlag. 1-14.

Gruber, Ira D. 1969. "The American Revolution as Conspiracy: The British View." *William and Mary Quarterly* 26: 360-72.

Grzesiak-Feldman, Monika. 2007. "Conspiracy Thinking and State-Trait Anxiety in Young Polish Adults." *Psychological Reports* 100: 199-202.

The relationships among conspiracy thinking and state and trait anxiety were examined with 118 high school students who were assessed using the Conspiracy Beliefs Scale and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Among boys there was a positive correlation between scores on A-Trait and the conspiracy thinking (r = .39) whereas among girls there was a negative correlation between these scores (r = −.32).

———. 2013. "The Effect of High-Anxiety Situations on Conspiracy Thinking." *Current Psychology* 32: 100-18.

The aim of the present studies was to examine a possible relationship between anxiety and conspiracy thinking about ethnic and national groups. Two hundred university student volunteers participated in 3 studies. Study One (N = 87; mixed male and female sample) found that state-anxiety and trait-anxiety, measured with the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), were positively correlated with conspiracy thinking about Jewish people, Germans and Arabs. Study Two (N = 46; male sample) and Study Three (N = 67; female sample) were designed to check whether a high-anxiety situation (connected with waiting for an examination) would increase conspiracy thinking. Findings from Studies Two and Three showed that the pre-exam (high-anxiety) situation increased conspiracy thinking about Jewish people. This effect was not mediated by state-anxiety. Hence, further research should focus on searching for possible mediators of the relationship between a pre-exam situation and conspiracy thinking. The obtained results are consistent with previous findings showing that conspiracy thinking about Jewish people is sensitive to situational factors and with findings on links between anxiety and processing information about threat-related stimuli.

Grzesiak-Feldman, Monika, and Monika Irzycka. 2009. "Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Conspiracy Thinking in a Polish Sample." *Psychological Reports* 105: 389-93.

*Summary*.—The relationships among scores for right-wing authoritarianism and conspiracy thinking toward Jews, Arabs, Germans, and Russians were examined. 354 volunteer high school students were assessed using the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Three-Dimensional (RWA3D) Scale and the Conspiracy Beliefs Scale. The scores for conspiracy thinking about all the nationalities were positively correlated with the total scores for RWA3D.

Gutstein, Donald. 2009. Not a Conspiracy Theory: How Business Propaganda Hijacks Democracy: Key Porter Books.

Haas, Ernst B. 1970. "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections of the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing." *International Organization* 24: 607-46.

Why have we been studying something we call “regional integration” for about fifteen years ? We were stimulated by two otherwise unrelated trends: the flowering in the United States of systematic social science and the blooming in Europe of political efforts to build a united continent, to “integrate” Western Europe at least. But the story of integration encompassed a mixed bag of heroes ranging from such regional “integrators”as Napoleon Bonaparte and Simón Bolívar to nation-building statesmen such as Otto von Bismarck and Camillo Cavour. Some saw even in Adolf Hitler and Hideki Tojo certain characteristics of the political actor who seeks to integrate nations into a regional unit. Are we then studying any kind of political unification ?

Hagen, Kurtis. 2012. "Conspiracy Theories and Stylized Facts." *Journal for Peace and Justice Studies* 21: 3-22.

———. 2010. "Is Infiltration of “Extremist Groups” Justified?" *International Journal of Applied Philosophy* 24: 153-68.

Hall, Peter M. 1970. "The Quasi-Theory of Communication and the Management of Dissent." *Social Problems* 18: 18-27.

A series of Presidential actions and other events connected with the recent use of U. S. troops in Cambodia suggest a preoccupation with communication (its presence or absence, its process, and its style) that deflected and obscured the basic issue of the war by defining events in terms of a quasi-theory of communication failure. The cultural and situational bases of such a theory of communication failure as a means of explaining and coping with social problems are explored in this paper; evidence for its use in the Cambodian situation is examined; and its possible consequences are suggested. The role of symbolic reassurance in coping with public uneasiness about the war and the anti-war movement is also examined.

Hamm, Mark S. 1997. Apocalypse in Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged: Northeastern University Press Boston.

Hargrove, Thomas. 2006. "Third of Americans Suspect 9-11 Government Conspiracy." *Scripps News*.

Harms, E. 1937. "Paranoid Tendencies in Social Behavior." *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 32: 431-38.

Paranoia in an individual is not simply and solely "a product of a diseased brain," but also of the conditions of life and of the environment. The basic structure of social organization (social secrecy), the opposition of varying social and spiritual environments (social deception and prejudice), the accompaniments of social group differences (symbols and codes), and finally the accompaniments of so-called scientific progress (abstraction and relativity), are all disorienting and paranoiac factors. The task of developing a feeling of security and equanimity, which is the basic task of psychotherapy, means struggling against abstraction and its negative effects. The author hopes that his stress on the social factors in paranoia will give incentive to the study by physicians of their social function and duty in modern society.

Hart, Stephen. 2001. Cultural Dilemmas of Progressive Politics: Styles of Engagement among Grassroots Activists. Vol. Ch. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Hartman, Todd K., and Adam J. Newmark. 2012. "Motivated Reasoning, Political Sophistication, and Associations between President Obama and Islam." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 45: 449-55.

Recent polls reveal that between 20% and 25% of Americans erroneously indicate that President Obama is a Muslim. In this article, we compare individuals' explicit responses on a survey about religion and politics with reaction time data from an Implicit Association Test (IAT) to investigate whether individuals truly associate Obama with Islam or are motivated reasoners who simply express negativity about the president when given the opportunity. Our results suggest that predispositions such as ideology, partisanship, and race affect how citizens feel about Obama, which in turn motivates them to accept misinformation about the president. We also find that these implicit associations increase the probability of stating that Obama is likely a Muslim. Interestingly, political sophistication does not appear to inoculate citizens from exposure to misinformation, as they exhibit the same IAT effect as less knowledgeable individuals.

Heins, Volker. 2007. "Critical Theory and the Traps of Conspiracy Thinking." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 33: 787-801.

Historically, blatantly untrue and defamatory conspiracy theories had disastrous consequences for those who were portrayed in them as evildoers. At the same time, conspiratorial agreements at the expense of the common good between powerful groups in society do exist and have occasionally been uncovered. Against this background, the article describes different ways in which critical theory has looked at conspiracies. First, an attempt is made to show that Max Horkheimer's notes on 'rackets' are an ambitious but flawed attempt to theorize conspiracy. It is argued that Horkheimer's theory is imbued by the very conspiracy thinking that he proposed to criticize. Second, the author suggests recovering Franz Neumann's concept of 'political alienation' as a more appropriate starting point to think critically about the ethical and epistemological questions raised by conspiracy theories.

Hellinger, Daniel. 2003. "Paranoia, Conspiracy, and Hegemony in American Politics." In Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World Order, eds. Harry G. West and Todd Sanders. Durham: Duke University Press.

Henderson, Marlone. 2009. "Psychological Distance and Group Judgments: The Effect of Physical Distance on Beliefs About Common Goals." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 35: 1330-41.

The present research examined the consequences of physical distance on beliefs about common goals, which have been implicated in judgments of entitativeness (“groupness”) of social entities. A central feature of task groups is the degree to which its members are driven by common goals. According to construal level theory, as stimuli are removed psychologically (e.g., physically), people construe stimuli in more abstract terms, focusing more on central features of stimuli. Adopting this framework, four studies demonstrated that people are more likely to assume the behavior of task group members is driven by common goals for physically distant rather than near groups. This effect occurred when perceived identification and similarity to others were held constant. Implications for intergroup relations are discussed.

Hepola, Sarah. 2009. " Whoopi Goldberg: Was the Moon Landing a Hoax? "The View" Co-Host Celebrates the 40th Anniversary of Apollo 11 by Spreading Wacky Conspiracy Theories." Salon.com. (September 11, 2013).

Hetherington, Marc J. 2005. Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan D. Weiler. 2009. Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hill, David B. 1981. "Letter Opinion on Era: A Test of the Newspaper Bias Hypothesis." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45: 384-92.

This paper compares letter opinion (opinions expressed in published letters-to-the-editor) with public opinion on ERA. Prior research has suggested that letter opinion is biased by atypical letter writers or by newspaper editorial policies which are used to select letters for publication. Drawing on a national sample of 92 daily newspapers, no substantial difference between letter opinion and public opinion on ERA is detected. Little support is found for the hypothesis that newspaper policies bias letter opinion.

Hofman, Amos. 1993. "Opinion, Illusion, and the Illusion of Opinion: Barruel's Theory of Conspiracy." *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 27: 27-60.

Hofstadter, Richard. 1963. Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. New York: Vintage.

———. 1971. "The Paranoid Style in American Politics." In The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present, ed. D.B. Davis. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press. 2-8.

———. 1964. The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

———. 1965. The Paranoid Style of American Politics and Other Essays. New York: Knopf.

Hogue, William M. 1976. "The Religious Conspiracy Theory of the American Revolution: Anglican Motive." *Church History* 45: 277-92.

The historian of American religion seeking to establish the relevance of his specialty to the event of 1776 labors under something of a handicap, a disability epitomized in the cold silence about religion in those documents which have become the secular scriptures of the nation's political faith. Neither the official justification for the Revolution, the Declaration of Independence, nor the popular contemporaneous one, Paine's Common Sense, accords the remotest of influences to formal religion. If the Revolution had a religious dimension, evidence for it must be sought elsewhere. Both the exegete, hoping to throw new light upon old truth, and the skeptic, to whom a received dogma is a standing challenge, have perforce turned to the antiquarian's shelves, stuffed with the literary remains of a pamphleteering age.

Howe, Neil, and William Strauss. 2000. Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation. USA: Vintage.

Hurley, Patrick T., and Peter A. Walker. 2004. "Whose Vision? Conspiracy Theory and Land-Use Planning in Nevada County, California." *Environment and Planning* 36: 1529-47.

In this paper we examine the role of claims of global conspiracy in undermining a local environmental planning process known as Natural Heritage 2020 (NH2020) in Nevada County, California. County officials intended NH 2020 to mitigate the environmental impacts of rapid growth in this gentrifying rural community. This program illustrates the increasing use by land-use planners of landscape-scale approaches derived from conservation biology to protect biodiversity on private land. In Nevada County, this new planning vision met intense resistance. The ensuing struggle demonstrates the conflicts that can arise between social groups with competing visions for the future of the local environment in response to efforts to realize particular visions through land-use planning and policymaking. Opponents perceived a significant threat to their property rights from the use of a landscape-scale vision from conservation biology in county planning, which some depicted as part of a global environmental conspiracy. We explore the links between broader conservation science, ideology, and activism in the case of NH2020, and suggest that quite real conceptual connections to global conservation politics potentially make local conservation planning efforts susceptible to claims of `outside' interference. Although NH2020 had no direct link (despite claims by some opponents) to global conservation efforts, the successful use of claims of global conspiracy in efforts to halt the program underscores social realities that planners and scholars need to consider when promoting what they often view as simply `good planning.'

Husting, Gina, and Martin Orr. 2007. "Dangerous Machinery: "Conspiracy Theorist" as a Transpersonal Strategy of Exclusion." *Symbolic Interaction* 30: 127-50.

In a culture of fear, we should expect the rise of new mechanisms of social control to deflect distrust, anxiety, and threat. Relying on the analysis of popular and academic texts, we examine one such mechanism, the label conspiracy theory, and explore how it works in public discourse to “go meta” by sidestepping the examination of evidence. Our findings suggest that authors use the conspiracy theorist label as (1) a routinized strategy of exclusion; (2) a reframing mechanism that deflects questions or concerns about power, corruption, and motive; and (3) an attack upon the personhood and competence of the questioner. This label becomes dangerous machinery at the transpersonal levels of media and academic discourse, symbolically stripping the claimant of the status of reasonable interlocutor—often to avoid the need to account for one's own action or speech. We argue that this and similar mechanisms simultaneously control the flow of information and symbolically demobilize certain voices and issues in public discourse.

Icke, David. 2001. Children of the Matrix: How an Interdimensional Race Has Controlled the World for Thousands of Years-and Still Does. Wildwood, MO: Bridge of Love Publications USA.

Imhoff, Roland, and Martin Bruder. 2013. "Speaking (Un-)Truth to Power: Conspiracy Mentality as a Generalised Political Attitude." *European Journal of Personality*.

Conspiracy theories explain complex world events with reference to secret plots hatched by powerful groups. Belief in such theories is largely determined by a general propensity towards conspirational thinking. Such a conspiracy mentality can be understood as a generalised political attitude, distinct from established generalised political attitudes such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) (Study 1a, N = 497) that is temporally relatively stable (Study 1b and 1c, total N = 196). Three further studies (combined N = 854) show that in contrast to RWA and SDO, conspiracy mentality is related to prejudice against high-power groups that are perceived as less likeable and more threatening than low-power groups, whereas SDO and RWA are associated with an opposite reaction to perceptions of power. Study 5 (N = 1852) investigates the relationship of conspiracy mentality with political behavioural intentions in a specific catastrophic scenario (i.e. the damage to the Fukushima nuclear reactor after the 2011 tsunami in Japan) revealing a hitherto neglected role of conspiracy mentality in motivating social action aimed at changing the status quo.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1987. "Extremist Political Positions and Perceptions of Conspiracy: Even Paranoids Have Real Enemies." In Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, eds. C. F. Graumann and S. Moscovici. Vol. 231-244. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Jacobsen, Annie. 2011. "The United States of Conspiracy: Why, More and More, Americans Cling to Crazy Theories." NYDailyNews.com. http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-08-07/news/29878465\_1\_conspiracy-theories-bavarian-illuminati-nefarious-business.

Jacobson, Gary. 2010. "Barack Obama and the American Public: The First 18 Months." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., September 2-5, 2010.

How did Barack Obama, a “center-left pragmatic reformer” advocating “a moderately activist government constrained by a sense of trade-offs” polarize the public and the Congress so quickly and so thoroughly during his first 18 months in office? First, Americans were polarized from the start in their opinions of Obama and his agenda; the coalitions supporting and opposing the Obama administration as of the first half of 2010 look remarkably like the rival electoral coalitions of 2008. Second, the deep recession and high unemployment have fueled a combination of anger and anxiety that has left many Americans looking for someone to blame, and, as exemplified by the “Tea Party” movement, susceptible to conspiracy theories fingering various culprits. Third, Republican leaders, aiming to revive their electoral fortunes, made the strategic decision to court the Tea Party enthusiasts and sympathizers rather than trying to broaden their party’s appeal to moderates (the strategy seems to be working for 2010). Fourth, inverting the pattern of the Bush administration, Obama’s policies toward Iraq and Afghanistan have attracted considerable bipartisan support, but this has done nothing to narrow partisan differences in evaluations of his overall performance, which have been dominated by polarized reactions to his domestic more controversial initiatives, particularly on economic stimulus and health care.

Jacobson, Joseph L, and Sandra W Jacobson. 2013. "Low-Level Alcohol Consumption in Early Pregnancy May Not Affect Child Intelligence, Attention or Executive Function at 5 Years of Age." *Evidence Based Mental Health* 16: 4-4.

Jacoby, Susan. 2008. The Age of American Unreason. New York: Vintage.

Jaeger, Marianne E., Susan Anthony, and Ralph L. Rosnow. 1980. "Who Hears What from Whom and with What Effect?" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 6: 473-78.

This experiment explored whether subjects, high and low in anxiety, would transmit a rumor that was believable or not believable when the rumor was told to them by a peer as opposed to an authority figure. We found that the rumor was more frequently repeated when the story was believable than unbelievable. 7he highly anxious subjects repeated the rumor more often than did the less anxious subjects only when the source was a peer.

Jamil, Uzma, and Cécile Rousseau. 2011. "Challenging the ‘Official’ Story of 9/11: Community Narratives and Conspiracy Theories." *Ethnicities* 11: 245-61.

This article examines the gap in meaning systems between the dominant mainstream understanding in North America of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the meaning given to it within different Pakistani communities in Canada and in Pakistan. It describes the emergence of 9/11 conspiracy theory discourses in three different studies involving Pakistani immigrants in Montreal and Pakistanis in Karachi, carried out at three different points in time over the last five years. The polarization of meaning in the war on terror between the host society and Muslim immigrant communities in North America is associated with the emergence of feelings of fear and threat in all communities. The results also suggest that views of local and global power relations play a role in shaping these conspiracy theory discourses.

Jennings, M. K. 1990. "The Crystallization of Orientations." In Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies, eds. M. K. Jennings and Jan W. Van Deth. Berlin and New York: D Gruyter. 313-48.

Jensen, Tom. 2009. "A Deeper Look at the Birthers." Public Policy Polling, Wednesday, August 19.

Jervis, Robert. 2010. "Roundtable on Politics and Scholarship." *H-Diplo/ISSF* 1.

Johnson, Daryl. 2013. Right-Wing Resurgence: How a Domestic Terrorist Threat Is Being Ignored. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Johnson, D. M. 1945. "The "Phantom Anesthetist" of Mattoon: A Field Study of Mass Hysteria." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 40: 175-86.

The writer analyzes the records of an example of mass hysteria in a small Illinois town. One woman's hysterical report of being gassed and paralyzed at night led to heightened suggestibility of many others. Most victims were women of slightly below average social status. A surge of telephone calls to the police, reporting prowlers and 'gassers,' was followed by an abnormal decrease in calls to the police after the attacks were judged to be imaginary.

Johnson, George. 1983. Architects of Fear: Conspiracy Theories of Paranoia in American Politics. Boston: Houghton: Mifflin.

Johnson, Kirk. 2011. "Evidence Aside, State Lawmakers Debate ‘Birther’ Bills." Nytimes.com.

Jolley, Daniel, and Karen M. Douglas. 2014. "The Effects of Anti-Vaccine Conspiracy Theories on Vaccination Intentions." *PLoS ONE* 9: e89177.

The current studies investigated the potential impact of anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs, and exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, on vaccination intentions. In Study 1, British parents completed a questionnaire measuring beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and the likelihood that they would have a fictitious child vaccinated. Results revealed a significant negative relationship between anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs and vaccination intentions. This effect was mediated by the perceived dangers of vaccines, and feelings of powerlessness, disillusionment and mistrust in authorities. In Study 2, participants were exposed to information that either supported or refuted anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, or a control condition. Results revealed that participants who had been exposed to material supporting anti-vaccine conspiracy theories showed less intention to vaccinate than those in the anti-conspiracy condition or controls. This effect was mediated by the same variables as in Study 1. These findings point to the potentially detrimental consequences of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, and highlight their potential role in shaping health-related behaviors.

Jolley, Daniel, and Karen M Douglas. 2013. "The Social Consequences of Conspiracism: Exposure to Conspiracy Theories Decreases Intentions to Engage in Politics and to Reduce One’s Carbon Footprint." *British Journal of Psychology* epub in advance, DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12018.

The current studies explored the social consequences of exposure to conspiracy theories. In Study 1, participants were exposed to a range of conspiracy theories concerning government involvement in significant events such as the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. Results revealed that exposure to information supporting conspiracy theories reduced participants' intentions to engage in politics, relative to participants who were given information refuting conspiracy theories. This effect was mediated by feelings of political powerlessness. In Study 2, participants were exposed to conspiracy theories concerning the issue of climate change. Results revealed that exposure to information supporting the conspiracy theories reduced participants' intentions to reduce their carbon footprint, relative to participants who were given refuting information, or those in a control condition. This effect was mediated by powerlessness with respect to climate change, uncertainty, and disillusionment. Exposure to climate change conspiracy theories also influenced political intentions, an effect mediated by political powerlessness. The current findings suggest that conspiracy theories may have potentially significant social consequences, and highlight the need for further research on the social psychology of conspiracism.

Jones, Laura. 2012. "The Commonplace Geopolitics of Conspiracy." *Geography Compass* 6: 44-59.

Conspiracy narratives and ways of knowing are a highly visible, accessible and increasingly commonplace part of contemporary global life, permeating across spheres of politics, science and popular culture. Catalyzed by rapid developments in networked media and a political climate of enhanced government secrecy following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, thinking conspiratorially about power forms part of a broader global public challenge to State control over access to information and knowledge. Rather than relegate the study of conspiracy to a marginalised and discredited form of dissent (‘conspiracy theory’), this article proposes how geographers can bring a critical attention to the multiple spatialities inherent in and produced through discourses of conspiracy; the ways of knowing and practising the world which conspiracy informs for differently placed subjects, both publics and politicians alike, across the political spectrum. This discursive understanding of conspiracy is developed in relation to the critical geopolitics scholarship and recent concerns within this literature towards producing more situated, embodied and emotional accounts of geopolitics stemming from engagements with non-representational and feminist theory. Grounding the geopolitical analysis of conspiracy discourse in these concerns, the types of geographies that might emerge is explored through empirical research conducted on and with the 9/11 Truth Movement. Here the convergence of heterogeneous political actors around their conviction in a US government conspiracy exposes some of the possibilities and problematics which attending to the commonplace geopolitics of conspiracy opens up for ongoing research.

———. 2010. "‘How Do the American People Know…?’: Embodying Post-9/11 Conspiracy Discourse." *GeoJournal* 75: 359-71.

Conspiratorial thought has been highly visible in post-September 11th America, manifest through the continued growth of a public ‘9/11 Truth Movement’ as well as at the state-level, through the Bush administration’s conspiracy rhetoric of Islamic terrorists intent on infiltrating the US homeland. In this paper, I demonstrate how conspiracy can be understood as a ‘knowledge-producing discourse’; dialectically engaged across multiple subject positions and through which geopolitical narratives are performatively produced and contested at interconnected scales of bodies, homes, city streets and national ‘homelands’. Through drawing on, and challenging, the conceptual and methodological approaches of a burgeoning feminist geopolitics, I ground my analysis in the embodied performances of ‘patriotic dissent’ by members of the 9/11 Truth Movement in New York City, as well as through my own situated and ethical engagement with positions of political difference.

Jonsson, Patrik. 2011. "Blackbirds Fall from Sky, Fish Die Off: What's a Conspiracy Theorist to Think? ." The Christian Science Monitor. (July 12, 2013).

Jost, John T. 2006. "The End of the End of Ideology." *American Psychologist* 61: 651-70.

The "end of ideology" was declared by social scientists in the aftermath of World War II. They argued that (a) ordinary citizens' political attitudes lack the kind of stability, consistency, and constraint that ideology requires; (b) ideological constructs such as liberalism and conservatism lack motivational potency and behavioral significance; (c) there are no major differences in content (or substance) between liberal and conservative points of view; and (d) there are few important differences in psychological processes (or styles) that underlie liberal versus conservative orientations. The end-of-ideologists were so influential that researchers ignored the topic of ideology for many years. However, current political realities, recent data from the American National Election Studies, and results from an emerging psychological paradigm provide strong grounds for returning to the study of ideology. Studies reveal that there are indeed meaningful political and psychological differences that covary with ideological self-placement. Situational variables--including system threat and mortality salience--and dispositional variables--including openness and conscientiousness--affect the degree to which an individual is drawn to liberal versus conservative leaders, parties, and opinions. A psychological analysis is also useful for understanding the political divide between "red states" and "blue states."

Jost, John T., Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank J. Sulloway. 2003. "Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition." *Psychological Bulletin* 129: 339-75.

Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (authoritarianism, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system justification). A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12 countries, 22,818 cases) confirms that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety (weighted mean r=.50); system instability (.47); dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (-.32); uncertainty tolerance (-.27); needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (-.20); fear of threat and loss (.18); and self-esteem (-.09). The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat.

Jost, John T., Brain A. Nosek, and Samuel D. Gosling. 2008. "Ideology: Its Resurgence in Social, Personality, and Political Psychology." *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 3: 126-36.

We trace the rise, fall, and resurgence of political ideology as a topic of research in social, personality, and political psychology. For over 200 years, political belief systems have been classified usefully according to a single left—right (or liberal-conservative) dimension that, we believe, possesses two core aspects: (a) advocating versus resisting social change and (b) rejecting versus accepting inequality. There have been many skeptics of the notion that most people are ideologically inclined, but recent psychological evidence suggests that left-right differences are pronounced in many life domains. Implicit as well as explicit preferences for tradition, conformity, order, stability, traditional values, and hierarchy—versus those for progress, rebelliousness, chaos, flexibility, feminism, and equality—are associated with conservatism and liberalism, respectively. Conservatives score consistently higher than liberals on measures of system justification. Furthermore, there are personality and lifestyle differences between liberals and conservatives as well as situational variables that induce either liberal or conservative shifts in political opinions. Our thesis is that ideological belief systems may be structured according to a left-right dimension for largely psychological reasons linked to variability in the needs to reduce uncertainty and threat.

Jung, C. G. 1964. "Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Skies." In The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, eds. H. Read, M. Fordham and G. Adler. New York: Pantheon Books.

Jung, C. G. . 1959. "A Visionary Rumor." *Journal of Analytical Psychology* 4: 5-19.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." *Econometrica* 47: 263-92.

This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low probabilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling.

Kam, Dara, and John Lantigua. 2012. "Former Florida Gop Leaders Say Voter Suppression Was Reason They Pushed New Election Law." Palm Beach Post. (September 10, 2013).

Kaplan, Fred. 1983. The Wizards of Armageddon. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kata, Anna. 2010. "A Postmodern Pandora's Box: Anti-Vaccination Misinformation on the Internet." *Vaccine* 28: 1709-16.

The Internet plays a large role in disseminating anti-vaccination information. This paper builds upon previous research by analyzing the arguments proffered on anti-vaccination websites, determining the extent of misinformation present, and examining discourses used to support vaccine objections. Arguments around the themes of safety and effectiveness, alternative medicine, civil liberties, conspiracy theories, and morality were found on the majority of websites analyzed; misinformation was also prevalent. The most commonly proposed method of combating this misinformation is through better education, although this has proven ineffective. Education does not consider the discourses supporting vaccine rejection, such as those involving alternative explanatory models of health, interpretations of parental responsibility, and distrust of expertise. Anti-vaccination protestors make postmodern arguments that reject biomedical and scientific “facts” in favour of their own interpretations. Pro-vaccination advocates who focus on correcting misinformation reduce the controversy to merely an “educational” problem; rather, these postmodern discourses must be acknowledged in order to begin a dialogue.

Katznelson, Ira, and Martin Shefter, eds. 2002. Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kaufman, Chaim D. 2004. "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War." *International Security* 29: 5-48.

Kaufman, Chaim D., and Robert A. Pape. 1999. "Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade." *International Organization* 53: 631-68.

Most of the major theoretical traditions in international relations offer little advice on how costly international moral action could be accomplished. The main exception is the constructivist approach that focuses on the spread of cosmopolitan ethical beliefs through transnational interaction. While the logic of this theory does not imply any limit on the scale of goals that might be achieved, most constructivist empirical work so far has focused on relatively inexpensive moral efforts, such as food aid, and so may not identify the conditions under which states will take on much more costly moral projects. In this article, we test the constructivist theory of moral action against the record of the most costly international moral action in modern history: Britain's sixty-year effort to suppress the Atlantic slave trade from 1807 to 1867. We find that the willingness of British abolitionists to accept high costs was driven less by a cosmopolitan commitment to a moral community of all people than by parochial religious imperatives to impose their moral vision on others and, especially, to reform their domestic society. Transnational influences also had no important effect. Rather, the abolitionists' success in getting the British state to enact their program was determined mainly by opportunities provided by the fragile balance of power m British domestic politics. Although testing in more cases is needed, these findings suggest that better explanations of international moral action might be provided by a type of domestic coalition politics model based on what we call “saintly logrolls.”

Kaufman, Leslie, and Kate Zernike. 2012. "Activists Fight Green Projects, Seeing U.N. Plot." The New York Times. (August 4, 2013).

Kay, Aaron E., Jennifer A. Whitson, Danielle Gaucher, and Adam D. Galinsky. 2009. "Conspensatory Control: Achieving Order through the Mind, Our Institutions, and the Heavens." *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 18: 264-68.

We propose that people protect the belief in a controlled, nonrandom world by imbuing their social, physical, and metaphysical environments with order and structure when their sense of personal control is threatened. We demonstrate that when personal control is threatened, people can preserve a sense of order by (a) perceiving patterns in noise or adhering to superstitions and conspiracies, (b) defending the legitimacy of the sociopolitical institutions that offer control, or (c) believing in an interventionist God. We also present evidence that these processes of compensatory control help people cope with the anxiety and discomfort that lacking personal control fuels, that it is lack of personal control specifically and not general threat or negativity that drives these processes, and that these various forms of compensatory control are ultimately substitutable for one another. Our model of compensatory control offers insight into a wide variety of phenomena, from prejudice to the idiosyncratic rituals of professional athletes to societal rituals around weddings, graduations, and funerals.

Kay, Jonathan. 2011. Among the Truthers: A Journey through America's Growing Conspiracist Underground. New York: Harper Collins Publishers

Keele, Luke. 2007. "Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 51: 241-54.

It is well understood that trust in government responds to the performance of the president, Congress, and the economy. Despite improved government performance, however, trust has never returned to the levels witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s. Social capital may be the force that has kept trust low. If so, we need to assess the relative contributions of both government performance and social capital at the macro level. Using macrolevel data, the analysis, here, is designed to capture the variation over time in both social capital and government performance and let them compete to explain the macro variation in trust. The empirical results demonstrate that both government performance and social capital matter, but that social capital appears to be the force which accounts for the decline in trust over the last 40 years.

Keeley, Brian. 2003. "Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition! More Thoughts on Conspiracy Theory." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 34: 104-10.

———. 1999. "Of Conspiracy Theories." *Journal of Philosophy* 96: 109-26.

Kennan, George F. 1997. At a Century's Ending: Reflections 1982-1995. New York: W.W. Norton.

Kimball, Jeffrey. 1984. "The Influence of Ideology on Interpretive Disagreement: A Report on a Survey of Diplomatic, Military and Peace Historians on the Causes of 20th Century U.S. Wars." *The History Teacher* 17: 356-84.

Kinder, Donald R., and Cindy D. Kam. 2009. Us against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kindleberger, Charles P. 1986. The World in Depression: 1929-1939, Revised and Enlarged Edn. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kindleberger, Charles P., and Robert Aliber. 2005. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. New York Wiley.

Kirtley, David. 2013. "The 1970s Ice Age Myth and Time Magizine Covers." Science Blogs: Greg Laden's Blog. (7/12/2013).

Klein, Adam. 2012. "Slipping Racism into the Mainstream: A theory of Information Laundering." *Communication Theory* 22: 427-48.

Many studies in recent years have addressed the notable ways that Internet features such as blogs and search engines have democratized the community of information seekers and providers, however, fewer investigations have addressed the darker element that has emerged from that same democratic sphere. That is, the huge resurgence and transformation of racist communities across cyberspace. This article presents a new theory of information laundering to explain the process by which racial hate speech is becoming legitimized through a borrowed network of online associations. This Internet-specific theory builds upon research of “information-based” racist propaganda to explain how today's search engines, social networks, and political blogs unwittingly enable purveyors of bigotry to infiltrate into mainstream spaces of public discourse.

Knight, Frank. 1997. The Ethics of Competition. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Knight, Peter, ed. 2002. Conspiracy Nation: The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America. New York: New York University Press.

———. 2003. "Conspiracy Theories in America: A Historical Overview." In Conspiracy Theories in American History Vol. 1, ed. Peter Knight. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC CLIO. 1-13.

———. 2002. "Introduction: A Nation of Conspiracy Theorists." In Conspiracy Nation: The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America, ed. Peter Knight. New York: New York University Press.

———. 2008. "Outrageous Conspiracy Theories: Popular and Official Responses to 9/11 in Germany and the United States." *New German Critique* 35: 165-93.

Kofta, Miroslaw, and Patrycja Slawuta. 2013. "Thou Shall Not Kill…Your Brother: Victim−Perpetrator Cultural Closeness and Moral Disapproval of Polish Atrocities against Jews after the Holocaust." *Journal of Social Issues* 69: 54-73.

This paper addresses the role of collective memory of post-Holocaust crimes in contemporary Polish−Jewish relations. We examined how reminding Polish participants of ingroup atrocities affects constructive as well as destructive attitudes and behavioral intentions toward the Jewish victim group. We address the question of how experimentally induced feelings of cultural closeness between the outgroup and the ingroup modify the effects of these reminders on intergroup relations. Our two experiments suggest that perceived sharing of culture is a crucial factor in dealing constructively with the “problematic past” in intergroup relations. In the baseline condition (where cultural closeness of Jews and Poles was not made salient), reminders of ingroup atrocities activated group-defensive strategies, resulting in more negative intergroup attitudes and dehumanization of Jews. In stark contrast, in the “culturally close” condition (where feelings of shared culture were induced), reminders of ingroup atrocities actually resulted in more positive intergroup attitudes and humanization of Jews.

Kramer, Roderick M. 1999. "Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Questions." *Annual Review of Psychology* 50: 569-98.

Scholarly interest in the study of trust and distrust in organizations has grown dramatically over the past five years. This interest has been fueled, at least in part, by accumulating evidence that trust has a number of important benefits for organizations and their members. A primary aim of this review is to assess the state of this rapidly growing literature. The review examines recent progress in conceptualizing trust and distrust in organizational theory, and also summarizes evidence regarding the myriad benefits of trust within organizational systems. The review also describes different forms of trust found in organizations, and the antecedent conditions that produce them. Although the benefits of trust are well-documented, creating and sustaining trust is often difficult. Accordingly, the chapter concludes by examining some of the psychological, social, and institutional barriers to the production of trust.

Kramer, Roderick M., and D. Gavrieli. 2005. "The Perception of Conspiracy: Leader Paranoia as Adaptive Cognition." In The Psychology of Leadership: New Perspectives and Research, eds. D. M. Messick and Roderick M. Kramer. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Krauss, C. 1992. "28 Years after Kennedy's Assassination, Conspiracy Theories Refuse to Die." New York Times, January 5 12.

Krauthammer, Charles. 1991. "A Rash of Conspiracy Theories." Washington Post, July 5.

Krueger, Alan B. , and David Laitin. 2002. "Faulty Terror Report Card." Washington Post, May 17.

Krugman, Paul. 2008. "Crazy Consipracy Theorists." The New York Times. (August 15, 2013).

———. 2006. "Who's Crazy Now?" The New York Times. (March 1, 2012).

———. 2013. "The Wonk Gap." The New York Times. (September 9, 2013).

Kuklinski, James H., Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, David Schwieder, and Robert F. Rich. 2000. "Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship." *Journal of Politics* 62: 790-816.

Scholars have documented the deficiencies in political knowledge among American citizens. Another problem, misinformation, has received less attention. People are misinformed when they confidently hold wrong beliefs. We present evidence of misinformation about welfare and show that this misinformation acts as an obstacle to educating the public with correct facts. Moreover, widespread misinformation can lead to collective preferences that are far different from those that would exist if people were correctly informed. The misinformation phenomenon has implications for two currently influential scholarly literatures: the study of political heuristics and the study of elite persuasion and issue framing.

Laitin, David. 1998. Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the New Abroad. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

LaPlant, James T. 2011. "No Winning This Argument." New York Times. (August 5, 2013).

LaRouche, Lyndon. 2013. "Remarks from Lyndon Larouche: Ww3 Showdown, or Global Policy for Growth." LaRouche Political Action Committee Newsletter.

Latner, Richard. 2006. "Here Are No Newters': Witchcraft and Religious Discord in Salem Village and Andover." *New England Quarterly* 79: 92-122.

Lavery, David, Angela Hague, and Marla Cartwright. 1996. Deny All Knowledge: Reading the X Files: Syracuse University Press.

Layne, Christopher. 2004. "The War on Terror and the Balance of Power: The Paradoxes of American Hegenomy." In Balance of Power Revisited: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, eds. T.V. Paul, James Wirtz and Michel Fortmann. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 103-26.

Leber, Rebecca. 2013. "Poll Reveals Wide Racial, Partisan Divide on George Zimmerman Trial." Think Progress. (September 11, 2013).

Lee, Spike. 2007. "Spike Lee on Real Time with Bill Maher." HBO.

Leman, Patrick J, and Marco Cinnirella. 2013. "Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories and the Need for Cognitive Closure." *Frontiers in Psychology* 4.

An important component of conspiracy theories is how they influence, and are influenced by, the evaluation of potential evidence. Some individuals may be more open minded regarding certain explanations for events whereas others may seek closure and thus cut off a conspiracy explanation. Two studies examined the relationship between the need for cognitive closure (NFCC), levels of belief in real world conspiracy theories, and the attribution of conspiracy theories to explain events. A first, small (N = 30) and preliminary study found no relationship between NFCC and beliefs in conspiracy theories, suggesting that both advocates and opponents of conspiracy explanations do not differ on this dimension. A second study (N = 86) revealed that evidence for and against conspiracy theories had an influence on attributions of the likelihood of a conspiracy to explain a novel event. Specifically, after reading evidence individuals with high levels of belief in conspiracy theories tended to rate a conspiracy explanation as more likely whereas those with low levels of belief rated it as less likely. However, when the need for cognitive closure (NFCC) was experimentally lowered the effects of prior beliefs in conspiracy theories diminished.

Levi, Margaret, and Laura Stoker. 2000. "Political Trust and Trustworthiness." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 475-507.

After addressing the meaning of “trust” and “trustworthiness,” we review survey-based research on citizens' judgments of trust in governments and politicians, and historical and comparative case study research on political trust and government trustworthiness. We first provide an overview of research in these two traditions, and then take up four topics in more detail: (a) political trust and political participation; (b) political trust, public opinion, and the vote; (c) political trust, trustworthy government, and citizen compliance; and (d) political trust, social trust, and cooperation. We conclude with a discussion of fruitful directions for future research.

Levy, Jack. 2004. "What Do Great Powers Balance against and When?" In Balance of Power Revisited: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, eds. T.V. Paul, James Wirtz and Michel Fortmann. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 29-51.

Levy, Neil. 2007. "Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories." *Episteme* 4: 181-92.

The typical explanation of an event or process which attracts the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is an explanation that conflicts with the account advanced by the relevant epistemic authorities. I argue that both for the layperson and for the intellectual, it is almost never rational to accept such a conspiracy theory. Knowledge is not merely shallowly social, in the manner recognized by social epistemology, it is also constitutively social: many kinds of knowledge only become accessible thanks to the agent's embedding in an environment that includes other epistemic agents. Moreover, advances in knowledge typically require ongoing immersion in this social environment. But the intellectual who embraces a conspiracy theory risks cutting herself off from this environment, and therefore epistemically disabling herself. Embracing a conspiracy theory therefore places at risk the ability to engage in genuine enquiry, including the enquiry needed properly to evaluate the conspiracy theory.

Lewandowsky, Stephan, John Cook, Klaus Oberauer, and Michael Marriott. 2013. "Recursive Fury: Conspiracist Ideation in the Blogosphere in Response to Research on Conspiracist Ideation." *Frontiers in Psychology* 4.

Conspiracist ideation has been repeatedly implicated in the rejection of scientific propositions, although empirical evidence to date has been sparse. A recent study involving visitors to climate blogs found that conspiracist ideation was associated with the rejection of climate science and the rejection of other scientific propositions such as the link between lung cancer and smoking, and between HIV and AIDS (Lewandowsky et al., in press; LOG12 from here on). This article analyses the response of the climate blogosphere to the publication of LOG12. We identify and trace the hypotheses that emerged in response to LOG12 and that questioned the validity of the paper’s conclusions. Using established criteria to identify conspiracist ideation, we show that many of the hypotheses exhibited conspiratorial content and counterfactual thinking. For example, whereas hypotheses were initially narrowly focused on LOG12, some ultimately grew in scope to include actors beyond the authors of LOG12, such as university executives, a media organization, and the Australian government. The overall pattern of the blogosphere’s response to LOG12 illustrates the possible role of conspiracist ideation in the rejection of science, although alternative scholarly interpretations may be advanced in the future.

Lewandowsky, Stephan, Ullrich K. H. Ecker, Colleen M. Seifert, Norbert Schwarz, and John Cook. 2012. "Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and Successful Debiasing." *Psychological Science in the Public Interest* 13: 106-31.

The widespread prevalence and persistence of misinformation in contemporary societies, such as the false belief that there is a link between childhood vaccinations and autism, is a matter of public concern. For example, the myths surrounding vaccinations, which prompted some parents to withhold immunization from their children, have led to a marked increase in vaccine-preventable disease, as well as unnecessary public expenditure on research and public-information campaigns aimed at rectifying the situation.

Lewandowsky, Stephan, Klaus Oberauer, and Gilles Gignac. 2013. "Nasa Faked the Moon Landing—Therefore (Climate) Science Is a Hoax: An Anatomy of the Motivated Rejection of Science." *Psychological Science* 5: 622-33.

Although nearly all domain experts agree that carbon dioxide emissions are altering the world’s climate, segments of the public remain unconvinced by the scientific evidence. Internet blogs have become a platform for denial of climate change, and bloggers have taken a prominent role in questioning climate science. We report a survey of climate-blog visitors to identify the variables underlying acceptance and rejection of climate science. Our findings parallel those of previous work and show that endorsement of free-market economics predicted rejection of climate science. Endorsement of free markets also predicted the rejection of other established scientific findings, such as the facts that HIV causes AIDS and that smoking causes lung cancer. We additionally show that, above and beyond endorsement of free markets, endorsement of a cluster of conspiracy theories (e.g., that the Federal Bureau of Investigation killed Martin Luther King, Jr.) predicted rejection of climate science as well as other scientific findings. Our results provide empirical support for previous suggestions that conspiratorial thinking contributes to the rejection of science. Acceptance of science, by contrast, was strongly associated with the perception of a consensus among scientists.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Tom W. Rice. 1985. "Government Growth in the United States." *The Journal of Politics* 47: 2-30.

For American politicians, big government is a perennial issue. Scholars, however, have neglected it. In fact, systematic knowledge about the causes of government growth in the United States is virtually absent. Here we first formulate a “hybrid” model of government growth, borrowing from popular theories of public policy. Then, we estimate the model using annual time series data, 1932–80. In general, government size in the United States is viewed as a function of group demands, elite preferences, and mass support. In particular, government in the United States seems to have expanded in response to the influences of national defense commitment, foreign trade, economic hardship, demographic change, Democratic politicians, and a risk-aversive public. Of these influences, the international ones appear especially important. Overall, the ensemble of variables manages to predict the pattern of government growth in twentieth-century America quite well.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1971. "Supporters of the Birch Society." In American Political Radicalism, ed. Gilbert Abcarian. Lexington, MA: Xerox College Publishing. 195-210.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Earl Raab. 1978. The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America 1790-1977. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Locke, Simon. 2009. "Conspiracy Culture, Blame Culture, and Rationalization." *The Sociological Review* 57: 567-85.

This paper outlines an approach to conspiracy culture that attempts to resolve the conundrum posed by the parallel logics of conspiracy and sociological theorising, without reducing the former to an irrational response to hidden social forces. Rather, from a re-crafting of Weber's rationalisation thesis as an analysis of the developmental logic of theories of suffering, it argues that conspiracy culture is an outcome of the means of moral accounting, or blame attribution, that inform mundane reasoning in modernity, as also are the human sciences. As part of this, the paper sketches a tentative framework of moral accounting in relation to the notion of ‘blame culture’ based in part on a distinction between a culture of blaming and the blaming of culture. This is used to argue that there is nothing irrational about conspiracy culture – or at least no more so than there is about sociology.

Lodge, Milton, and Charles S Taber. 2013. The Rationalizing Voter: Cambridge University Press.

Lubove, Roy. 1986. The Struggle for Social Security, 1900-1935. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Luciano, Dana. 2003. "Freemasonry." In Conspiracy Theories in American History Vol. 1, ed. Peter Knight. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. 269-74.

MacDonald, Paul K. 2009. "Is Imperial Rule Obsolete? Assessing the Barriers to Overseas Adventurism." *Security Studies* 18: 79-114.

The idea that the United States is an empire or should adopt imperial strategies has been widely criticized. One of the most persuasive sets of arguments against imperial enthusiasts is that empire is an obsolete and outdated strategy. Both systemic- and domestic-level changes are said to prevent the United States from successfully implementing an imperial strategy. I maintain that the importance of these barriers—whether technological, economic, or ideational—are greatly overstated. In contrast, I point to a number of developments, such as the rise of nontraditional security threats, the revolution in military affairs, and changing norms of humanitarian intervention, that will encourage greater American overseas adventurism.

———. 2013. "'Retribution Must Succeed Rebellion': The Colonial Origins of Counterinsurgency Failure." *International Organization* 67: 253-86.

What can explain the decline in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency wars? Political scientists offer a variety of explanations for these trends. Some focus on the structure and doctrine of counterinsurgent forces, while others emphasize the lethality and motivation of insurgent adversaries. I challenge these explanations. Declines in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency wars are not driven by fundamental shifts in the character of these conflicts, but in the political context in which they take place. Nineteenth-century colonial incumbents enjoyed a variety of political advantages—including strong political will, a permissive international environment, access to local collaborators, and flexibility to pick their battles—which granted them the time and resources necessary to meet insurgent challenges. In contrast, twentieth-century colonial incumbents struggled in the face of apathetic publics, hostile superpowers, vanishing collaborators, and constrained options. The decline in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency warfare, therefore, stems not from problems in force structure or strategy, but in political shifts in the profitability and legitimacy of colonial forms of governance.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1996. Discourses on Livy. Translated by Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1994. Il Principe. Translated by Joseph Parent. Milan: Oscar Mondadori.

———. 1998. The Prince. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mahoney, M. 1977. "Publication Prejudices: An Experimental Study of Confirmatory Bias in the Peer Review System." *Cognitive Therapy and Research* 2: 161-75.

Confirmatory bias is the tendency to emphasize and believe experiences which support one's views and to ignore or discredit those which do not. The effects of this tendency have been repeatedly documented in clinical research. However, its ramifications for the behavior of scientists have yet to be adequately explored. For example, although publication is a critical element in determining the contribution and impact of scientific findings, little research attention has been devoted to the variables operative in journal review policies. In the present study, 75 journal reviewers were asked to referee manuscripts which described identical experimental procedures but which reported positive, negative, mixed, or no results. In addition to showing poor interrater agreement, reviewers were strongly biased against manuscripts which reported results contrary to their theoretical perspective. The implications of these findings for epistemology and the peer review system are briefly addressed.

Maier, Pauline. 1998. American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence New York: Vintage Books.

Mandik, Pete. 2007. "Shit Happens." *Episteme* 4: 205-18.

In this paper I embrace what Brian Keeley calls in “Of Conspiracy Theories” the absurdist horn of the dilemma for philosophers who criticize such theories. I thus defend the view that there is indeed something deeply epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. My complaint is that conspiracy theories apply intentional explanations to situations that give rise to special problems concerning the elimination of competing intentional explanations.

Manwell, Laurie A. 2010. "In Denial of Democracy: Social Psychological Implications for Public Discourse on State Crimes against Democracy Post-9/11." *American Behavioral Scientist* 53: 848-84.

Protecting democracy requires that the general public be educated on how people can be manipulated by government and media into forfeiting their civil liberties and duties. This article reviews research on cognitive constructs that can prevent people from processing information that challenges preexisting assumptions about government, dissent, and public discourse in democratic societies. Terror management theory and system justification theory are used to explain how preexisting beliefs can interfere with people’s examination of evidence for state crimes against democracy (SCADs), specifically in relation to the events of September 11, 2001, and the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. Reform strategies are proposed to motivate citizens toward increased social responsibility in a post-9/11 culture of propagandized fear, imperialism, and war.

Markley, Robert. 1997. "Alien Assassinations: The X-Files and the Paranoid Structure of History." *Camera Obscura* 14: 75-102.

Markman, Art. 2009. "Conspiracy Theories Are Easier to Maintain from a Distance." Psychology Today. http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/ulterior-motives/200909/conspiracy-theories-are-easier-maintain-distance.

Martin, Andrew D., and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation Via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999." *Political Analysis* 10: 134-53.

At the heart of attitudinal and strategic explanations of judicial behavior is the assumption that justices have policy preferences. In this paper we employ Markov chain Monte Carlo methods to fit a Bayesian measurement model of ideal points for all justices serving on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1953 through 1999. We are particularly interested in determining to what extent ideal points of justices change throughout their tenure on the Court. This is important because judicial politics scholars oftentimes invoke preference measures that are time invariant. To investigate preference change, we posit a dynamic item response model that allows ideal points to change systematically over time. Additionally, we introduce Bayesian methods for fitting multivariate dynamic linear models to political scientists. Our results suggest that many justices do not have temporally constant ideal points. Moreover, our ideal point estimates outperform existing measures and explain judicial behavior quite well across civil rights, civil liberties, economics, and federalism cases.

Martin, Cathie Jo, and Duane Swank. 2008. "The Political Origins of Coordinated Capitalism: Business Organizations, Party Systems, and State Structure in the Age of Innocence " *The American Political Science Review* 102: 181-98.

This paper investigates the political determinants of corporatist and pluralist employers' associations and reflects on the origins of the varieties of capitalism in the early decades of the 20th century. We hypothesize that proportional, multiparty systems tend to enable employers' associations to develop into social corporatist organizations, whereas nonproportional, two-party systems are conducive to the formation of pluralist associations. Moreover, we suggest that federalism tends to reinforce incentives for pluralist organization. We assess our hypotheses through quantitative analysis of data from 1900 to the 1930s from 16 nations and case studies of the origins of peak employers' associations in Denmark and the United States. Our statistical analysis suggests that proportional, multiparty systems foster, and federalism works against, social corporatist business organization; employers' organization is also greater where the mobilization of labor, traditions of coordination, and economic development are higher. These factors also largely explain pre-World War II patterns of national coordination of capitalism. Case histories of the origins of employers' associations in Denmark and the United States further confirm the causal importance of political factors. Although Danish and American employers had similar interests in creating cooperative national industrial policies, trajectories of associational development were constrained by the structure of party competition, as well as by preindustrial traditions for coordination.

Marzilli, Ted. 2011. "Cain's Candidacy Splits Pizza Scores." YouGov: BrandIndex. (September 11, 2013).

Mayhew, David R. 2005. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946 - 2002. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

———. 2008. Parties and Policies: How the American Government Works. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Mays, Vickie M., Courtney N. Coles, and Susan D. Cochran. 2012. "Is There a Legacy of the U.S. Public Health Syphilis Study at Tuskegee in Hiv/Aids-Related Beliefs among Heterosexual African Americans and Latinos?" *Ethics & Behavior* 22: 461-71.

The Tuskegee Syphilis Study is often cited as a major reason for low research participation rates among racial/ethnic minorities. We use data from a random-digit-dial telephone survey of 510 African Americans and 253 Latinos drawn from low income Los Angeles neighborhoods to investigate associations between knowledge of the study and endorsement of HIV/AIDS conspiracy theories. Results indicate African Americans were significantly more likely than Latinos to endorse HIV/AIDS conspiracy theories and were more aware of the study. Nevertheless, few Americans and Latinos had ever heard of Syphilis Study suggesting that awareness is not a major factor in low participation rates.

McAllister, James. 2002. No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

McCauley, Clark, and Susan Jacques. 1979. "The Popularity of Conspiracy Theories of Presidential Assassination: A Bayesian Analysis." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 37: 637-44.

Journalist T. Bethell (1975) advanced the hypothesis that conspiracy explanations of presidential assassination are popular because people have an irrational need to explain big and important events with proportionately big and important causes. This is a species of consistency hypothesis and clearly predicts that a shot that kills a president is more likely than a miss to be attributed to a conspiracy. Four studies with 80 undergraduate Ss are reported that support this prediction. Three of the studies provided a check on whether conspiracy was overly favored, in the case of successful assassination, by comparison with the normative Bayesian formulation. No evidence of this kind of departure from rationality was found. It appears that people associate conspiracy with successful assassination, not because of any kind of special need for proportionality of cause and effect, but because of a belief that conspiracies are more effective and successful than lone assassins.

McClosky, Herbert, and Dennis Chong. 1985. "Similarities and Differences between Left-Wing and Right-Wing Radicals." *British Journal of Political Science* 15: 329-63.

Although some scholars have argued that authoritarianism is characteristic only of the right and not of the left, persuasive reasons exist for doubting this claim. Intuitive observation of left-wing and right-wing regimes as well as radical political movements of the left and right reveals striking parallels in their styles of political engagement, their reliance upon force, their disdain for democratic ideals and practices and their violations of civil liberties. In addition, systematic inquiry into the similarities and differences between far-left and far-right radicals in the United States has been hampered by various methodological difficulties. One can list, among these, such problems as the obvious inappropriateness of the F scale (owing to its strong right-wing content) as a measure for identifying left-wing authoritarians; the difficulty of obtaining adequate samples of true believers of the extreme left and right; the self-image of the American left as a persecuted minority which, for reasons of self-interest, spuriously inflates the degree of support expressed by its members for individual rights and liberties; and the exposure of both extreme camps to the liberal democratic values dominating American political culture, which unmistakably colours their political rhetoric.

McClosky, Herbert, and John Zaller. 1984. The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McCright, Aaron M, and Riley E Dunlap. 2011. "Cool Dudes: The Denial of Climate Change among Conservative White Males in the United States." *Global environmental change* 21: 1163-72.

We examine whether conservative white males are more likely than are other adults in the U.S. general public to endorse climate change denial. We draw theoretical and analytical guidance from the identity-protective cognition thesis explaining the white male effect and from recent political psychology scholarship documenting the heightened system-justification tendencies of political conservatives. We utilize public opinion data from ten Gallup surveys from 2001 to 2010, focusing specifically on five indicators of climate change denial. We find that conservative white males are significantly more likely than are other Americans to endorse denialist views on all five items, and that these differences are even greater for those conservative white males who self-report understanding global warming very well. Furthermore, the results of our multivariate logistic regression models reveal that the conservative white male effect remains significant when controlling for the direct effects of political ideology, race, and gender as well as the effects of nine control variables. We thus conclude that the unique views of conservative white males contribute significantly to the high level of climate change denial in the United States.

McDougall, Walter A.

———. 2004. Freedom Just around the Corner: A New American History, 1585-1828. New York: Harper Collins.

McHoskey, John W. 1995. "Case Closed? On the John F. Kennedy Assassination: Biased Assimilation of Evidence and Attitude Polarization." *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 17: 1995.

Vitriolic debate surrounds John F. Kennedy's (JFK's) death more than 30 years after the assassination. Whereas some endorse the official government conclusion that Oswald acted alone, others allege that some form of a conspiracy is responsible for Kennedy's death. The central thesis of this article is that due to the processes of biased assimilation and attitude polarization, personal theories about the perpetrator(s) of the assassination are essentially immutable, and therefore that the debate surrounding JFK's assassination will continue endlessly. Due to the process of biased assimilation, proponents of both the Oswald and conspiracy theories perceive the same body of evidence as supportive of their position. Biased assimilation leads to attitude polarization rather than to a moderation or reversal of existing attitudes. The results of the present study strongly support this line of reasoning. The study also examined the formation of assassination attitudes among subjects with no initial opinion. The majority of these subjects embraced the conspiracy theory at the conclusion of the study. However, authoritarianism was indirectly associated with the development of an Oswald theory stance via an increased endorsement of evidence consistent with the Oswald theory.

McMahon, Darrin M. 2004. "Conspiracies So Vast: Conspiracy Theory Was Born in the Age of Enlightenment and Has Matastasized in the Age of the Internet. Why Wont It Go Away?" The Boston Globe, Feb. 1, 2004.

McNeil, Donald G., Jr. 2011. "Panel Hears Grim Details of Venereal Disease Tests." New York Times, 30 August

Mearsheimer, John J. 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. USA: W.W. Norton & Company.

———. 2011. Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Melley, Timothy. 2008. "Brainwashed! Conspiracy Theory and Ideology in the Postwar United States." *New German Critique* 35: 145-64.

———. 2000. Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Messick, Kim. 2013. "The Tea Party’s Paranoid Aesthetic " Salon.com. (September 10, 2013).

Middlekauff, Robert. 2005. The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789. New York: Oxford University Press.

Miller, Neil Z. 2013. "Vaccine Science Vs. Science Fiction."

Montesquieu, Baron De. 1965. "Considerations on the Causes of the Romans and Thier Decline." Indianapolis: Hackett.

Montford, AW. 2010. The Hockey Stick Illusion: Climategate and the Corruption of Science: Stacey International.

Mooney, Chris. 2013. "The More Republicans Know About Politics, the More They Believe Conspiracy Theories." Mother Jones. (July 8, 2013).

Moos, Julie. 2011. "Factchecking Obama: Birther Controversy Was 4% of Newshole, Not 'Dominant' Story." Poytner. http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/top-stories/129708/factchecking-obama-birther-controversy-was-3-4-of-newshole-economy-was-39/. http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/top-stories/129708/factchecking-obama-birther-controversy-was-3-4-of-newshole-economy-was-39/. (8/20/2011).

Morales, Lyman. 2011. "Majority in U.S. Continues to Distrust the Media, Perceive Bias." Gallop Politics.

Morello, Carol. 2004. "Conspiracy Theories Flourish on the Internet." The Washington Post. (August 1, 2013).

Morgan, Philip D. 2002. "Conspiracy Scares." *William and Mary Quarterly* 59: 159-66.

Mueller, John. 2006. "Is There Still a Terrorist Threat: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy." *Foreign Affairs* 85: 2-8.

———. 2009. Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them. New York: Free Press.

———. 1994. Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War. Chicago University Press of Chicago

———. 1985. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Mulligan, Kenneth, and Philip Habel. 2013. "The Implications of Fictional Media for Political Beliefs." *American Politics Research* 41: 122-46.

Most research on media effects in political science deals with the news media or political campaigns. Although some recent work looks at the effects of soft news on beliefs and opinions, little attention has been paid to the potential consequences of media that are fictional. Although viewers typically watch fiction for entertainment, the themes, plots, and dialogue may nevertheless influence their thoughts about politics. This article examines the effects of fiction on political beliefs. We do this in the context of an experimental design, where subjects in the treatment group watched the outlandish movie, Wag the Dog. The results show that those who watched the film were more likely to believe in a far-fetched conspiracy, namely that the U.S. government has and will fabricate a war for political gain. The findings stretch the boundaries of fictional influence by focusing on extreme, conspiratorial beliefs. We suggest that political science and communications scholars should focus greater attention on the implications of fiction for beliefs and attitudes, as the consequences can be perverse.

Murphy, Dan. "Fort Hood Shooting: Was Nidal Malik Hasan Inspired by Militant Clerics?" *Christian Science Monitor*.

Nacos, Brigitte L., Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2011. Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion, Chicago Studies in American Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Nattrass, Nicoli. 2012. "How Bad Ideas Gain Social Traction." *The Lancet* 380: 332-33.

———. 2013. "Understanding the Origins and Prevalence of Aids Conspiracy Beliefs in the United States and South Africa." *Sociology of Health & Illness* 35: 113-29.

The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) originated from cross-species transmission of the simian immunodeficiency virus from primates to humans. Yet a significant minority of people in the United States (US) and South Africa believe that HIV was deliberately created by scientists as a bioweapon. Scholars in the humanities emphasise the historical context, socially situated character and psycho-social dimensions of such aetiological narratives. This is important, but so is the role of individual agents participating in the cultic milieu in which oppositional ideas such as HIV conspiracy theories are borrowed across national, ideological and political divides. This article discusses the origins of the legend of ‘HIV as bioweapon’ and summarises the available evidence on the prevalence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) conspiracy beliefs in the US and South Africa. This is followed by a discussion of the history of biowarfare and racial oppression which renders the legend (and its local South African variants) believable for many people. The article then moves beyond socio-historical analysis to argue that analytical space needs to be created to critique the political leaders who promoted AIDS conspiracy beliefs.

Nefes, Turkay. 2012. "The History of the Social Constructions of Donmes (Converts)." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 25: 413-39.

This paper investigates the history of social constructions, principally conspiracy theories, about a crypto-Jewish group, the Dönmes, in Turkey. It considers the socio-political reasons for the conspiracy theories and their significance by analysing their contents in different periods. The findings suggest that the fluid identity of Dönmes makes them stranger figures, in a sociological sense, creates public mistrust and encourages conspiratorial explanations. Moreover, the study shows that the conspiracy theories surrounding Dönmes are also fed by the ontological insecurities of Turkish politics, and that conspiracy theories tend to have appeal for alienated groups during major social transformations.

Nefes, Türkay Salim. 2013. "Political Parties' Perceptions and Uses of Anti-Semitic Conspiracy Theories in Turkey." *The Sociological Review* 61: 247-64.

Despite its ever-present and at times escalating significance, conspiracy theory is an under-researched topic in the social sciences. This paper analyses the political influence of conspiracy theories by drawing on semi-structured interviews with the representatives of four major political parties from the Turkish parliament about widespread anti-Semitic conspiracy theories regarding Dönmes (converts). The findings indicate that right-wing political parties problematize the secret character of the Dönme community and use the conspiracy theories to express their own ontological insecurities emerging from the Sèvres syndrome. Left-wing and liberal parties conversely dissociate themselves from the conspiratorial rhetoric. The research concludes that the political parties reject or accept the conspiracy theories rationally and in alignment with their own ontological insecurities; by doing so, they pragmatically confirm their individual ideological perspective.

Neisser, Phil. 2007. "Power, Conspiracy, Command Center Thinking, and Deliberative Democracy." Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL, April 13, 2007.

The paper argues that the form of political thinking that commonly goes by name of conspiracy theory is, like its milder cousin conspiracy thinking, deeply informed by an overly voluntaristic understanding of power that I call command center thinking. The paper goes on to claim that these three modes of thought stand, both as they operate together and taken separately, as major sources of disagreement failure and thus as obstacles to deliberative democracy.

Neumann, Franz L. 1957. "Anxiety and Politics." In The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory, ed. Herbert Marcuse. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Newheiser, Anna-Kaisa, Miguel Farias, and Nicole Tausch. 2011. "The Functional Nature of Conspiracy Beliefs: Examining the Underpinnings of Belief in the *Da Vinci Code* Conspiracy." *Personality and Individual Differences* 51: 1007-11.

Focusing on a contemporary conspiracy theory popularized in the novel The Da Vinci Code ( Brown, 2002), we examined the underlying psychological factors and individual differences that may predict belief in conspiracy theories, and assessed such beliefs’ resistance to counterevidence. Our results suggest that belief in the Da Vinci Code conspiracy may be associated with coping with existential threat and death-related anxiety. In addition, the extent to which participants believed in the conspiracy was associated with the endorsement of congruent (New Age spiritual) and competing (Christian religious) beliefs, in opposite directions. Finally, exposure to counterevidence resulted in belief reduction, specifically among more religious participants (i.e. among those endorsing a competing belief system). We suggest that belief in modern conspiracy theories may help individuals attain or maintain a sense of meaning, control, and security.

Neyfakh, Leon. 2012. "Revealed! Obama’s Secret Agenda " The Boston Globe. (July 15, 2013).

Niemi, Richard G., and Mary A. Hepburn. 1995. "The Rebirth of Political Socialization." *Perspectives on Political Science* 24: 7-16.

Nyhan, Brendan. 2009. "9/11 and Birther Misperceptions Compared." Brendan-nyhan.com/blog. (August 1, 2011).

———. 2013. "Backsliding on the ‘Death Panels’ Myth." Columbia Journalism Review.

———. 2011. "Why Conspiracy Theories Die Hard." CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/04/28/nyhan.birther.truth/index.html.

———. 2010. "Why the "Death Panel" Myth Wouldn't Die: Misinformation in the Health Care Reform Debate." *The Forum* 8: Article 5.

Both Bill Clinton and Barack Obama struggled to overcome widespread and persistent myths about their proposals to reform the American health care system. Their difficulties highlight the influence of factual misinformation in national politics and the extent to which it correlates with citizens' political views. In this essay, I explain how greater elite polarization and the growth in media choice have reinforced the partisan divide in factual beliefs. To illustrate these points, I analyze debates over health care reform in 1993–1994 and 2009–2010, tracing the spread of false claims about reform proposals from Bill Clinton and Barack Obama and analyzing the prevalence of misinformation in public opinion. Since false beliefs are extremely difficult to correct, I conclude by arguing that increasing the reputational costs for dishonest elites might be a more effective approach to improving democratic discourse.

Nyhan, Brendan, Eric McGhee, John Sides, Seth Masket, and Steven Greene. 2012. "One Vote out of Step? The Effects of Salient Roll Call Votes in the 2010 Election." *American Politics Research*.

We investigate the relationship between controversial roll call votes and support for Democratic incumbents in the 2010 midterm elections. Consistent with previous analyses, we find that supporters of health care reform paid a significant price at the polls. We go beyond these analyses by identifying a mechanism for this apparent effect: constituents perceived incumbents who supported health care reform as more ideologically distant (in this case, more liberal), which in turn was associated with lower support for those incumbents. Our analyses show that this perceived ideological difference mediates most of the apparent impact of support for health care reform on both individual-level vote choice and aggregate-level vote share. We conclude by simulating counterfactuals that suggest health care reform may have cost Democrats their House majority.

Nyhan, Brendan, and Jason Reifler. 2009. "The Effects of Semantics and Social Desirability in Correcting the Obama Muslim Myth."

Previous research has found that the effectiveness of corrective information can vary

depending on its source and the characteristics and beliefs of recipients. In this paper, we examine two other factors that may affect the effectiveness of corrections – their semantic construction and the context in which they are delivered. Specifically, we conducted three experiments testing whether the effectiveness of corrections of the rumor that Barack Obama is a Muslim changed depending on their phrasing (negating the myth or affirming the truth). Our results varied dramatically depending on context. When a study was conducted by or attributed to non-white researchers, corrections reduced stated misperceptions among white participants. However, misperceptions often became worse in response to corrections when a study was conducted by or attributed to white researchers, particularly among Republicans. These findings suggest that the context in which corrections are delivered can shape how people respond to them.

———. 2011. "Opening the Political Mind: The Effects of Self-Affirmation and Graphical Information on Factual Misperceptions."

Why do so many Americans believe in misinformation? One possibility is that people

have not been exposed to clear factual information. If so, then presenting correct

information in a compelling format should substantially reduce these false or unsupported beliefs. Alternatively, people may have encountered accurate information but rejected it because it threatened their worldview or self-concept. Drawing from psychology research, we examine whether affirming individuals’ self-worth can make them more willing to acknowledge these politically uncomfortable facts. We find support for both explanations. Results from three experiments show that providing accurate information in graphical form reduces misperceptions. However, self-affirmation also substantially reduces misperceptions among those most likely to hold them even if no other information is provided. The misperceptions problem is thus not simply the result of a lack of information – our results suggest that many people could offer correct answers if they were less psychologically threatening to provide.

———. 2010. "When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions." *Political Behavior* 32: 303-30.

An extensive literature addresses citizen ignorance, but very little research focuses on misperceptions. Can these false or unsubstantiated beliefs about politics be corrected? Previous studies have not tested the efficacy of corrections in a realistic format. We conducted four experiments in which subjects read mock news articles that included either a misleading claim from a politician, or a misleading claim and a correction. Results indicate that corrections frequently fail to reduce misperceptions among the targeted ideological group. We also document several instances of a “backfire effect” in which corrections actually increase misperceptions among the group in question.

Nyhan, Brendan, Jason Reifler, and Peter A Ubel. 2013. "The Hazards of Correcting Myths About Health Care Reform." *Medical care* 51: 127-32.

Context: Misperceptions are a major problem in debates about health care reform and other controversial health issues.

Methods: We conducted an experiment to determine if more aggressive media fact-checking could correct the false belief that the Affordable Care Act would create “death panels.” Participants from an opt-in Internet panel were randomly assigned to either a control group in which they read an article on Sarah Palin’s claims about “death panels” or an intervention group in which the article also contained corrective information refuting Palin.

Findings: The correction reduced belief in death panels and strong opposition to the reform bill among those who view Palin unfavorably and those who view her favorably but have low political knowledge. However, it backfired among politically knowledgeable Palin supporters, who were more likely to believe in death panels and to strongly oppose reform if they received the correction.

Conclusions: These results underscore the difficulty of reducing misperceptions about health care reform among individuals with the motivation and sophistication to reject corrective information.

Oliver, J., and T. Wood. 2014. "Medical Conspiracy Theories and Health Behaviors in the United States." *JAMA Internal Medicine* 174: 817-18.

To determine the extent of “medical conspiracism” in the American public, a nationally representative, online-survey sample of 1351 adults was collected in August and September of 2013 by Internet market research company YouGov. The survey results were then weighted to provide a representative sample of the population and have the same degree of accuracy as in-person or telephone surveys.1 This research was approved by the institutional review board of the University of Chicago. Respondents who took part in the survey gave their written consent.

Oliver, J Eric, and Thomas J Wood. 2014. "Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style (S) of Mass Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science*.

Although conspiracy theories have long been a staple of American political culture, no research has systematically examined the nature of their support in the mass public. Using four nationally representative surveys, sampled between 2006 and 2011, we find that half of the American public consistently endorses at least one conspiracy theory and that many popular conspiracy theories are differentiated along ideological and anomic dimensions. In contrast with many theoretical speculations, we do not find conspiracism to be a product of greater authoritarianism, ignorance, or political conservatism. Rather, the likelihood of supporting conspiracy theories is strongly predicted by a willingness to believe in other unseen, intentional forces and an attraction to Manichean narratives. These findings both demonstrate the widespread allure of conspiracy theories as political explanations and offer new perspectives on the forces that shape mass opinion and American political culture.

Oliver, J. Eric, and Thomas J. Wood. 2012. "Conspiracy Theories, Magical Thinking, and the Paranoid Style(S) of Mass Opinion." The Univeristy of Chicago Working Paper Series.

Although conspiracy theories have long been a staple of American political culture, no research has systematically examined their support in the mass public. Using four nationally representative surveys, sampled between 2006 and 2011, this paper examines the nature of “conspiracism” in the United States. We find that about half the American public endorses at least one kind of conspiratorial narrative, that conspiracy theories systematically differentiate along ideological and anomic dimensions, and that conspiracism is driven by predispositions towards “magical thinking” and an attraction to Manichean narratives. Belief in conspiracy theories also affects normal patterns of opinion formation on a host of policy items. These findings highlight the importance of conspiracism as an integral part of American public opinion.

Olmsted, Kathryn S. 2008. Real Enemies: Conspiracy Theories and American Democracy, World War I to 9/11. New York Oxford University Press.

Oppel, Richard A. Jr. 2011. "Mysterious Blight Destroys Afghan Poppy Harvest." New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/world/asia/13opium.html. (8/8/2011).

Orda, Olga. "The Romantic View of Nature and the Conspiracy Theory in Environmental Documentaries." University of Calgary, 2012.

This project argues that environmental documentaries of the 2000s promote harmful Romantic views of nature and produce overly simplistic knowledge about the causes of global environmental degradation through the use of the conspiracy theory. By analyzing the rhetorical and ideological features of environmental documentaries through the tradition of scholars who write on the Romantic views of nature and the conspiracy theories, this project’s methodology will allow us to see how environmental documentaries frame nature and environmental problems in ways that are overly simplistic and even harmful to the advancement of the environmental movement itself. Ultimately, this project contributes a unique analysis not only of environmental films, but more importantly, the types of definitions of nature and environmental problems that circulate and that are perpetuated in popular culture and environmental movement circles.

O'Reilly, Bill. 2006. "O'reilly Takes on 9/11 Conspiracy Theorist!", The O'Reilly Factor. USA: FOX News.

———. 2012. "Who Is Running Sandra Fluke?" The O'Reilly Factor. (July 7, 2013).

Origgi, Gloria. 2012. "Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust." *Social Epistemology* 26: 221-35.

Miranda Fricker has introduced the insightful notion of epistemic injustice in the philosophical debate, thus bridging concerns of social epistemology with questions that arise in the area of social and cultural studies. I concentrate my analysis of her treatment of testimonial injustice. According to Fricker, the central cases of testimonial injustice are cases of identity injustice in which hearers rely on stereotypes to assess the credibility of their interlocutors. I try here to broaden the analysis of that testimonial injustice by indicating other mechanisms that bias our credibility assessments. In my perspective, the use of identity stereotypes is just one case among many biases in our credibility judgments.

Ortmann, Stefanie, and John Heathershaw. 2012. "Conspiracy Theories in the Post-Soviet Space." *The Russian Review* 71: 551-64.

Despite the ubiquity of conspiracy theories in the former Soviet Union, there is an almost total lack of systematic research on the issue. The relative absence of writing about conspiracy theories in Russia and the former Soviet Union is noteworthy as, since the Tsarist era, conspiracy theories have found fertile ground across the Russian empire and indeed the Soviet Union, and they continue to abound during in the post-Soviet space. Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that anyone recently doing social science or humanities research on the region will have come across conspiracy theories as a form of historical analysis or artistic expression, as has recently been explored with regard to the novels of Andrei Pelevin. The phenomenon seems to operate in fictional and nonfictional accounts both on the level of popular narratives and, in the case of Russia and some regional governments, in the official discourses of state power. Some of the reasons for the rise in popularity of conspiracy theories in the post-Soviet era will be explored below. In fact, this introductory article serves a dual purpose: both to discuss the theoretical implications of analyzing conspiracy theories in the post-Soviet space and to sketch out a research agenda for what is a largely unexplored field. The latter demands that we attend to questions of what might be specific and especially significant about conspiracy theories in the post-Soviet space, and how the post-Soviet type adds to the emergence of a field of conspiracy theory studies which seeks to understand this apparently increasingly prominent feature of the post-modern world.

Osher, Christopher N. 2010. "Bike Agenda Spins Cities toward U.N. Control, Maes Warns." Denverpost.com.

O'Toole, Randal. 2012. "The Great Streetcar Conspiracy." *Policy Analysis*.

Owen, Diana. 1997. "Mixed Signals: Generation X's Attitudes toward the Political System." In After the Boom: The Politics of Generation X, eds. Stephen C. Craig and Spephen Earl Bennett. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 85-106.

Owens, Bob. 2012. "Ex “the View” Co-Host Entertains Zimmerman Case Conspiracy Theories." Bob-Owens.com. (September 11, 2013).

Pagan, Victoria E. 2008. "Toward a Model of Conpsiracy Theory for Ancient Rome." *New German Review* 35: 27-49.

Page, Benjamin I. 1996. Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Palin, Sarah. 2009. "Statement on the Current Health Care Debate." Facebook.

Parent, Joseph. 2012. "Tomorrow's Disintegration: Security and Unity in an Era of Entropy." Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute.

Parent, Joseph, and Joseph E. Uscinski. 2011. "Conspiracy Theories Are for Losers." Fareed Zakaria GPS. http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/30/conspiracy-theories-are-for-losers/.

Parent, Joseph M. 2010. "Publius's Guile and the Paranoid Style." *Public Integrity* 12: 221-39.

When foreign dangers become domestic threats, how should governments respond? This article turns to the past to better understand the present. Three rebellions in early American history—Shays's Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, and Fries's Rebellion—illustrate how similar domestic events elicited different governmental responses, depending on changes in the international environment. The ethical implications are mixed, but the policy recommendations suggest that quick executive action and slow judicial action are appropriate responses. A necessary cause of these events, both in government officials and those opposing them, is traced back to imbalances of power. The argument builds on Richard Hofstadter's *Paranoid Style in American Politics*, and elaborates the strategic logic of political paranoia.

Parent, Joseph M., and Joseph Bafumi. 2008. "Correspondence: Of Polarity and Polarization." *International Security* 33: 170-73.

Parker, Christopher S, and Matt A Barreto. 2013. Change They Can't Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America: Princeton University Press.

Parsons, Sharon , WIlliam Simmons, Frankie Shinhoster, and John Kilburn. 1999. "A Test of the Grapevine: An Empirical Examination of the Conspiracy Theories among African Americans." *Sociological Spectrum* 19: 201-22.

This research examines the prevalence of belief in conspiracy theories among African Americans in one Deep South state and identifies the factors related to these beliefs . Overall , there is a surprisingly strong belief in most conspiracy theories involving government . Over 85 % of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that African Americans are harassed by police because of their race and that the criminal justice system is not fair to Blacks . The theories with the least support involved transracial adoption , family planning , and needle - exchange programs as genocide . Through factor analysis , the 11 conspiracy theory questions were combined into conceptual scales . The theories grouped into two distinct factors - malicious intent and benign neglect , with benign theories the more prevalent of the two . Suprisingly , age , gender , and education were not significant in explaining beliefs in malicious intent or benign neglect conspiracy theories . Among the interesting differences between the two groups of theories , church attendance was not significantly related to support for malicious intent theories , whereas it was negatively related to support for benign theories . The most important variable for explaining belief in conspiracies was the perceived involvement by African Americans in government . Those who believed that Blacks could influence the political process were less likely to believe in conspiracy theories . This finding suggests that such beliefs in conspiracy theories will not be reduced until African Americans perceive that they have more of a role to play in their government .

Pennebaker, J. W. , and M. E. Ireland. 2011. "Using Literature to Understand Authors: The Case for Computerized Text Analysis." *Scientific Study of Literature* 1: 34-48.

Through computerized text analysis, the psychology of literature is on the threshold of becoming a dominant force in psychology and the social sciences. The ways people use words in their writing and in everyday life reflect people’s social and psychological states. Whereas most text analysis research has focused on the content of people’s writings, the current paper demonstrates that almost-invisible function words can be psychologically relevant as well. Through the analysis of pronouns, prepositions, and other function words used in literature, several studies demonstrate how authors’ emotional states, aging processes, theories of mind, and the nature of their romantic and collaborative relationships are revealed through their words. The function word approach provides a glimpse of the rapidly expanding methods available to psychologists interested in tracking the social and psychological worlds of authors. With the upcoming release of data sets such as Google Books, the analysis of literature will likely serve as a foundational method used in the fields of psychology, linguistics, history, and other areas of the behavioral and social sciences.

Perrin, Andrew , and Stephen Vaisey. 2008. "Parallel Public Spheres: Distance and Discourse in Letters to the Editor." *American Journal of Sociology* 114: 781-810.

This article examines letters to the editor as one of the ways citizens seek to enact a public sphere using technological mediation. Using a sample of all letters received by a metropolitan newspaper during a three‐month period (N = 1,113), the authors demonstrate that the tone and argumentative styles of letters differ with the scope of the issues the letters address. Local issues evoke more reasoned, conciliatory tones, while issues beyond the local context evoke more emotional, confrontational tones, even after controlling for individual writers' characteristics and anger as a motivation to write.

Peterson, Geoff, and J. Mark Wrighton. 1998. "Expressions of Distrust: Third-Party Voting and Cynicism in Government." *Political Behavior* 20: 17-34.

Voter distrust of the national government is an ongoing theoretical concern for scholars who study voting behavior in the United States. Previous research demonstrates that distrustful voters are less likely to vote for major party candidates than their more trusting counterparts. Using the American National Election Survey, we explore the relationship between citizen distrust and voting for three major third-party challengers (Wallace, Anderson, and Perot) and the use of trust levels as predictors of third- party voting. We find citizen trust levels are significant and strong predictors of third-party voting, independent of other common explanatory variables of vote choice. We also find trust levels are stable over time, and we find little evidence to support the argument that trust levels measure trust of incumbent political figures.

Pew. 2012. "Pluralities Say Press Is Fair to Romney, Obama: Republicans Again See Pro-Obama Bias." Pew Research: Center for the People and the Press.

Pigden, Charles. 1995. "Popper Revisited, or What Is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?" *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 25: 3-34.

Conpiracy theories are widely deemed to be superstitious. Yet history appears to be littered with conspiracies successful and otherwise. (For this reason, "cock-up" theories cannot in general replace conspiracy theories, since in many cases the cock-ups are simply failed conspiracies.) Why then is it silly to suppose that historical events are sometimes due to conspiracy? The only argument available to this author is drawn from the work of the late Sir Karl Popper, who criticizes what he calls "the conspiracy theory of society" in The Open Society and elsewhere. His critique of the conspiracy theory is indeed sound, but it is a theory no sane person maintains. Moreover, its falsehood is compatible with the prevalence of conspiracies. Nor do his arguments create any presumption against conspiracy theories of this or that. Thus the belief that it is superstitious to posit conspiracies is itself a superstition. The article concludes with some speculations as to why this superstition is so widely believed.

Pipes, Daniel. 1997. Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From. New York: Touchstone.

Plait, Phil. 2013. "Antivaccine Megachurch Linked to Texas Measles Outbreak." Slate.com. (August 26, 2013).

Poole, Keith T, and Howard Rosenthal. 2000. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting: Oxford University Press.

Popper, Sir Karl R. 1972. Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge Kegan Paul.

———. 1966. The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2: The High Tide of Profecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath. 5th ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Porter, Bruce D. 1994. War and the Rise of the State. New York: Free Press.

Posner, Daniel. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.

Posner, Eric. 2002. Law and Social Norms. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Posner, Richard A. 2013. "Instrumental and Noninstrumental Theories of Tort Law." *Indiana Law Journal* 88: 474.

Prasad, J. 1935. "The Psychology of Rumour: A Study Relating to the Great Indian Earthquake of 1934." *British Journal of Psychology* 26: 1-15.

Pronin, Emily, Justin Kruger, Kenneth Savitsky, and Lee Ross. 2001. "You Don't Know Me, but I Know You: The Illusion of Asymmetric Insight." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81: 639-56.

People, it is hypothesized, show an asymmetry in assessing their own interpersonal and intrapersonal knowledge relative to that of their peers. Six studies suggested that people perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers' knowledge of them. Several of the studies explored sources of this perceived asymmetry, especially the conviction that while observable behaviors (e.g., interpersonal revelations or idiosyncratic word completions) are more revealing of others than self, private thoughts and feelings are more revealing of self than others. Study 2 also found that college roommates believe they know themselves better than their peers know themselves. Study 6 showed that group members display a similar bias—they believe their groups know and understand relevant out-groups better than vice versa. The relevance of such illusions of asymmetric insight for interpersonal interaction and our understanding of "naive realism" is discussed.

Pryor, Joshua. 2013. "Social Change through Control: How Elites Shape Society." *Available at SSRN 2310417*.

Society continually experiences processes of social change and disruption, toppling old power structures and creating new ones. Discussions of social change initiated by elites often leads to cries of ‘conspiracy theory,’ expressing a belief that social change comes from numerous areas of society that cannot be reduced to simplified assumptions of social control. Section one will identify explicitly what is meant by social change, recognizing what changes, and does not change, in social change. Section two and three will provide a history and analysis of cultivation and Veblen’s theories of social change, emphasizing theoretical arguments, application, and critique. Section four will extrapolate a conspiratorial theory of social change, explaining how elites directly collude among themselves, project their desires through visions of preferred futures, and manifest or manipulate changes in society to benefit themselves.

Quantrone, George A., and Edward E. Jones. 1980. "The Perception of Variablility within in-Groups and out-Groups" Implications for the Law of Small Numbers." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 38: 141-52.

Hypothesized that an observer's tendency to generalize from the behavior of a specific group member to the group as a whole is proportional to the observer's perception of the group's homogeneity, at least when the observer lacks a clear preconception on the behavioral dimension witnessed. 95 undergraduates from 2 rival universities viewed target persons alleged to be students either at their own university or its rival. Each of 3 such target persons made a simple decision within a different decision scenario. After observing the decision made, each S made estimates of the percentage of people likely to make the same decision in the parent group. The results confirm the main predictions: (a) Percentage estimates tended to be consistent with the target person's decision; (b) the degree of consistency was greater for out-group than for in-group target persons; and (c) both of these effects were clearest for the decision scenario where Ss' preconceptions about the most likely decision were weakest.

Raab, Marius Hans, Nikolas Auer, Stefan A Ortlieb, and Claus-Christian Carbon. 2013. "The Sarrazin Effect: The Presence of Absurd Statements in Conspiracy Theories Makes Canonical Information Less Plausible." *Frontiers in Psychology* 4.

Reptile prime ministers and flying Nazi saucers—extreme and sometimes off-wall conclusion are typical ingredients of conspiracy theories. While individual differences are a common research topic concerning conspiracy theories, the role of extreme statements in the process of acquiring and passing on conspiratorial stories has not been regarded in an experimental design so far. We identified six morphological components of conspiracy theories empirically. On the basis of these content categories a set of narrative elements for a 9/11 story was compiled. These elements varied systematically in terms of conspiratorial allegation, i.e., they contained official statements concerning the events of 9/11, statements alleging to a conspiracy limited in time and space as well as extreme statements indicating an all-encompassing cover-up. Using the method of narrative construction, 30 people were given a set of cards with these statements and asked to construct the course of events of 9/11 they deem most plausible. When extreme statements were present in the set, the resulting stories were more conspiratorial; the number of official statements included in the narrative dropped significantly, whereas the self-assessment of the story's plausibility did not differ between conditions. This indicates that blatant statements in a pool of information foster the synthesis of conspiracy theories on an individual level. By relating these findings to one of Germany's most successful (and controversial) non-fiction books, we refer to the real-world dangers of this effect.

Raab, Marius H, Stefan Ortlieb, Nikolas Auer, Klara Guthmann, and Claus-Christian Carbon. 2013. "Thirty Shades of Truth: Conspiracy Theories as Stories of Individuation, Not of Pathological Delusion." *Frontiers in Psychology* 4.

Recent studies on conspiracy theories employ standardized questionnaires, thus neglecting their narrative qualities by reducing them to mere statements. Recipients are considered as consumers only. Two empirical studies—a conventional survey (n = 63) and a study using the method of narrative construction (n = 30)—which were recently conducted by the authors of this paper—suggest that the truth about conspiracy theories is more complex. Given a set of statements about a dramatic historic event (in our case 9/11) that includes official testimonies, allegations to a conspiracy and extremely conspiratorial statements, the majority of participants created a narrative of 9/11 they deemed plausible that might be considered a conspiracy theory. The resulting 30 idiosyncratic stories imply that no clear distinction between official story and conspiratorial narrative is possible any more when the common approach of questionnaires is abandoned. Based on these findings, we present a new theoretical and methodological approach which acknowledges conspiracy theories as a means of constructing and communicating a set of personal values. While broadening the view upon such theories, we stay compatible with other approaches that have focused on extreme theory types. In our view, accepting conspiracy theories as a common, regulative and possibly benign phenomenon, we will be better able to understand why some people cling to immunized, racist and off-wall stories—and others do not.

Raikka, Juha. 2009. "On Political Conspiracy Theories." *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 17: 185-201.

It is often pointed out that *political conspiracy theories* are of limited falsifiability. Government officials’ public statements and testimonies in a court of law that contradict a conspiracy theory can be interpreted as signs that support the theory. Almost all potentially falsifying evidence can be construed to be supporting or neutral. Official reports that contradict conspiracy theories are exactly what conspiracy theorists expect governments to produce. Although some people tend to reject conspiracy theories because of this feature, limited falsifiability is not really a problem. As many authors have argued, it is not *ad hoc* reasoning to suppose that misleading evidence will be thrown your way when one believes that there is somebody out there actively feeding that evidence to investigators and seeking to steer the investigation away from the truth of the matter.1

Räikkä, Juha. 2012. "Conspiracy Theories and Ethics." Paper presented at the Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy

Political conspiracy theorists have done a lot of good in the past; undoubtedly they will do a lot of good in the future too. However, it is important to point out that conspiracy theories may have adverse consequences too. Political conspiracy theorizing, as a public activity, may lead to harmful scapegoating and its implications may be racist and fascist rather than democratic. Conspiracy theories may undermine trust in political institutions. Certain conspiracy theories are kept artificially alive, because of their political effects; “conspiracy theorists” do not always believe in their theories, but repeat them in public because of political reasons. Conspiracy theories have close connections to populism, and when theories are accepted widely enough, they remind harmful rumors. Sometimes conspiracy theories are designed and disclosed to make political decision-making more difficult and to create an impression that certain questions are still “open”. Certain conspiracy theories are disguised libels: they place individual persons in a “false light” in the public eye. In my presentation, I aim to discuss the ethics of political conspiracy theorizing and conditions for ethically acceptable conspiracy theorizing.

Rakove, Milton L. 1979. We Don't Want Nobody Nobody Sent: An Oral History of the Daley Years. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Rasmussen. 2012. "51% Expect Most Reporters to Help Obama; 9% Predict Most Will Help Romney." Rasmussen Reports.

Rattner, Steven. 2012. "Beyond Obamacare." New York Times. (July 13, 2013).

Reeves, Thomas C. 1992. "Movie Reviews -- Jfk Directed by Oliver Stone." *The Journal of American History* 79: 1262.

Reich, Robert B. 2013. "American Bile." The New York Times. (November 12, 2013).

Remnick, David. 2013. "The Culprits." The New Yorker.

Renfro, Paula Cozort. 1979. "Bias in Selection of Letters to the Editor." *Journalism Quarterly* 56: 822-26.

A comparison of published and unpublished letters to the editor of a Texas metropolitan daily newspaper revealed that the newspaper published fewer letters in the categories of economics, media, and religion than would be expected, and more letters in the categories of education, law and order, and issues than would be expected. (GT)

Richardson, James T., and Massimo Introvigne. 2001. ""Brainwashing" Theories in European Parlimentary and Administrative Reports on "Cults" and "Sects"." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 40: 143-68.

This study examines the recent rash of official reports done by governmental agencies in Western Europe to guide policy development in those societies. Particular attention is given to reports in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, and Italy, and to the changes in such reports that have occurred, perhaps because of the influence of scholarly critiques offered for some of the earlier reports. The reports are divided into “Type I” and “Type II” reports, with the former being thorough-going in their anti-cult orientation, and the latter reports being more moderate in tone, with some attention paid to scholarship on new religions. However, the major thesis of the study is supported, as an examination of both types of reports reveals that they incorporate “brainwashing” and “mind control” imagery imported from the United States, even though such theories have been largely discounted within the United States. Use of such theories leads directly to some questionable policy recommendations, as demonstrated in the reports. Reasons for the spread of “brainwashing” ideas to Europe are discussed.

Riding, Alan. 2002. "Sept. 11 as Right-Wing U.S. Plot: Conspiracy Theory Sells in France." The New York Times. (August 4, 2013).

Ridley, Jasper. 2001. The Freemasons. New York: Arcade Publishing.

Robbins, Thomas. 2001. "Combating “Cults” and “Brainwashing” in the United States and Western Europe: A Comment on Richardson and Introvigne's Report." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 40: 169-76.

The surge of harsh anti-cultism in parts of Europe may be generally contextualized in terms of recent spectacular violence involving new movements as well as globalization, which transplants esoteric, aggressive movements to societies with antithetical values. The notion of “brainwashing” as an anti-cult rationale was pioneered by American activists but is now more influential in continental Western Europe than in the United States due in part to the greater influence of secular humanism, the greater European tendency toward activist, paternalist government, the shock of the Solar Temple killings, American deference to religious “free exercise,” and problems of national unity and cultural assimilation in Europe that enhance distrust of what are perceived as alien spiritual imports. Nevertheless, the legal climate regarding religious movements may conceivably become less favorable in the United States. In general the “brainwashing” controversy has been characterized by pervasive confusions of fact and interpretation and of process and outcome.

Robins, Robert S., and Jerrold M. Post. 1997. Political Paranoia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Robinson, Peter, and John Crewdson. 2011. "Nra Raises $200 Million as Gun Lobby Toasters Burn Logo on Bread." Bloomberg.

Rosenblitz, L., and F. Keil. 2002. "The Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: An Illusions of Explanatory Depth." *Cognitive Science* 26: 521-62.

The surge of harsh anti-cultism in parts of Europe may be generally contextualized in terms of recent spectacular violence involving new movements as well as globalization, which transplants esoteric, aggressive movements to societies with antithetical values. The notion of “brainwashing” as an anti-cult rationale was pioneered by American activists but is now more influential in continental Western Europe than in the United States due in part to the greater influence of secular humanism, the greater European tendency toward activist, paternalist government, the shock of the Solar Temple killings, American deference to religious “free exercise,” and problems of national unity and cultural assimilation in Europe that enhance distrust of what are perceived as alien spiritual imports. Nevertheless, the legal climate regarding religious movements may conceivably become less favorable in the United States. In general the “brainwashing” controversy has been characterized by pervasive confusions of fact and interpretation and of process and outcome.

Rosenthal, Andrew. 2013. "No Comment Necessary: Conspiracy Nation." The New York Times. (August 3, 2013).

Rosnow, Ralph L. 1980. "Psychology of Rumor Reconsidered." *Psychological Bulletin* 87: 578-91.

The "basic law of rumor" of G. W. Allport and L. J. Postman (1947), which asserts that rumor strength varies with thematic importance and ambiguity, is called into question. As a possible synthesizing proposition, it is instead postulated that rumor results from combinations of uncertainty and anxiety that are related to rumor strength differently as state and trait factors.

Rosnow, Ralph L., James L. Esposito, and Leo Gibney. 1988. "Factors Influencing Rumor Spreading: Replication and Extension." *Language & Communication* 8: 29-42.

Rosnow, Ralph L., John H. Yost, and James L. Esposito. 1986. "Belief in Rumor and Likelihood of Rumor Transmission." *Language & Communication* 6: 189-94.

Ross, Lee, and Andrew Ward. 1996. "Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding." In Values and Knowledge, eds. Edward S. Reed, Elliot Turiel and Terrance Brown, Jean Piaget Symposia Series. New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Ross, Michael. 2013. "Glenn Beck Alleges "Concentrated Effort Now to Label Me a Conspiracy Theorist?"." Examiner.com. (7/11/2013).

———. 2013. "Glenn Beck Claims Obama Behind Conspiracy to Depict Him as a Conspiracy Theorist." Examiner.com. (July 7, 2013).

Rothman, Stanley, and S. Robert Lichter. 1987. "Elite Ideology and Risk Perception in Nuclear Energy Policy." *The American Political Science Review* 81: 383-404.

Changing U.S. attitudes toward new technologies are examined, as are explanations of such changes. We hypothesize that increased concern with the risks of new technologies by certain elite groups is partly a surrogate for underlying ideological criticisms of U.S. society. The question of risk is examined within the framework of the debate over nuclear energy. Studies of various leadership groups are used to demonstrate the ideological component of risk assessment. Studies of scientists' and journalists' attitudes, media coverage of nuclear energy, and public perception of scientists' views suggest both that journalists' ideologies influence their coverage of nuclear energy and that media coverage of the issue is partly responsible for public misperceptions of the views of scientists. We conclude with a discussion of the historical development of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s and the relation of this movement to the public's declining support for nuclear energy.

Rothstein, Susan. 2012. "Right-Wing Conspiracy Theories Do a Number on Us." The Boston Globe. (July 15, 2013).

Rousseau, Cécile, and Uzma Jamil. 2008. "Meaning of 9/11 for Two Pakistani Communities: From External Intruders to the Internalisation of a Negative Self-Image." *Anthropology & Medicine* 15: 163-74.

Since September 11, the increase in international tensions and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have created turmoil and fears in immigrant communities, fanned by the media in the context of the war against terrorism. This paper aims to compare the meaning systems evoked around 9/11 within two Pakistani groups–an immigrant community in Montreal and a group in Karachi. It also intends to examine the representation of themselves and of the ‘Other’ within these two groups. Results suggest that both Karachi and Montreal Pakistani respondents favour a conspiracy scenario which protects the Muslim community from the responsibility of 9/11 events. They refer to an argumentation process based on ‘proofs’, thus mirroring the political rhetoric used by the US government and its allies to justify the military intervention in Iraq. In the Montreal group, the pervasive feeling of fear and the bleak image that the community has of itself support the hypothesis of an immigrant internalisation of the negative representations of Muslim and South Asian identities in the North American context. The negative self-image observed in these minority groups indicates that more effort than ever should be dedicated to understanding the impact of the present international context on minority-majority relations in multi-ethnic societies.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1987. The Basic Political Writings. Translated by Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

Rutenberg, Jim, and Jackie Calmes. 2009. "False ‘Death Panel’ Rumor Has Some Familiar Roots " The New York Times.

Sapountzis, Antonis, and Susan Condor. 2013. "Conspiracy Accounts as Intergroup Theories: Challenging Dominant Understandings of Social Power and Political Legitimacy." *Political Psychology* n/a-n/a.

Conspiracy accounting is often regarded as an atypical, pathological form of political reasoning, and little research has considered how ordinary social actors may refer to political conspiracies in the course of argument. In this article, we consider the spontaneous use of conspiracy narratives by politically engaged Greek citizens in interview discussions of the Macedonian crisis. Analysis revealed that conspiracy narratives were typically used to challenge dominant representations that attributed the Macedonian crisis to Greek xenophobic nationalism. Specifically, conspiracy accounts were used to dispute assumptions concerning Greece's majority status by representing the political opposition as a consortium rather than a single out-group, by recasting the threat posed to Greece as a matter of realistic rather than symbolic competition, and by extending the historical frame of reference to encompass past and prospective future threats to the Greek people and the Greek state. In conclusion, we note how the use of conspiratorial reasoning may be used to construct complex causal arguments concerning intergroup relations and to challenge dominant ideological assumptions about social hierarchy and political legitimacy. In this respect, conspiratorial reasoning might be regarded as a prototypical form of intergroup representation.

Sarnoff, Rachel Lincoln. 2013. "Jenny Mccarthy's Got the Wrong View on Vaccinations." Huffington Post. (September 11, 2013).

Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. 1960. The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.

Schmidle, Nicholas. 2011. "Getting Bin Laden: What Happened That Night in Abbottabad." *New Yorker*, (August 8, 2011).

Schmidt, Regin. 2000. Red Scare: Fbi and the Origins of Anticommunism in the United States, 1919-1943. Copenhagen, Denmark: Museum Tusculanum Press.

Schudson, Michael. 1995. "Three Hundred Years of the American Newpaper." In The Power of News. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sears, David O. 1983. "The Persistence of Early Political Predispositions: The Roles of Attitude Object and Life Stage." *Review of personality and social psychology* 4: 79-116.

———. 1990. "Whither Political Socialization Research? The Questions of Persistence." In Political Socialization, Citizenship Education and Democracy, ed. O. Ichilov. New York: Teachers College Press. 69-97.

Sears, David O, and S. Levy. 2003. "Childhood and Adult Political Development." In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. David O Sears, L. Huddy and R. Jervis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 60-109.

Seitz-Wald, Alex. 2013. "Sandy Hook Truther Won’t Quit " Salon.com. (July 15, 2013).

Shahid, Aliyah, and Corky Siemaszko. 2010. "President Obama Takes on Preacher Terry Jones and Controverisal Plan for Sept. 11 Koran Burn." New York Daily News. (August 5, 2013).

Shapiro, Dina. 2011. "The Risk of Disease Stigma: Threat and Support for Coercive Public Heath Policy." Paper presented at the APSA Pre-Conference on Political Communication of Risk, Seattle, WA, August 31, 2011.

Sharp, David. 2008. "Advances in Conspiracy Theory." *The Lancet* 372: 1371-72.

Sherif, Muzafer, O. J. Harvey, B. Jack White, William R. Hood, and Carolyn W. Sherif. 1961. Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange.

Shermer, Michael. 2011. The Believing Brain: From Ghosts and Gods to Politics and Conspiracies: How We Construct Belief Systems and Reinforce Them as Truths. New York: Times Books.

———. 2010. "The Conspiracy Theory Detector." *Scientific American* 303: 102-02.

———. 2012. "Philosophy: Creative Resilience." *Nature* 491: 523-23.

Shils, Edward. 1954. "Authoritarianism: "Right" and "Left"." In Studies in the Scope and Method of the Authoritarian Personality, eds. Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda. Vol. 1954. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 24-29.

Sigelman, Lee, and Barbara J. Walkosz. 1992. "Letters to the Editor as a Public Opinion Thermometer: The Martin Luther King Holiday Vote in Arizona." *Social Science Quarterly* 73: 938-46.

This article presents an analysis to explain how letters to the editor section reflect public opinion by focusing on example of Martin Luther King Holiday in Arizona along with results of statewide public opinion. Letters to the editor offer all citizens an opportunity to voice their opinions and each year millions avail themselves of this opportunity. However, those who do so are often dismissed as a fringe element, unrepresentative demographically and extreme politically, who derive exhibitionistic pleasure from blowing off steam publicly. Some researchers described people who wrote a letter to the editor during the 1972 presidential campaign and people who did not as "remarkably alike" in their political opinions. In sum, letters to the editor are widely considered an unreliable public opinion thermometer. The weight of existing evidence is clearly on the side of unreliability, but the reliability of this evidence is itself open to question, for much of it is dated and, more importantly, most of it is based on the characteristics of letter writers rather than on the content of the letters they write.

Silverstein, Paul A. 2002. "An Excess of Truth: Violence, Conspiracy Theorizing and the Algerian Civil War." *Anthropological Quarterly* 75: 643-74.

This essay examines the proliferation of practices of conspiracy theorizing among Algerian citizens and expatriates in light of the current civil war that since 1992 has resulted in 100,000 deaths and an ongoing state of emergency disrupting nascent democratic legal and political processes. Seeking to provide transparent accounts of opaque military actions, Algerian conspiracy theorizing adopts a totalizing rhetoric that eschews uncertainty and fetishizes causality and actor intentionality. The article argues that such rhetoric outlines a shared political culture for Algerians across ethnic, linguistic, and ideological divides. While constituting a vernacular sphere of transnational knowledge production and circulation (a Foucauldian "regime of truth"), this political culture of conspiracy simultaneously provides a discursive prop for military and governmental structures of power whose coherence is otherwise placed in jeopardy by the civil war violence. What is at issue in the end is the role of social practices like conspiracy theorizing in dialectical structures of hegemonic processes.

Simmel, Georg. 1964. Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations. Translated by Kurt Wolff. New York Free Press.

———. 1950. The Sociology of Georg Simmel. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff. New York: Free Press.

Simmons, William Paul, and Sharon Parsons. 2005. "Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories among African Americans: A Comparison of Elites and Masses." *Social Science Quarterly* 86: 582-98.

**Objective.** Several studies have reported a widespread belief in conspiracy theories among African Americans. Such theories have been shown to have possible deleterious effects, especially when they deal with HIV/AIDS. It has been conjectured that African-American elites could play a role in dispelling these beliefs, unless, of course, they believe in these theories themselves. To examine this possibility the present study examines the conspiratorial beliefs of African-American locally elected officials in Louisiana and compares them with a previous study of African-American churchgoers in the same state.

**Methods.** A systematic sample of 400 African-American locally elected officials was drawn from a list of all African-American elected officials in the state and 170 officials completed and returned the mail survey. Confirmatory factor analysis and OLS regression were used to analyze the attitude structure and determinants of beliefs, respectively.

**Results.** The locally elected officials believe in these theories as much as the churchgoers and the structures of their beliefs are also very similar. In some very important ways, however, the predictors of these beliefs differ between the two samples.

**Conclusions.** Our findings suggest that beliefs in conspiracy theories are widespread and that African-American locally elected officials will not seek to dispel these beliefs.

Simms, Brendan. 2013. Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy from 1453 to the Present New York: Basic Books.

Simon, Herbert. 1997. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations. New York: Free Press.

Sklar, Martin J. 1988. The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Adam. 1982. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Smith, Craig Allen. 1977. "The Hofstadter Hypothesis Revisited: The Nature of Evidence in Politically “Paranoid” Discourse." *Southern Journal of Communication* 42: 274-89.

This study explores the evidentiary character of politically “paranoid” and “non‐paranoid” discourse. The data suggest that the two types differ with regard to the types of references they make, but do not differ significantly in terms of accuracy or distortion. The results affirm the existence of an evidence‐inference dichotomy and suggest that political “paranoids” are able to construct their unique arguments without distorting evidence about their environment.

Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Philip Tetlock. 1991. Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Snyder, Jack. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: Norton.

Snyder, Jack, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon. 2009. "Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home." *World Politics* 61: 155-87.

Under unipolarity, the immediate costs and risks of war are more likely to seem manageable for a militarily dominant power like the U.S. This does not necessarily make the use of force cheap or wise, but it means that the costs and risks attendant on its use are comparatively indirect, long term, and thus highly subject to interpretation. Unipolarity, combined with the opportunity created by September 11, opened a space for interpretation that tempted a highly ideological foreign policy cohort to seize on international terrorism as an issue to transform the balance of power both in the international system and in American party politics. This cohort's response to the terrorist attack was grounded in ideological sincerity but also in the routine practice of wedge issue politics, which had been honed on domestic issues during three decades of partisan ideological polarization and then extended into foreign policy.

Solomon, Lawrence. 2010. "The Deniers, Fully Revised: The World-Renowned Scientists Who Stood up against Global Warming Hysteria, Political Persecution and Fraud." *Minneapolis: Richard Vigilante*.

Song, Hoon. 2012. "Cogito, Mimesis, and Conspiracy Theory." *Culture, Theory and Critique* 53: 1-18.

The idea of doubt seems to serve as a privileged dispositif in the contemporary social scientific imaginary. Its evidence is in the requisite denunciation of ‘Cartesianism’ as an obligatory course of social scientific argumentation; there seems to be a pressing need to recall cogito again and again as an errancy. Academic commentaries on the phenomenon of conspiracy theory seem to be already rehearsed in this ‘sacrificial’ complex in which the philosophy of doubt is caught; cogito and conspiracy theory are assigned a common scapegoat-like fate in this regime of thought. ‘In the evil of the scapegoat’, wrote Jacques Derrida, ‘the sacrificer expels what is vilest in itself’. To dwell on cogito and conspiracy theory in this climate, then, is to interrogate the rhetorical unity of social science's epistemic authority. I demonstrate the descriptive challenge this entanglement poses through an ethnographic case of conspiratorial doubt among a group of Pennsylvania (ex-)miners.

Staff. 2009. "Ten Classic Conspiracy Theories." The new Zealand Herald. (August 5, 2013).

Steger, Helmut. 2012. "The" Sokal Hoax" and a Movement Towards a Clarity of Expression in Leftist Writing." *Education and Culture* 19: 2.

This paper is an attempt to not only gain a better understanding of the "leftist" ideology in educational research by examining one its most prolific authors, but also to take a hard look at how leftist education literature has "allowed" powerful conservative (or "rightist") coalitions to set the educational agenda in the United States for the next unforeseeable years.

Stein, Arthur A. 1976. "Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20 143-72.

The paper reviews the theoretical formulations and the empirical tests of the proposition that external conflict increases internal cohesion. Literature from sociology, anthropology, psychology, and political science is discussed. Though it is often assumed to be true and is easily illustrated, the empirical studies suggest that there are a number of intervening variables and that the hypothesis is not uniformly true. While hardly adequate, these empirical studies provide a subtler specification of the hypothesis, knowledge of which can lead researchers to structure their studies differently. Examples of this are provided and other areas of application are also discussed.

Stempel, Carl, Thomas Hargrove, and Guido H. Stempel. 2007. "Media Use, Social Structure, and Belief in 9/11 Conspiracy Theories." *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 84: 353-72.

A survey of 1,010 randomly selected adults asked about media use and belief in three conspiracy theories about the attacks of September 11, 2001. “Paranoid style” and “cultural sociology” theories are outlined, and empirical support is found for both. Patterns vary somewhat by conspiracy theory, but members of less powerful groups (racial minorities, lower social class, women, younger ages) are more likely to believe at least one of the conspiracies, as are those with low levels of media involvement and consumers of less legitimate media (blogs and grocery store tabloids). Consumers of legitimate media (daily newspapers and network TV news) are less likely to believe at least one of the conspiracies, although these relationships are not significant after controlling for social structural variables. Beliefs in all three conspiracies are aligned with mainstream political party divisions, evidence that conspiracy thinking is now a normal part of mainstream political conflict in the United States.

Stieger, Stefan, Nora Gumhalter, Ulrich S Tran, Martin Voracek, and Viren Swami. 2013. "Girl in the Cellar: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Investigation of Belief in Conspiracy Theories About the Kidnapping of Natascha Kampusch." *Frontiers in Psychology* 4.

The present study utilized a repeated cross-sectional survey design to examine belief in conspiracy theories about the abduction of Natascha Kampusch. At two time points (October 2009 and October 2011), participants drawn from independent cross-sections of the Austrian population (Time Point 1, N = 281; Time Point 2, N = 277) completed a novel measure of belief in conspiracy theories concerning the abduction of Kampusch, as well as measures of general conspiracist ideation, self-esteem, paranormal and superstitious beliefs, cognitive ability, and media exposure to the Kampusch case. Results indicated that although belief in the Kampusch conspiracy theory declined between testing periods, the effect size of the difference was small. In addition, belief in the Kampusch conspiracy theory was significantly predicted by general conspiracist ideation at both time points. The need to conduct further longitudinal tests of conspiracist ideation is emphasized in conclusion.

Strombeck, Andrew. "None Dare Call It Masculinity: The Subject of Post-Kennedy Conspiracy Theory." University of California, Davis, 2003.

Sullivan, Daniel, Mark J. Landau, and Zachary K. Rothschild. 2010. "An Existential Function of Enemyship: Evidence That People Attribute Influence to Personal and Political Enemies to Compensate for Threats to Control." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 98: 434-49.

Perceiving oneself as having powerful enemies, although superficially disagreeable, may serve an important psychological function. On the basis of E. Becker’s (1969) existential theorizing, the authors argue that people attribute exaggerated influence to enemies as a means of compensating for perceptions of reduced control over their environment. In Study 1, individuals dispositionally low in perceived control responded to a reminder of external hazards by attributing more influence to a personal enemy. In Study 2, a situational threat to control over external hazard strengthened participants’ belief in the conspiratorial power of a political enemy. Examining moderators and outcomes of this process, Study 3 showed that participants were especially likely to attribute influence over life events to an enemy when the broader social system appeared disordered, and Study 4 showed that perceiving an ambiguously powerful enemy under conditions of control threat decreased perceptions of external risk and bolstered feelings of personal control.

Sullivan, John L., James Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1979. "An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases 1950s-1970s." *The American Political Science Review* 73: 781-94.

This article proposes an alternative conceptualization of political tolerance, a new measurement strategy consistent with that conceptualization, and some new findings based upon this measurement strategy. Briefly put, we argue that tolerance presumes a political objection to a group or to an idea, and if such an objection does not arise, neither does the problem of tolerance. Working from this understanding, we argue that previous efforts to measure tolerance have failed because they have asked respondents about groups preselected by the investigators. Those groups selected as points of reference in measuring tolerance have generally been of a leftist persuasion. Our measurement strategy allowed respondents themselves to select a political group to which they were strongly opposed. They were then asked a series of questions testing the extent to which they were prepared to extend procedural claims to these self-selected targets. Using this approach, we found little change between the 1950s and the 1970s in levels of tolerance in the United States, a result that contradicts much recent research on the problem.

———. 1982. Political Tolerance and American Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sunstein, Cass, and Adrian Vermeule. 2008. "Conspiracy Theories." *Social Science Research Network*.

Sunstein, Cass R, and Adrian Vermeule. 2009. "Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures\*." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 17: 202-27.

Swami, Viren. 2012. "Social Psychological Origins of Conspiracy Theories: The Case of the Jewish Conspiracy Theory in Malaysia." *Frontiers in Psychology* 3.

Two studies examined correlates of belief in a Jewish conspiracy theory among Malays in Malaysia, a culture in which state-directed conspiracism as a means of dealing with perceived external and internal threats is widespread. In Study 1, 368 participants from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, completed a novel measure of belief in a Jewish conspiracy theory, along with measures of general conspiracist ideation, and anomie. Initial analysis showed that the novel scale factorially reduced to a single dimension. Further analysis showed that belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory was only significantly associated with general conspiracist ideation, but the strength of the association was weak. In Study 2, 314 participants completed the measure of belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory, along with measures of general conspiracist ideation, and ideological attitudes. Results showed that belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory was associated with anti-Israeli attitudes, modern racism directed at the Chinese, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. General conspiracist ideation did not emerge as a significant predictor once other variables had been accounted for. These results suggest that there may be specific cultural and social psychological forces that drive belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory within the Malaysian context. Specifically, belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory among Malaysian Malays appears to serve ideological needs and as a mask for anti-Chinese sentiment, which may in turn reaffirm their perceived ability to shape socio-political processes.

Swami, Viren, Rebecca Coles, Stefan Stieger, Jakob Pietschnig, Adrian Furnham, Sherry Rehim, and Martin Voracek. 2011. "Conspiracist Ideation in Britain and Austria: Evidence of a Monological Belief System and Associations between Individual Psychological Differences and Real-World and Fictitious Conspiracy Theories." *British Journal of Psychology* 102: 443-63.

Despite evidence of widespread belief in conspiracy theories, there remains a dearth of research on the individual difference correlates of conspiracist ideation. In two studies, we sought to overcome this limitation by examining correlations between conspiracist ideation and a range of individual psychological factors. In Study 1, 817 Britons indicated their agreement with conspiracist ideation concerning the July 7, 2005 (7/7), London bombings, and completed a battery of individual difference scales. Results showed that stronger belief in 7/7 conspiracy theories was predicted by stronger belief in other real-world conspiracy theories, greater exposure to conspiracist ideation, higher political cynicism, greater support for democratic principles, more negative attitudes to authority, lower self-esteem, and lower Agreeableness. In Study 2, 281 Austrians indicated their agreement with an entirely fictitious conspiracy theory and completed a battery of individual difference measures not examined in Study 1. Results showed that belief in the entirely fictitious conspiracy theory was significantly associated with stronger belief in other real-world conspiracy theories, stronger paranormal beliefs, and lower crystallized intelligence. These results are discussed in terms of the potential of identifying individual difference constellations among conspiracy theorists.

Swami, Viren, Jakob Pietschnig, Ulrich S. Tran, Ingo W. Nader, Stefan Stieger, and Martin Voracek. 2013. "Lunar Lies: The Impact of Informational Framing and Individual Differences in Shaping Conspiracist Beliefs About the Moon Landings." *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 27: 71-80.

Two studies examined the role of informational framing and individual differences on acceptance of the moon landings conspiracy theory (CT). In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups in which they were exposed to different forms of information about the moon landings CT. Results showed that information critical of the moon landings CT resulted in attenuated conspiracist beliefs and that information supportive of the CT resulted in stronger conspiracist beliefs. In addition, stronger belief in the moon landings CT was associated with participants' belief in other CTs and openness to experience. In Study 2, participants completed a survey measuring their belief in the moon landings CT and a range of individual difference factors. Results showed that acceptance of the moon landings CT was associated with the adoption of a conspiracist worldview and schizotypal tendencies. Possibilities for conceptualizing the functional roles played by CTs are discussed.

Swift, Graham. 2012. "The Mind Is a Storyteller." *The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human* 87.

Swindler, Ann. 1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." *American Sociological Review* 51: 273-86.

Culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented, but by shaping a repertoire or "tool kit" of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct "strategies of action." Two models of cultural influence are developed, for settled and unsettled cultural periods. In settled periods, culture independently influences action, but only by providing resources from which people can construct diverse lines of action. In unsettled cultural periods, explicit ideologies directly govern action, but structural opportunities for action determine which among competing ideologies survive in the long run. This alternative view of culture offers new opportunities for systematic, differentiated arguments about culture's causal role in shaping action.

Taber, Charles S., and Milton Lodge. 2006. "Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 755-69.

We propose a model of motivated skepticism that helps explain when and why citizens are biased-information processors. Two experimental studies explore how citizens evaluate arguments about affirmative action and gun control, finding strong evidence of a prior attitude effect such that attitudinally congruent arguments are evaluated as stronger than attitudinally incongruent arguments. When reading pro and con arguments, participants (Ps) counterargue the contrary arguments and uncritically accept supporting arguments, evidence of a disconfirmation bias. We also find a confirmation bias—the seeking out of confirmatory evidence—when Ps are free to self-select the source of the arguments they read. Both the confirmation and disconfirmation biases lead to attitude polarization—the strengthening of t2 over t1 attitudes—especially among those with the strongest priors and highest levels of political sophistication. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of these findings for rational behavior in a democracy.

Tackett, Timothy. 2000. "Conspiracy Obsession in a Time of Revolution: French Elites and the Origins of the Terror, 1789-1792." *American Historical Review* 105: 691-713.

Tajfel, Henri. 1981. Human Groups and Social Categories. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Taleb, Nassim. 2008. Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets. 2nd Updated ed. New York: Random House.

Tavernise, Sabrina. 2010. "Us Is a Top Villain in Pakistan's Conspiracy Talk." *New York Times* 25.

Taylor, Michael. 2014. "British Conservatism, the Illuminati, and the Conspiracy Theory of the French Revolution, 1797–1802." *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 47: 293-312.

The reception and acceptance by British conservatives of the conspiracy theory of the French Revolution, as propounded by the Abbé Augustin de Barruel and Professor John Robison, has often been underplayed. This article seeks to correct that historiographical oversight by demonstrating the remarkable and unremarked extent to which the conspiracy theory of the Illuminati and the philosophes took root in the 1790s, then to explain that popularity, and finally to examine how acceptance of the conspiracy theory encouraged the development of an intellectual exceptionalism which had significant consequences for British attitudes towards continental philosophy, particularly that of Immanuel Kant.

Tesler, Michael, and David O. Sears. 2010. Obama's Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America, Chicago Studies in American Politics. Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press.

Tetlock, Philip. 2006. Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Thaler, Richard. 1994. Quasi-Rational Economics. New York: Russell Sage.

Thomas, Kenn. 1994. "Clinton Era Conspiracies! Was Gennifer Flowers on the Grassy Knoll? Probably Not, but Here Are Some Other Bizarre Theories for a New Political Age." The Washington Post, January 16, 1994.

Thomas, S. B., and S. C. Quinn. 1991. "The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 1932 to 1972: Implications for Hiv Education and Aids Risk Education Programs in the Black Community." *American Journal of Public Health* 81: 1498-505.

The Tuskegee study of untreated syphilis in the Negro male is the longest nontherapeutic experiment on human beings in medical history. The strategies used to recruit and retain participants were quite similar to those being advocated for HIV/AIDS prevention programs today. Almost 60 years after the study began, there remains a trail of distrust and suspicion that hampers HIV education efforts in Black communities. The AIDS epidemic has exposed the Tuskegee study as a historical marker for the legitimate discontent of Blacks with the public health system. The belief that AIDS is a form of genocide is rooted in a social context in which Black Americans, faced with persistent inequality, believe in conspiracy theories about Whites against Blacks. These theories range from the belief that the government promotes drug abuse in Black communities to the belief that HIV is a manmade weapon of racial warfare. An open and honest discussion of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study can facilitate the process of rebuilding trust between the Black community and public health authorities. This dialogue can contribute to the development of HIV education programs that are scientifically sound, culturally sensitive, and ethnically acceptable.

Thomson, Robert, Naoya Ito, Hinako Suda, Fangyu Lin, Yafei Liu, Ryo Hayasaka, Ryuzo Isochi, and Zian Wang. 2012. "Trusting Tweets: The Fukushima Disaster and Information Source Credibility on Twitter." Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management

This paper focuses on the micro-blogging service Twitter, looking at source credibility for information shared in relation to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster in Japan. We look at the sources, credibility, and between-language differences in information shared in the month following the disaster. Messages were categorized by user, location, language, type, and credibility of information source. Tweets with reference to third-party information made up the bulk of messages sent, and it was also found that a majority of those sources were highly credible, including established institutions, traditional media outlets, and highly credible individuals. In general, profile anonymity proved to be correlated with a higher propensity to share information from low credibility sources. However, Japanese-language tweeters, while more likely to have anonymous profiles, referenced low-credibility sources less often than non-Japanese tweeters, suggesting proximity to the disaster mediating the degree of credibility of shared content.

Thornhill, Ted. 2012. "James Holmes Case: The Conspiracy Theories Surrounding the Aurora Shooting " The Huffington Post United Kingdom. (August 10, 2013).

Thorson, Emily. 2012. "Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effects of Misinformation and Corrections." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 12-15.

The omnipresence of political misinformation in the today's media environment raises serious concerns about citizens' ability make fully informed decisions. In response to these concerns, the last few years have seen a renewed commitment to journalistic and institutional fact-checking. The assumption of these efforts is that successfully correcting misinformation will prevent it from affecting citizens' attitudes. However, through a series of experiments, I find that exposure to a piece of negative political information persists in shaping attitudes even after the information has been successfully discredited. A correction—even when it is fully believed—does not eliminate the effects of misinformation on attitudes. These lingering attitudinal effects, which I call "belief echoes," are created even when the misinformation is corrected immediately, arguably the gold standard of journalistic fact-checking. ^ Belief echoes can be affective or cognitive. Affective belief echoes are created through a largely unconscious process in which a piece of negative information has a stronger impact on evaluations than does its correction. Cognitive belief echoes, on the other hand, are created through a conscious cognitive process during which a person recognizes that a particular negative claim about a candidate is false, but reasons that its presence increases the likelihood of other negative information being true. Experimental results suggest that while affective belief echoes are created across party lines, cognitive belief echoes are more likely when a piece of misinformation reinforces a person's pre-existing political views. ^ The existence of belief echoes provide an enormous incentive for politicians to strategically spread false information with the goal of shaping public opinion on key issues. However, results from two more experiments show that politicians also suffer consequences for making false claims, an encouraging finding that has the potential to constrain the behavior of politicians presented with the opportunity to strategically create belief echoes. While the existence of belief echoes may also provide a disincentive for the media to engage in serious fact-checking, evidence also suggests that such efforts can also have positive consequences by increasing citizens' trust in media.

Toppo, Greg. 2012. "Common Core Standards Drive Wedge in Education Circles." *USA Today*.

Trachtenberg, Marc. 1999. A Constructed Peace: The Making of European Settlement, 1945-1963 Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tracy, James. 2013. "An Open Letter to the South Florida Sun-Sentinel." memoryholeblog.com.

Travers, Eva F. 1983. "The Role of School in Political Socialization Reconsidered: Evidence from 1970 and 1979." *Youth and Society* 14: 475-500.

In 1970, ability tracking of students at one high school was more strongly associated with political beliefs and participation than was students' socioeconomic background. Participation in an alternative school program in 1979 appeared to have the same effects on political attitudes and behavior than ability tracking did in 1970.

Trifonova, Temenuga. 2012. "Agency in the Cinematic Conspiracy Thriller." *SubStance* 41: 109-26.

Trudeau, G. B. 1994. In Search of Cigarette Holder Man. Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel.

Tumasjan, Andranik, Timm O. Sprenger, Philipp G. Sandner, and Isabell M. Welpe. 2010. "Predicting Elections with Twitter: What 140 Characters Reveal About Political Sentiment." Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Fourth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence.

Twitter is a microblogging website where users read and write millions of short messages on a variety of topics every day. This study uses the context of the German federal election to investigate whether Twitter is used as a forum for political deliberation and whether online messages on Twitter validly mirror offline political sentiment. Using LIWC text analysis software, we conducted a content analysis of over 100,000 messages containing a reference to either a political party or a politician. Our results show that Twitter is indeed used extensively for political deliberation. We find that the mere number of messages mentioning a party reflects the election result. Moreover, joint mentions of two parties are in line with real world political ties and coalitions. An analysis of the tweets’ political sentiment demonstrates close correspondence to the parties' and politicians’ political positions indicating that the content of Twitter messages plausibly reflects the offline political landscape. We discuss the use of microblogging message content as a valid indicator of political sentiment and derive suggestions for further research.

Turner, John C. 1987. Rediscovering the Social Groups: Self-Categorization Theory. Oxford: Blackwell.

Updike, John. 1979. Problems and Other Stories. New York: Knopf.

Uscinski, Joseph E. 2014. The People's News: Media, Politics, and the Demands of Capitalism. New York: New York University Press.

Uscinski, Joseph E. 2013. "Why Are Conspiracy Theories Popular? There’s More to It Than Paranoia." EUROPP: European Politics and Policy. (June 26, 2013).

Uscinski, Joseph E., and Ryden W. Butler. 2013. "The Epistemology of Fact-Checking." *Critical Review* 25.

Fact checking has become a prominent facet of political news coverage, but it employs a variety of objectionable methodological practices, such as treating a statement containing multiple facts as if it were a single fact and categorizing as accurate or inaccurate predictions of events yet to occur. These practices share the tacit presupposition that there cannot be genuine political debate about facts, because facts are unambiguous and not subject to interpretation. Therefore, when the black-and-white facts—as they appear to the fact checkers—conflict with the claims produced by politicians, the fact checkers are able to see only (to one degree or another) “lies.” The examples of dubious fact-checking practices that we discuss show the untenability of the naïve political epistemology at work in the fact-checking branch of journalism. They may also call into question the same epistemology in journalism at large, and in politics.

Uscinski, Joseph E., Joseph Parent, and Bethany Torres. 2011. "Conspiracy Theories Are for Losers." *SSRN eLibrary*.

What drives conspiracy theorizing in the United States? Conspiracy theories can undermine the legitimacy and efficacy of government policy, and sometimes lead to violence. Unfortunately prior studies on the topic have been anecdotal and impressionistic. For purchase on this problem, we attempt the first systematic data collection of conspiracy theories at the mass and elite levels by examining published letters to the editor of the New York Times from 1897 to 2010 and a validating sample from the Chicago Tribune. We argue that perceived power asymmetries, indicated by international and domestic conflicts, influence when and why conspiracy theories resonate in the U.S. On this reasoning, conspiracy theories conform to a strategic logic that helps vulnerable groups manage threats. Further, we find that both sides of the domestic partisan divide partake in conspiracy theorizing equally, though in an alternating pattern, and foreign conspiracy theories crowd out domestic conspiracy theories during heightened foreign threat.

Uscinski, Joseph E, and Joseph M. Parent. 2014. American Conspiracy Theories. New York: Oxford University Press.

van der Linden, Sander. 2013. "What a Hoax." *Scientific American Mind* 24: 40-43.

van Deth, Jan W., Simone Abendschön, and Meike Vollmar. 2011. "Children and Politics: An Empirical Reassessment of Early Political Socialization." *Political Psychology* 32: 147-74.

Demands for the inclusion of children, the youngest citizens, in democratic decision making are increasing. Although there is an abundance of empirical research on the political orientations of adolescents, there is a paucity of research on younger children's orientations. Our panel study of more than 700 children in their first year of primary school shows that these young children already exhibit consistent, structured political orientations. We examine the distribution and development of political knowledge, issue orientations, and notions of good citizenship. We find achievement differences between subgroups at the beginning of the school year, and these differences do not disappear. Children from ethnic minorities and lower socioeconomic residence areas show relatively less developed political orientations, and they do not improve as much over the school year as other children. Furthermore, normative political orientations and cognitive orientations differ in their development.

van Prooijen, Jan-Willem. 2012. "Suspicions of Injustice: The Sense-Making Function of Belief in Conspiracy Theories." In Justice and Conflicts: Springer. 121-32.

In contemporary society, people are frequently faced with threats to the social order (e.g., terrorist attacks). These threats often give rise to belief in conspiracy theories, which assume such events to be injustices that were secretly and deliberately planned by legitimate authorities or institutions. In the present chapter I propose that conspiracy beliefs are functional for basic sense-making desires when faced with events that threaten the social order. Recent findings indicate that contextual and personal factors that are likely to elicit sense-making activities (e.g., lacking control, feelings of uncertainty, high need for structure) increase the association between the perceived morality of institutions and conspiracy beliefs. Furthermore, additional findings reveal that an underlying mechanism why sense-making activities may lead to conspiracy beliefs is that people tend to attribute big causes to big events. To illuminate practical implications I connect these insights to knowledge on procedural justice, and reason that adhering to procedural justice principles may help to decrease conspiracy beliefs.

van Prooijen, Jan-Willem, and Nils B. Jostmann. 2013. "Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Influence of Uncertainty and Perceived Morality." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 43: 109-15.

In the present research, we examined people's tendency to endorse or question belief in conspiracy theories. In two studies, we tested the hypothesis that the perceived morality of authorities influences conspiracy beliefs, particularly when people experience uncertainty. Study 1 revealed that information about the morality of oil companies influenced beliefs that these companies were involved in planning the war in Iraq, but only when uncertainty was made salient. Similar findings were obtained in Study 2, which focused on a bogus newspaper article about a fatal car accident of a political leader in an African country. It is concluded that uncertainty leads people to make inferences about the plausibility or implausibility of conspiracy theories by attending to morality information.

Verba, Sidney, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon S. Black. 1967. "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam." *American Political Science Review* 61: 317-33.

Vohs, K. D., R. F. Baumeister, and J. Chin. 2007. "Feeling Duped: Emotional, Motivational, and Cognitive Aspects of Being Exploited by Others." *Review of General Psychology* 11.

Feeling duped is an aversive emotional response to the perception of having been taken advantage of in a interpersonal transaction (primarily those involving economic exchange), partly as a result of one's own decisions. The actual likelihood of being duped, as well as the heightened vigilance for it, should increase as a function of opportunity (e.g., information asymmetry that gives one side a big advantage in knowledge) and motivation (e.g., an exceptionally huge payoff may make it worth defrauding a long-term business partner). Being duped produces an aversive self-conscious emotion with a threat of self-blame. There appears to be stable individual differences in the motivation (called sugrophobia) to avoid being a sucker. High sugrophobes will be vigilant and skeptical of potential deals. Low sugrophobes may not even realize in some instances that they were duped. The aversive reaction to feeling duped stimulates counterfactual ruminations that may intensify sugrophobia but also aids in extracting useful lessons.

Volgy, Thomas J., Margaret Krigbaum, Mary Kay Langan, and Vicky Mosher. 1977. "Some of My Best Friends Are Letter Writers: Eccentrics and Gladiators Revisited." *Social Science Quarterly* 58: 321-27.

This article tests the degree to which letter writers are similar to the electorate, and to more specialized publics. The data indicate significant differences between letter writers and registered voters in terms of their attitudes and orientation toward foreign policy. Although differences in social background between the two groups did tend to correspond to differences and similarities noted by Buell's 1975 study, even on this dimension, significant differences were noted on sex and length of residence. The study also illustrated critical differences between letter writers and registered voters involving attitudes toward foreign policy, media preferences, and interest and concern toward issues. The findings indicate the possibility that within specific policy domains, letter writers may differ fundamentally from the mainstream of citizens. Significant differences between letter writers and the more articulate and active segment within the community was also found. Letter writers also differ from the more active and concerned elements in the community when it comes to articulating foreign policy positions. While on the basis of this type of evidence it would be both unkind and unwarranted to claim that letter writers are cranks or extremists, at least in the foreign policy domain, their approach to issues does provide a significantly different dimension of inputs to the policy arena. Given this unique nature of their message, it may become more important to investigate the potential influence that letter writers may exercise on voters and politicians alike.

Volkan, Vamik. 1988. The Need to Have Enemies and Allies. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.

Volkov, Vadim. 2002. Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Vollers, Maryanne. 2006. Lone Wolf: Eric Rudolph: Murder, Myth, and the Pursuit of an American Outlaw: HarperCollins.

Wagner-Egger, Pascal, Adrian Bangerter, Ingrid Gilles, Eva Green, David Rigaud, Franciska Krings, Christian Staerklé, and Alain Clémence. 2011. "Lay Perceptions of Collectives at the Outbreak of the H1n1 Epidemic: Heroes, Villains and Victims." *Public Understanding of Science* 20: 461-76.

Lay perceptions of collectives (e.g., groups, organizations, countries) implicated in the 2009 H1N1 outbreak were studied. Collectives serve symbolic functions to help laypersons make sense of the uncertainty involved in a disease outbreak. We argue that lay representations are dramatized, featuring characters like heroes, villains and victims. In interviews conducted soon after the outbreak, 47 Swiss respondents discussed the risk posed by H1N1, its origins and effects, and protective measures. Countries were the most frequent collectives mentioned. Poor, underdeveloped countries were depicted as victims, albeit ambivalently, as they were viewed as partly responsible for their own plight. Experts (physicians, researchers) and political and health authorities were depicted as heroes. Two villains emerged: the media (viewed as fear mongering or as a puppet serving powerful interests) and private corporations (e.g., the pharmaceutical industry). Laypersons' framing of disease threat diverges substantially from official perspectives.

Wahl-Jorgenson, Karin. 2004. "A 'Legitimate Beef' or 'Raw Meat'? Civility, Multiculturalism, and Letters to the Editor." *Communication Review* 7: 89-105.

This article looks at the news production practices surrounding letters to the editor as a case study in the difficulties of creating a civil public debate in multicultural societies. It examines how letters editors make decisions about publishing uncivil letters—letters that are sexist, racist, homophobic, or generally intolerant. If letters contribute to the public debate, editors are reluctant to reject them, even if they challenge norms of propriety. Editors reject only letters that fall into one of two categories: (1) personal attack letters that might result in libel suits and (2) letters that are openly racist, sexist, or homophobic and do not in any way contribute to the public debate. They justify their decisions in common sense theories sympathetic to deliberative democracy. Editors thus see a policy of limited editorial intervention as the only way to ensure an open and honest debate about the varied issues that face the citizens of a multicultural society.

Walker, Jesse. 2013. The United States of Paranoia: A Conspiracy Theory. USA: Harper.

Wallis, Joe. 1997. "Conspiracy and the Policy Process: A Case Study of the New Zealand Experiment." *Journal of Public Policy* 17: 1-29.

This paper advances the concept of a policy conspiracy – perpetrators strive together to steer the policy process in a direction which they believe to be worthwhile and possible. A policy conspiracy is conceived as an exclusive social network of policy participants who commit themselves to the advancement of a policy quest which embodies their shared hopes and who promote one another to positions of influence on the basis of the mutual trust they develop through regular interaction. The degree to which the network of technocrats, technopols and change agents who played a pivotal role in the implementation and consolidation of the ‘New Zealand experiment’ between 1984 and 1993 exhibit these characteristics is considered. By examining the way this policy conspiracy took advantage of a significant window of opportunity for reform, this paper seeks to make a contribution to the literature concerned with the conditions for radical policy reform.

Walt, Stephen M. 1990. The Origin of Alliances: Cornell University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Relations. New York: McGraw Hill.

Warner, Benjamin R., and Ryan Neville-Shepard. 2014. "Echoes of a Conspiracy: Birthers, Truthers, and the Cultivation of Extremism." *Communication Quarterly* 62: 1-17.

A significant number of Americans express sympathies for conspiracy theories about Barack Obama's birth and George Bush's role in the 9/11 attacks. This study sought to test the role of ideological media in perpetuating these beliefs. Specifically, experiments were conducted to determine if ideologically homogeneous media echo-chambers could cultivate belief in conspiracy theories and whether debunking information would reverse this belief. Results found that media echo-chambers increased belief in conspiracy theories though debunking information reversed or minimized this effect. Results confirm the role of ideological media in spreading extremist attitudes but also demonstrate the value of debunking efforts.

Waters, Anita M. 1997. "Conspiracy Theories as Ethnosociologies: Explanations and Intention in African American Political Culture " *Journal of Black Studies* 28: 112-25.

Watts, Mark D., David Domke, Dhavan V. Shah, and David P. Fan. 1999. "Elite Cues and Media Bias in Presidential Campaigns: Explaining Public Perceptions of a Liberal Press." *Communication Research* 26: 144-75.

Public perception of a biased news media, particularly media biased in a liberal direction, has increased over the past 3 presidential elections. To examine what might be influencing this public opinion, the authors look at shifts in public perception of media bias, press coverage of the topic of media bias, and the balance in valence coverage of presidential candidates—all during the 1988, 1992, and 1996 presidential elections. Their results suggest that the rise in public perception that news media are liberally biased is not the result of bias in valence news coverage of the candidates, but, rather, due to increasing news self-coverage that focuses on the general topic of bias in news content. Furthermore, the increased claims of media bias come primarily from conservative elites who have proclaimed a liberal bias that is viewed as including the entire media industry.

Webster, Stephen. 2013. "Glenn Beck Sees Media Conspiracy to Label Him a ‘Conspiracy Theorist’." The Raw Story. (July 15, 2013).

Wedel, Janine. 2009. Shadow Elite: How the World's New Power Brokers Undermine Democracy, Government, and the Free Market. New York Basic Books.

Weinberg, Bill. 2014. "9/11 at Nine: The Conspiracy Industry and the Lure of Fascism." *ADCS*.

Weiner, Rachel. 2009. "After "Death Panel" Claim, Palin Now Calls for Civility." Huffington Post.

Whitson, Jennifer A., and Adam D. Galinsky. 2008. "Lacking Control Increases Illusory Pattern Perception." *Science* 322: 115-17.

We present six experiments that tested whether lacking control increases illusory pattern perception, which we define as the identification of a coherent and meaningful interrelationship among a set of random or unrelated stimuli. Participants who lacked control were more likely to perceive a variety of illusory patterns, including seeing images in noise, forming illusory correlations in stock market information, perceiving conspiracies, and developing superstitions. Additionally, we demonstrated that increased pattern perception has a motivational basis by measuring the need for structure directly and showing that the causal link between lack of control and illusory pattern perception is reduced by affirming the self. Although these many disparate forms of pattern perception are typically discussed as separate phenomena, the current results suggest that there is a common motive underlying them.

Whittemore, Andrew. 2013. "Finding Sustainability in Conservative Contexts: Topics for Conversation between American Conservative Élites, Planners and the Conservative Base." *Urban Studies*.

Sustainability’s reception is dependent upon its presentation. While academics may be reaching the consensus that pursuing sustainability requires at least a triple-bottom-line approach, in practice, planners, legislators and other leaders often choose an approach that best suits their needs. In north central Texas, this has in recent years meant an approach with a focus on fiscal matters. Whatever the pro-market flavour of sustainability practice in north central Texas, elements of the conservative base have resented its pursuit. Because planners and legislators in north central Texas have muddled their concept of sustainability with jargon, conflated it with other causes and failed clearly to justify its pursuit, elements of the conservative base have interpreted sustainability as an externally motivated, threatening agenda. This paper presents eight points for planners and other leaders to consider when framing sustainability in conservative contexts for the purpose of finding for positive dialogue and outcomes.

Whitty, Christopher JM, Monty Jones, Alan Tollervey, and Tim Wheeler. 2013. "Biotechnology: Africa and Asia Need a Rational Debate on Gm Crops." *Nature* 497: 31-33.

Wilson, R. A. 2004. Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Witt, Matthew T. 2013. "Conspiracy Theory Reconsidered Responding to Mass Suspicions of Political Criminality in High Office." *Administration & Society* 45: 267-95.

This article criticizes recent proposals for covert government operations against conspiracy-theory groups and networks. The article argues that fear of secret plots by political insiders is intrinsic to America’s civic culture, legal traditions, and political institutions. The appropriate government response to conspiracy theories is not to try to silence mass suspicions but instead to establish procedures for ensuring that suspicious events are thoroughly and credibly investigated. As it stands, investigations of assassinations, defense failures, election breakdowns, and other political events with grave implications for America and the world fail to meet basic standards for transparency, independence, and objectivity.

Wolf, Naomi. 2011. "The Shocking Truth About the Crackdown on Occupy. ." TheGuardian.com. (August 15, 2013).

Wood, C, and WML Finlay. 2008. "British National Party Representations of Muslims in the Month after the London Bombings: Homogeneity, Threat, and the Conspiracy Tradition." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 47: 707-26.

This study presents an analysis of articles written by prominent members of the British National Party. Each of these articles discussed Muslims and Islam in the aftermath of the 7 July 2005 London bombings. Two prominent discursive themes are discussed here. The first concerned the writers' constructions of the threat that Muslims and Islam pose to Britain. Central to this theme were constructions of Muslims as ‘fascists’, anti-white racists, and all potentially dangerous, although there was variability in this. Using the Koran as evidence, the articles present a vision of a faith which intends to take over the country; in this way, a homogenous, culturally essentialist version of Muslims is worked up. The second theme illustrates how the writers challenge those who believe that creating a British multicultural society is possible, and in doing so construct liberals and multiculturalists as also posing a threat to the country. The ways in which this represents a variety of conspiracy theory, and the implications of these constructions for social action, are discussed.

Wood, Gordon S. 1982. "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century." *William and Mary Quarterly* 39: 402-41.

———. 1998. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Wood, Michael James, and Karen M. Douglas. 2013. "“What About Building 7?” a Social Psychological Study of Online Discussion of 9/11 Conspiracy Theories." *Frontiers in Psychology* 4.

Recent research into the psychology of conspiracy belief has highlighted the importance of belief systems in the acceptance or rejection of conspiracy theories. We examined a large sample of conspiracist (pro-conspiracy-theory) and conventionalist (anti-conspiracy-theory) comments on news websites in order to investigate the relative importance of promoting alternative explanations vs. rejecting conventional explanations for events. In accordance with our hypotheses, we found that conspiracist commenters were more likely to argue against the opposing interpretation and less likely to argue in favor of their own interpretation, while the opposite was true of conventionalist commenters. However, conspiracist comments were more likely to explicitly put forward an account than conventionalist comments were. In addition, conspiracists were more likely to express mistrust and made more positive and fewer negative references to other conspiracy theories. The data also indicate that conspiracists were largely unwilling to apply the “conspiracy theory” label to their own beliefs and objected when others did so, lending support to the long-held suggestion that conspiracy belief carries a social stigma. Finally, conventionalist arguments tended to have a more hostile tone. These tendencies in persuasive communication can be understood as a reflection of an underlying conspiracist worldview in which the details of individual conspiracy theories are less important than a generalized rejection of official explanations.

Wood, Michael J., Karen M. Douglas, and Robbie M. Sutton. 2012. "Dead and Alive: Beliefs in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories." *Social Psychological and Personality Science*.

Conspiracy theories can form a monological belief system: A self-sustaining worldview comprised of a network of mutually supportive beliefs. The present research shows that even mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively correlated in endorsement. In Study 1 (n = 137), the more participants believed that Princess Diana faked her own death, the more they believed that she was murdered. In Study 2 (n = 102), the more participants believed that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when U.S. special forces raided his compound in Pakistan, the more they believed he is still alive. Hierarchical regression models showed that mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively associated because both are associated with the view that the authorities are engaged in a cover-up (Study 2). The monological nature of conspiracy belief appears to be driven not by conspiracy theories directly supporting one another but by broader beliefs supporting conspiracy theories in general.

Woods, Jeff. 2004. Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism in the South, 1948- 1968. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.

Wulff, Erich. 1988. "Paranoic Conspiracy Delusion " In Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, eds. C. F. Graumann and S. Moscovici. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Young, T. J. 1990. "Cult Violence and the Identity Movement." *Cultic Studies Journal* 7: 150-59.

Although most cults are apparently nonviolent, some of the theopolitical cults associated with the Identity Movement have proven to be quite violent. These cults combine conspiracy theories, White supremacy, and religious survivalism into a theology of hatemongering and violence. By seeing others as evil and impure, Identity cult members engage in self-idealization. The cult leader also acts as a transitional object and helps members express their hostility.

Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Zaller, John, and Stanley Feldman. 1992. "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions Versus Revealing Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science* 36: 579-616.

Opinion research is beset by two major types of "artifactual" variance: huge amounts of overtime response instability and the common tendency for seemingly trivial changes in questionnaire form to affect the expression of attitudes. We propose a simple model that converts this anomalous "error variance" into sources of substantive insight into the nature of public opinion. The model abandons the conventional but implausible notion that most people possess opinions at the level of specificity of typical survey items--and instead assumes that most people are internally conflicted over most political issues--and that most respond to survey questions on the basis of whatever ideas are at the top of their heads at the moment of answering. Numerous empirical regularities are shown to be consistent with these assumptions.

Zonis, Marvin, and Craig Joseph. 1994. "Conspiracy Thinking in the Middle East." *Political Psychology* 15: 443-59.

Conspiracy thinking is defined as a pattern of explanatory reasoning about events and situations of personal, social, and historical significance in which a "conspiracy" is the dominant or operative actor. While conspiracy thinking exists to some extent probably in every society, the authors note the special prevalence of this type of thinking in the Arab-Iranian-Muslim Middle East, and offer a psychoanalytically based approach to conspiracy thinking based on theories of the paranoid process. The authors also attempt to identify aspects of Arab-Iranian-Muslim culture that may predispose individuals from that culture to conspiracy thinking, especially child-rearing practices, attitudes toward sexuality, and the role of secrecy.